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1 Introduction: real-time medical imaging and the 
mediation of illness 
 
 
 
 
(…) two masked men in surgical outfits look at the screen of a portable scanner. The senior doctor 
explains and demonstrates rapidly to his apprentice, the probe searching around the right side under the 
ribs and over the stomach, in sweeping motions. The intern listens raptly, nodding repeatedly. The 
screen is turned so that the patient can also see it. (….) 
I emerged from surgery with the liver of an unknown five days ago. My attention now shifts to the two 
men as they speak, I follow their conversation and wait expectantly for words directed to me. It is a 
crucial moment: if the veins and arteries have not taken to their new place, my whole adventure comes 
to a halt. The graft, from their point of view, represents hardly anything more than a successful fixture. I 
am short of breath as I pick up the doctor's overheard telegraphic comments: Good portal circulation, no 
inflammation.... Abruptly he smiles to me and says: 'Tout va bien!' I am now my prostrate body that 
feels broken up, in bits and pieces, aching from a visible incision that goes from right to left in an 
arching path, and suddenly bifurcates over the chest right to my sternum, almost immobile from the 
multiple intubations and perfusions. His reassuring statement oddly makes me feel my liver as a small 
sphere, as if I am carrying an infant (I remember the pictures of my last son's beating heart in his 
mother's belly); it is tinged with a light pain, it is definitely present. 
In the background, the brokenness of my body beckons me with an infinite fatigue, and a primordial 
desire to close my eyes and rest for eternity. Yet the screen is a few centimeters away and a 
simultaneous curiosity perks up unflinchingly. I can see my new liver, inside me. I follow the details: 
the anastomoses of the cava and the porta veins, the two large hepatic arteries, the II then the III lobule 
squished one into the other. I travel within, gliding inside and out of the liver capsule, like an animation. 
I listen with unabashed interest to the explanations to the intern (….). 
We are looking at the scene from the side, you and I. And yet for me alone is echoed in multiple mirrors 
of shifting centres each of which I call 'I', each one a subject which feels and suffers, which expects a 
word, which is redoubled in a scanner's image, a concrete fragment that seems to partake with me of a 
mixture of intimacy and foreignness. 
(Varela 2001: 259-60) 
In a phenomenological account of his own liver transplantation with the telling title Intimate 
distances from which I quote here, neuroscientist and philosopher Francisco Varela describes 
an ultrasound examination performed five days after the surgery. Shifting from third person to 
first person to second person perspective, Varela pictures the experience. He describes the 
doctors moving the ultrasound transducer over the patient’s abdomen, looking at the monitor 
and talking about what they see. He portrays himself – the patient – anxiously listening to 
their comments, sensing his body, watching strange yet familiar moving pictures on a 
monitor. He also depicts the author and the reader observing the scene.  
CHAPTER 1 
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This book is about experiences like the one so probingly described in this quote. It presents an 
analysis of how real-time medical imaging affects experiences of illness. The medical 
imaging technologies presented in this book share a particular quality that evokes that issue: 
they provide people with the fascinating possibility to look into one’s own living body. The 
images of parts of patients’ interior bodies produced by means of such visualization devices 
appear on a monitor before the eyes of both doctors and patients in real-time, immediately 
upon their acquisition. In this book I show how the particular ways of producing medical 
knowledge in clinical practices of real-time medical imaging bring along particular modes of 
embodiment and illness.  
In today’s medicine images are omnipresent. Before the introduction of X-rays in 
clinical medicine in 1896, the interior living human body was largely invisible. Anatomical 
images depicted inner bodies modeled after corpses. Medical imaging technologies like X-
ray, CT, MRI, ultrasound and endoscopy provide visual access to the interior of a living 
human body without cutting the skin. These technologies produce different types of visual 
representations of the inner human body that can inform professional readers about the 
medical condition of that body. Although some expect that the possibilities of genetic 
diagnostics will cause the visualization of the living interior body to become less urgent in the 
future (cf. Houwaart and Kruisinga 2001: 251), at present the quantity of pictures made and 
the amount of money spent on medical imaging is growing rapidly (Van Engelshoven 2002). 
Ultrasound, fluoroscopy and endoscopy are the imaging technologies that feature in 
this book. The three means of medical visualization all produce real-time moving images, yet 
they are substantially different as well. Ultrasound and fluoroscopy are radiological 
techniques used to produce dynamic streaming images of interior body structures and 
functions by means of sound waves and X-rays respectively. Their main objectives are 
diagnostic, although they can also be used to guide therapeutic interventions. Endoscopy 
amounts to surgical navigation by means of a video camera in a tube inserted in a bodily 
cavity.  
 To find out how real-time imaging transforms medical knowledge and embodied 
experience of illness, I went to a Dutch hospital and over a period of six months I spent most 
of my working days in the Radiology and Endoscopy departments. As a medical 
anthropologist, I had been trained in empirical observations of cultures of medicine, health 
and illness (cf. Radstake 2000). In the hospital I did what anthropologists do: fieldwork, 
participant observation, ethnography. However, this book is not the ethnography that 
anthropologists usually write. I have called it an endography which is a rather unusual term, 
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occasionally used in medical settings to describe the technique of endoscopic ultrasound. I 
call this book an endography for three reasons. First, my fieldwork took place in my own 
habitat. Such ‘anthropology at home’ has been described as endo-ethnography (Van Ginkel 
1998).
 1
 The second reason is the more significant one. Besides entering hospital departments, 
examination rooms and doctors’ and patients’ lives, I entered patients’ bodies. Not only did I 
observe patients looking at their own interior, but I also watched the moving pictures of their 
insides, in real-time during an examination. A final reason why it seems appropriate to call 
this book an endography is the role of ethnographic material. My empirical observations and 
descriptions are starting points and benchmarks for an empirical-philosophical analysis of 
techno-visual mediations of embodied illness experience. Rather than interpretations of an 
outside reality, this book presents constructions of interiority. 
 
 
Into the field  
 
For a period of six months I spent several days a week in the Radiology and Endoscopy 
departments of a Dutch academic hospital. I watched doctors, nurses, assistants and 
technicians do their jobs and talked to them. I observed over forty real-time imaging events 
and interviewed patients afterwards. I copied preliminary and final reports and collected 
stored images. After they got the results, I called patients on the phone. Sometimes I joint 
them for follow-up with their physicians. I drew maps of the technical set-up of various 
examinations and read manuals and protocols. The hospital’s medical-ethical committee 
allowed me to talk to patients after they had given their consent on the basis of written 
information about my project. I could only approach patients upon check-in at the reception 
desk in the radiology or endoscopy department. In-patients were therefore excluded from my 
study. I also excluded patients who checked in for an examination that did not meet my 
criteria, i.e. being an ultrasound, fluoroscopic or endoscopic examination of the abdomen 
resulting in pictures that could be watched by the patient. Furthermore, some of the patients 
checking in were so sick, so uneasy, or so upset that I did not approach them. Of the people I 
approached, one in four did not want to participate. Yet a considerable number of people 
accepted my presence during a sometimes unpleasant and embarrassing examination.  
                                                 
1 The classical Greek prefix ‘endo-’ means ‘inside’ or ‘interior’.  
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Ultrasound, fluoroscopy and endoscopy are used for the inspection of various body parts. 
Ultrasound is best known for its obstetric use, but it is also used to visualize the  
abdomen, kidneys, heart, testicles or leg arteries.
2
 Stomachs, intestines, uteri and bladders, but 
also knee joints can be inspected endoscopically. Fluoroscopy is used to visualize the 
movement of contrast fluids in arteries, ovaries, bowels and urinary tracts. From the wide 
range of examinations I made a selection based on two criteria related to my research 
question. First, I only included examinations during which patients were physically able to 
watch the monitor during the examination. They were conscious or only lightly sedated; they 
were positioned in such a way that the monitor was in visual reach at least during part of the 
examination; and they were not too ill to watch. Secondly, I wanted to observe visualizations 
of the most ‘bodily’ of body parts in order to take the materialities of embodiment seriously. 
Whereas in contemporary western culture and medicine the heart represents life and the brain 
accommodates the mind, the organs of the abdomen denote little more than their physical 
functions and location.
3
 Body parts are treated differentially (Young 1989: 45), also by 
anthropologists, sociologists and philosophers writing about bodies and embodiment. I have 
taken the opportunity to descend into the depths of the ‘absent body’ (Leder 1990), a concept 
that I will discuss in the next chapter. 
 
  
Performative endography 
 
The methods of ethnography – and of endography in its wake – fit both the empirical and the 
theoretical setting of my project. I lacked essential conditions, skills and perceptions for true 
participant observation of real-time imaging practices from either a physician’s or a patient’s 
point of view. Yet being there, combining verbal with non-verbal interactions and with 
observations of behavior, allowed me to move beyond people’s interpretations of reality, into 
their ways of doing. That made it possible “to reconstruct the world not through a grid of 
                                                 
2 The ethical and political implications of the use of ultrasound in pregnancy have been amply and aptly analysed 
by various scholars from different disciplines (Duden 1993a, Mitchell 2001, Mueller-Rockstroh 2007, Petchesky 
1987, Price 1996, Rapp 1997, Stabile 1998, Taylor 1998). I leave it out for two other reasons as well. First, 
obstetric ultrasound involves the depiction of at least two bodies, that of the mother and that of the fetus, with the 
latter in visual focus. My focus is on the impact of watching pictures of unknown part of one’s own body. 
Secondly, I am interested in mediations of illness. Most pregnancies luckily do not fall into that category, 
although critics of the ongoing medicalization of conception, pregnancy and birth have argued that it is 
increasingly made to do so (e.g. Barker 1998, Smeenk and Ten Have 2003). 
3 In other cultural contexts different modes of ordering may be found. Cashinahua people in Peru, for example, 
locate emotional knowledge in the liver and social knowledge in the ears and do not consider the brain as a 
central locus in any way different from the rest of the body (cf. Jackson 1996: 34).  
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attributed meanings, but through a series of interventions carried out – which allows (me, 
MR) to talk about realities that are transformed” (Mol 1998: 145). In the next chapter I will 
introduce actor-network theory as one of my main sources for theoretical inspiration. Its 
method has been heavily influenced by the ethno-methodological idea that in order to 
understand what actors do and why and how they do it, you have to learn from the actors 
themselves. Anthropologists advocating performative (or dialogical) ethnography have argued 
that the only way to do this is by acknowledging that you yourself are an actor in whatever it 
is you study (e.g. Fabian 1991, Pool 1994). Although I do not explicitly address this issue 
throughout this book, I have entered the field in the awareness that “the Other is never simply 
given, never just found or encountered, but made” (Fabian 1991: 208). Rather than learning 
from the actors in the field of real-time medical imaging, I have been learning with them. My 
presence transformed the practices I observed. Some patients sought my eyes during an 
examination, looking for assurance or support. Although some liked to have me around, 
others were embarrassed. Several doctors and assistants reported to adjust their behavior when 
I was around, especially by giving more explanations to the patient or by explicitly addressing 
me. The real-time imaging practices that I studied included my own performance as a 
researcher. 
 
 
Transparency and alienation  
 
Real-time imaging technologies provide both physicians and patients with a seemingly direct, 
unmediated view inside a living body. Even more than other medical technologies, real-time 
imaging contributes to the popular utopic discourse of a transparent body that is readily 
accessible, controllable and manipulable (cf. Van Dijck 2005). When three-dimensional (3D) 
ultrasound entered clinical practices in the 1990s there was “a kind of manic exhilaration over 
the epistemic earnings potential of this virtual reality tour of the body (….) the images are so 
“life-like” that they seduce the viewer into thinking that the representation of the object is 
isomorphic with the object itself; the images seems to be just like what would be seen with 
our own eyes, but even better (….)” (Barad 1998: 118). 3D ultrasound images are not 
discussed in this book. Endoscopic images, however, have similar life-like qualities and the 
real-time visual accessibility of 2D ultrasound and fluoroscopic images gives them a 
comparable seductive power and evoke the image of a transparent body. Paradoxically, 
medical professionals generally consider real-time images to be relatively unreliable, 
CHAPTER 1 
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‘subjective’ representations of bodily realities, because they can only be interpreted by the 
ones who produce them. To conclude that the idea of a transparent body merely reflects 
patients’ unrealistic expectations, as I heard several physicians do, is, however, premature. 
Throughout the book I will argue that a ‘transparent body’ is actively being evoked as well as 
challenged in real-time imaging practices. 
  A more dystopic discourse on medical technology is the trope of disembodiment or 
alienation found in phenomenological literature and in social-scientific work inspired by 
phenomenology (see Akrich and Pasveer 2004, Duden 1993b, Good 1994, Ihde 2002, Leder 
1990, Stacey 1998, Toombs 1992, Young 1997). It is the idea that medical objectivations and 
technological representations move away human bodies from embodied selves and thus 
enforce the alienating effect of being ill. Put briefly, medical images show everything but 
one’s own body. This way of thinking can also be found in biomedicine itself. In his inaugural 
speech at the University of Groningen in 2002, Dutch radiology professor Matthijs Oudkerk 
stated that since Vesalius and Harvey medicine has reduced human bodies to images, 
ultimately culminating in the rise of radiology. Radiology has enforced the alienation of the 
body, Oudkerk claimed (Oudkerk 2002). It has also been claimed, however, that an increase 
of technology in medical practice results in ‘more talk’, that is more attention for the patient 
as person (Mol 2001). Radiology can only be described as a technology that alienates patients 
from their bodies if one presupposes that representations of a body essentially differ from 
‘lived bodies’. In this book I doubt this essential difference. Not only are “vision, visuality 
and visibility (...) as central to the subjective dimensions of embodied existence as they are to 
its objective dimensions” (Sobchack 2004: 2): subjective and objective dimensions shape each 
other in visualization practices. A disembodiment or alienation discourse opposes so-called 
objective medical and technological representations of the human body to subjective 
embodied experience. I will argue that real-time imaging challenges this opposition: bodies 
cannot self-evidently be distinguished from their images.  
 
 
Techno-visual mediations of embodied illness experience 
 
In this book I examine co-productions of images and illness (cf. Pasveer 1994), elaborating 
the proposition that far from simply depicting given bodies, medical images mediate bodily 
realities. What I mean by that is that the reference of images to the medical condition of 
human bodies is the result of particular historical, institutional, professional and cultural 
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practices in which imaging technologies have developed and are being used. People’s 
relations with reality can be described in different philosophical terms. In epistemological 
terms, people relate to the world as an object of knowledge. Phenomenologists describe the 
experience of ‘being-in-the-world’.
4
 The distinction between knowledge and experience is 
reflected in the social-scientific difference between disease as the object of professional 
medical knowledge and illness as a socio-cultural and personal experience, which I will 
discuss in chapter 2.  
While describing the subsequent stages of preparation, image production, and 
interpretation, I analyze how knowledge and experience, disease and illness are transformed 
and co-constructed in practices of real-time medical imaging. When radiologists or other 
imaging professionals ‘read’ medical images, they do not decode implicit meanings, as 
historians of medical imaging have assumed (cf. Holtzmann-Kevles 1997). Rather, they create 
material and discursive links between images and bodies. For patients, being sick or healthy is 
part of their embodied ‘being-in-the-world’. Medical images mediate patients’ experience of 
their own bodies. Real-time imaging is a particularly convenient practice to study relations 
between medical knowledge and embodied experiences of illness and health. The moving 
pictures shown on a monitor during a real-time imaging event refer to a body that is both the 
object of medical examination as well as the object and the subject of a patient’s sensory 
perception and agency. Because of its characteristic simultaneous mediation of professional 
knowledge production and of patients’ embodied experience, real-time medical imaging begs 
for any subject-object distinction to be bypassed. My focus is therefore on how patient bodies 
are done in practice (cf. Mol and Law 2004: 45). Rather than asking what images mean, I ask 
what real-time imaging does to illness and embodiment.  
Understanding how real-time medical imaging affects experiences of illness calls for a 
concept of illness that is more sophisticated than the notion that has been developed and used 
in medical anthropology and sociology. Throughout this book I develop a concept of illness 
that makes it possible to describe and understand its multiple layers and their interrelations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 A phenomenological term to describe human existence. The phenomenological frame and vocabulary will be 
further explored in chapter 2. 
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Outlining patients and pictures 
 
Francisco Varela’s moving account of an experience of real-time imaging is situated in a 
place where the leading question for this book originates and where most of my fieldwork 
started: in the examination room during a real-time imaging event. Readers who are eager to 
share the initial fascination and puzzlement I felt, should start reading chapter 4 before 
looking at other chapters. However, although starting in medias res would be in line with the 
method of actor-network theory that has strongly directed my work, I have decided that both 
the accessibility of the field and the understandability of my theoretical argument benefit from 
a more chronological set-up. The chapters address subsequent stages in the trajectories of 
patients going through real-time imaging and in the trajectories of the images that are 
produced.  
Chapter 2 contains short field fragments describing how people became patients in the 
first place. However, it mainly explores the conceptual frames of the anthropology and 
sociology of health and medicine, (post-)phenomenology and actor-network theory to collect 
building blocks for my analysis of illness as a technologically mediated, layered experience in 
the subsequent chapters.  
The second stage of an imaging trajectory, described in chapter 3, consists of the 
preparations of imaging devices, physicians, forms and protocols and by patients themselves, 
transforming patients into bodies that are ready for real-time imaging. Chapter 3 is engrafted 
onto actor-network theory and presents the individual and joint preparations of human and 
non-human actors for real-time imaging as a process of collective embodiment. Patients’ 
bodies and medical conditions result from such preparations, rather than precede them. This 
applies to bodies as (material) objects of examination and visualization as well as to their 
agency and identity. Objectivation and subjectivation are tied together from the beginning. 
Actor-network theory can be used to describe both, but will this be sufficient to understand 
the production of experience?  
In chapter 4 that presents the actual imaging event, I argue that more is needed to 
address the realm of actual experience in the case of real-time imaging. An analysis of how 
medical data and bodily sensations emerge as potential referents of real-time images during 
their actual production further blurs the boundaries between knowledge and experience. 
During a real-time imaging event, the patient’s body is – simultaneously and temporarily – 
present on the examination table and on the monitor, as a visual and tactile object and as a 
spectator. Material, discursive, agential and emotional attachments of bodies and images 
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produce an embodied mode of presence that conditions further translations of real-time 
imaging events. 
Such further translations of a body’s real-time presence during a real-time imaging 
event are described in chapter 5. In this chapter we follow images rather than bodies. It 
describes two interconnected follow-up trajectories: how imaging events contribute to 
medical knowledge production and how they are translated into narratives, body images and 
other expressions of embodied experience. Immediately after a real-time imaging event there 
are images, perceptions, interpretations and experiences, yet there is no diagnosis yet, nor do 
patients have a coherent narrative about the relation between the images and their own body.  
The last stage in my analysis describes how professional and patients’ translations of bodily 
presences result in embodied experiences of health and illness. Health or illness are neither 
the outcome of processes of signification, nor inherent qualities of bodies. Illness is a matter 
of practice. Real-time imaging mediates health and illness as embodied experiences by 
affecting various ways in which bodies are made to appear. I conclude the book with some 
reflections on the theoretical, practical and political relevance and implications of my 
analysis.
 10 
  11 
2 Patients in practice: exploring ways to talk 
about bodies  
 
 
 
 
While observing examinations in a radiology and in an endoscopy department to study how 
real-time imaging affects the bodies of patients, I saw many different bodies: male, female, 
young, old, sick, aching, silent, hungry or active bodies, bodies on the examination table and 
bodies on the monitor. Those were the bodies of people, embodied human beings with 
divergent histories and conditions, who all ended up on an examination table, looking at a 
monitor that showed pictures of their interior. In this book I describe how patients travel from 
their home via a general practitioner or another physician to an examination room in the 
radiology or endoscopy department and back. Along the way patients’ bodies get linked to 
real-time, moving images of parts of their body. When being processed by physicians, 
patients, and technological devices, pictures become clinical representations of a patient’s 
medical condition as well as objects of his or her own reflections. Practices of real-time 
imaging are extraordinary, for they grant patients a visual experience of their own interior 
body. In medical settings, where real-time imaging events usually take place, health or illness 
are the issues at stake: as objects of visualization and diagnosis as well as experiences of 
living bodies. I present an analysis of the bodily transformations that the travels of bodies and 
images entail and ‘ways to talk about bodies’
5
: a method and vocabulary to describe the 
production of embodied experiences of health and illness related to such transformations.  
The set-up of the current chapter reflects the heuristics of my empirical-philosophical 
project.
6
 I carried out fieldwork in radiology and endoscopy departments to find out which 
exactly were the questions I wanted to address. I turned to four bodies of philosophical and 
social-scientific work for directions on how to tackle the issue of real-time medical imaging 
and illness experience. The four core sections of the current chapter each introduce concepts 
and ideas from a particular theoretical vocabulary: interpretative medical anthropology and 
sociology of health and illness, phenomenology, actor-network theory and a synthesis of the 
latter two that has been labeled post-phenomenology (Verbeek 2005). These four frames are 
central because their respective focus is on the central elements that constitute my question: 
                                                 
5 Cf. Latour 2004. 
6 Cognate to empirical philosophy as practiced and described by Annemarie Mol (Mol 2002). 
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illness in medical anthropology, embodied experience in phenomenology, technological 
mediation in actor-network theory and a confrontation between the latter two in post-
phenomenology. 
 Case stories have more or less arbitrarily been assigned to each section. They 
illustrate the first step in the transformation of bodies into images: how people become 
patients. An in-depth analysis of this phase - which includes falling ill, looking for causes and 
solutions, seeing a doctor and being referred for further examination - falls outside the scope 
of this book. The case stories in this chapter indicate what patients have experienced and done 
before they ended up on an examination table for an endoscopic, fluoroscopic or ultrasound 
examination. Each of the four theoretical frameworks or vocabularies addresses and evokes 
different questions and different ways to analyze a case story. The juxtaposition of empirical 
cases and conceptual explorations in this chapter reflects my constant going back and forth 
between field notes and literature. The eventual results of that interaction will be presented 
throughout the book.  
 Anthropology, actor-network theory and (post-)phenomenology involve different 
questions, different epistemologies and different ontologies. Combining such diverging 
frames is not self-evident. Relating them to the specific practice of real-time medical imaging 
evokes both a theoretically challenging confrontation as well as a new understanding of a 
fascinating practice. While exploring promising concepts and vocabularies in this chapter, I 
collect building blocks for a framework particularly suited to describe and understand how 
experiences of health and illness come about in clinical practices of real-time medical 
imaging. I develop that framework in the book. In the present chapter I work the soil and sow 
the seeds. 
 
 
Interpreting illness: notions from anthropology and sociology 
 
68-year-old Mr. Bergmans
7
 has regularly suffered from abdominal pain over the past years. 
We talk after a fluoroscopic examination of his colon in the radiology department.
8
  
 
 
                                                 
7 All names of patients are pseudonyms. 
8 The case stories in this chapter are based on various sources: patients’ medical files, my observations of 
interactions among doctors and between doctors and patients during and after examinations, and my 
conversations with patients after an examination. I do not consider them as documents – factual accounts of what 
has actually happened – but rather as performative instruments, (re-)constructing the course of events. 
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MR Now what was this examination for? You had abdominal pains? 
MB Abdominal pains, right, I had abdominal pains. I recently had that. It surely has been 
more than three years that I have eaten yogurt with cereal for lunch. And then one 
day, I did not do that, I ate a sandwich for lunch, and then I did not have a bellyache. 
And I thought: now that is strange. Then I stopped the yogurt. And then I did not have 
the stomach-ache anymore, it was gone. Only pain here, in the groin. Well... But what 
it was? I cannot imagine that it was because of yogurt. But my bellyache was gone. 
MR The doctor had no clue? 
MB No, I had been to my general practitioner already, for the bellyache. That was about a 
month ago. Then I came here, early January. And I had to wait until today, January 
30
th
. 
MR But you did not have symptoms anymore? 
MB No, no symptoms. I did not have pain anymore. 
 (…) 
MR That stomach-ache, how long did you have that? 
MB About two months. 
MR And did you have any idea what it could be? 
MB No. 
MR Did you think it were your bowels? 
MB I immediately thought of cancer, that is what I thought of at first. 
MR Why? Why did you think of that? 
MB You hear it from many people: examinations, and that after a month it turns out to be 
cancer. I was somewhat afraid of that. 
MR Did the family doctor tell you anything, about what he thought it might be? 
MB No, he had no idea. He pushed on my belly everywhere. That is all he can do, isn’t it? 
He cannot see it. 
MR Since he does not have all those machines? 
MB Right. So he referred me right away. I do not often visit the GP, so he knows that if I 
come, it must be serious. 
MR You were really worried. 
MB Yes, I was. 
MR And when the pain was gone, were you less worried? 
MB A bit. But I am not at ease about it. 
MR And you hope to find out more with this examination? 
MB Yes, I do. 
 
In the above fragment Mr. Bergmans describes the onset of his recent illness, what he thinks 
possibly caused it and how he went about looking for a diagnosis and treatment for his  
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problem. Medical anthropologists
9
 have called such a set of notions about a particular episode 
of sickness an explanatory model (Kleinman 1980: 104 ff.). Mr. Bergmans presents his 
explanatory model as an illness narrative: a story about falling and being ill and looking for 
treatment. His story reveals particular features of the context in which this explanatory model 
is employed: cancer is a well-known and dreaded disease and medical imaging technologies 
seem to be valued over a physical examination to locate the cause of illness inside the body. 
According to Mr. Bergmans, medical images can show a doctor what cannot be felt or 
otherwise known. Had it not been for my interest in medical imaging, Mr. Bergmans might 
not have explicitly mentioned it in his account. When I asked him about the examination he 
told me about symptoms, worries and expectations: he expressed his illness experience. The 
examination was one among other ingredients of that experience.  
The fluoroscopic examination contributed to the translation of Mr. Bergmans’ illness 
into a disease. To readers whose native language is not English and to those unfamiliar with 
medical anthropology, the distinction between illness and disease may not be obvious.
10
 It is a 
central distinction in interpretative medical anthropology (e.g. Eisenberg 1977; Kleinman 
1980, 1988; Helman 2001). Where illness is used to denote a person’s psychosocial and 
cultural experience, perception and interpretation of being ill, disease refers to physical or 
mental abnormalities in the structure and function of a body. Disease is a condition one has. 
Whereas illness is something human - only humans are capable of social, lived experience, 
recognition of symptoms and seeking treatment - disease is a technical failure or biological 
abnormality that can also be diagnosed in plants or animals (Lupton 2003: 93-4). In other 
words, illness is what a patient feels when going to the doctor, whereas disease is what the 
doctor diagnoses (Helman 2001: 83). 
Medical anthropologists do not study disease as a physical condition – as doctors do –, 
but as the object of biomedical diagnosis and treatment. They characterize medical 
professional ways of dealing with disease by its scientific rationality, its emphasis on 
objective, numerical measurements as well as on physicochemical data, its mind-body 
dualism, its view of diseases as entities, its reductionism, and its emphasis on the individual 
                                                 
9‘Medical anthropologists’ refers to cultural anthropologists with a particular interest in health, illness and 
medicine as socio-cultural phenomena in their own or in other societies. Although the interpretative approach 
has become mainstream in contemporary medical anthropology, the field also includes scholars who work from 
a different perspective. Broadly speaking, two major approaches can be identified in medical anthropology. The 
first builds on techniques and findings from medical science (e.g. genetics, epidemiology, nutrition) and attempts 
primarily to describe and explain relations between biological changes and social and cultural factors in a 
particular society. At the other end of the spectrum is the interpretative ethnographic approach that I relate to 
here. 
10 In Dutch, the word ‘ziekte’ would be used for both terms. 
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patient body (Helman 2001: 79). Anthropologists study the explanatory models of medical 
professionals about disease as well as the lay explanatory models, which are about illness. 
Illness denotes one’s own and others’ interpretations and actions evoked by being unwell. 
Illness is not “a subjective phenomenon – something that a single person ‘has’- but an 
interpersonal medium shared by, engaged in and also mediating between persons in a local 
world” (Kleinman and Kleinman 1998: 213). Anthropologists look at the context of lay 
explanations as well as medical professional explanatory models (Helman 2001: 86).
11
  
Anthropologists usually study illness experience by interpreting its expressions (cf. 
Kleinman 1988; Good 1994: 135 ff.; Hydén 1997; Mattingly & Garro 2000). Experience can 
be expressed in words but also in behavior or images. Interpretative anthropologists take the 
relation between experience and expression to be dialogic and dialectical: they structure each 
other (Bruner 1986: 5-6). Expressions are not merely representations of experience, but they 
disclose experience (Csordas 1999: 146). In their observations of and conversations with 
people, most anthropologists primarily collect, evoke and co-produce stories that articulate 
events and discuss and construct meanings. In studying illness narratives, the experience of 
illness and embodiment can be studied as “a social and cultural construct, as a transformation 
and expression of bodily suffering, and most of all as the suffering person’s attempt to 
construct his or her world, to find his or her own life-work and life-context”(Hydén 1997: 65).  
Disease and illness, expressed narratively and discursively, are embedded in the 
physical materiality of human bodies. An exemplary medical anthropological 
conceptualization of embodiment has been developed by cultural anthropologists Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes and Margaret Lock. Their ‘mindful body’ includes the individual body, or 
the lived experience of the body-self; the social body, which is symbolically used to represent 
nature, society and culture; and the body-politic – controlled, regulated and surveyed by 
political institutions (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1998 (1987)). Such a concept of embodiment 
fits rather well with the concerns of ‘critical medical anthropology’, in which the body is 
understood “both as a product of biology and of social and cultural processes; simultaneously 
totally biological and totally cultural” (Guarnaccia in Lupton 2003: 16). The ways in which 
people understand their bodies, and the ways in which they understand their society, are 
interconnected and mutually shaping (cf. Isenberg and Owen in Young 1989: 44). 
                                                 
11 Arthur and Joan Kleinman have warned against the risk of culturalization that comes with such a contextual 
focus. Anthropologists should be aware that their professional discourse can be just as dehumanizing as medical 
or psychological counterparts, since a description of illness experience in terms of culture transforms it as much 
as (medical) descriptions in terms of nature do (Kleinman and Kleinman 1998: 199-200). What medical 
anthropologists need to do is find out what is at stake for various participants in particular practices (Kleinman 
and Kleinman: 213).  
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Interpretative medical anthropology shares many questions, concepts and themes with 
contemporary sociology of health and illness. Despite their different disciplinary 
backgrounds, the two sub-disciplines have developed a common social-constructivist 
approach. Social constructivism also covers large parts of history, cultural studies and 
feminist research on health, illness and medicine. Inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, 
social constructivist concepts of the body are largely framed in terms of its discursive 
constitution and discipline and its role in framing human subjectivity (Lupton 2003: 12-13). 
In a social-constructivist framework, knowledge production implies the construction of reality 
through practices, and it brings along particular subjectivities. The truth claims of 
biomedicine as well as the reality of illness and other embodied experiences emerge from 
social and cultural practices of knowledge production and interpretation.  
The story of Mr. Bergmans shows how the transformation of a patient’s body into an 
object of medical visualization brings along a transformation of the embodied subject as well. 
Mr. Bergmans no longer relies on his own physical sensations to know whether or not he is 
healthy, but needs a physician to virtually open up his body and look inside. Medical 
anthropologists have hardly explicitly addressed the main issue in this book: how people’s 
relations with (medical) technologies shape embodied experience. Anthropologist’s Cecil 
Helman statement about technological mediations of people’s images of the insides of their 
bodies is an exception: 
 
To most people the inner structure of the body is a matter of mystery and speculation. Without the 
benefit of anatomical dissections, charts of the skeletal or organ structures or X-ray photographs, beliefs 
about how the body is constructed are usually based on inherited folklore, books and magazines, 
personal experience and theorizing. The importance of this ‘inside-the-body’ image is that it influences 
people’s perception and presentation of bodily complaints. It also influences their responses to medical 
treatment. (Helman 2001: 16) 
 
The use of medical technologies has been described as part of the ‘disease perspective’ that 
reduces illness experience to a biomedical condition, yet also as altering “our sense of the 
human body” (Helman 2001: 65). My question about techno-visual mediations of illness 
emanates from the hypothesis that patients’ illness experiences are mediated by biomedical 
constructions of their bodies as (possible) accommodations of disease. Medical anthropology 
and the sociology of health and illness offer a rich vocabulary to describe both professional 
and lay understandings and practices of health, illness and health care. However, their 
analyses maintain an essential distinction between disease as the object of medical 
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knowledge, and illness as the object of lay experience. I argue that such a distinction is at 
odds with a study of illness as a mode of embodiment, for it implies a distinction between the 
patient as person (being ill) and as body (having a disease), that cannot empirically be 
substantiated in a context of technological mediation. In the next section I turn to 
phenomenology to address this problem and look for a vocabulary to describe experiences of 
embodied persons. 
  
 
Embodiment and perception: phenomenological vocabularies 
 
Mr. Theunissen is forty-nine years old and was diagnosed with inflammatory bowel disease 
after an endoscopic examination seventeen years ago. After a long period of relatively stable 
health, Mr. Theunissen’s condition deteriorated five years ago. Endoscopies, biopsies and 
blood tests have resulted in various adjustments of treatment, but not in a lasting 
improvement. The attending gastroenterologist has performed yearly endoscopic check-ups 
over the past years.  
The disease has seriously affected the life of Mr. Theunissen. Medication prescribed to 
fight the infection, for instance, interfered with his wife’s and his desire to have children by 
means of infertility treatment. They do not have any children now. Mr. Theunissen has a job, 
but has been declared partly unfit to work because of his condition. The disease limits his 
personal freedom: a toilet must always be within reach. Leaving the house is therefore a 
problem. Mr. Theunissen takes medication to fight recurring depressions that he and the 
doctor both ascribe to his ill-health.  
I talked to Mr. Theunissen after an endoscopic examination of his large intestine and 
asked him what has preceded the examination. 
 
MR Did you feel that it (the condition of the intestines, MR) was not okay? 
MT Yes, that is daily routine. In fact, it is always the same. I can feel that it is still the 
same. 
 
More specifically about the examination, I asked Mr. Theunissen: 
 
MR When you watch the pictures on the monitor, what does it mean to you? 
MT One never knows whether it is good or bad. The doctor really has to say: this is not 
good, and that is okay. One knows, you yourself, you see it from the inside, but…. 
MR Yes, how are you supposed to know what it should look like? 
MT There is no comparison, to what it should look like. 
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MR You have had many examinations already, so maybe you could compare between 
them. 
MT That is right. But back then, it was impossible for me to watch the monitor, actually.
12
 
 (….) 
MR When you think back to when you first watched those images, did your body look 
different than you expected? Or did you not really have an image of it? 
MT I did not have an image. You know you have a gut, but what does it look like? You 
have seen pictures sometimes, but you have no idea of what it really looks like. 
MR And now you have, after several examinations? 
MT Yes, now I have an idea.  
 
 
Mr. Theunissen describes how frequent biomedical interventions, including medical 
visualizations, have informed his perceptions of his own body and his illness. Not only has he 
learned to feel what condition his colon is in, he has also become acquainted with an 
endoscopic view of his intestines. An anthropological analysis could infer a confrontation of 
lay explanations − representing what a patient feels − and professional explanatory models 
based on doctors’ accounts of what they see. An analysis in those terms would present Mr. 
Theunissen and his ill body as effects of contrasting cultural and biomedical constructions. 
 As I mentioned in the previous section, the implicit separation between person and 
body that corresponds with an anthropological illness and disease distinction, impedes an 
understanding of illness as a mode of embodiment. Because the distinction between ‘disease’ 
and ‘illness’ has not been challenged, illness has remained a subjective category separate from 
the realm of professional and technological objectivation. A number of anthropologists and 
sociologists have turned to phenomenology in order to address the particular issue of 
embodiment as “the existential ground of culture and self” and thus “a paradigm for 
anthropology” (Csordas 1994, 1990). Interpretative anthropologists state that illness 
experiences concern patients’ bodies as physical objects, but also affect their identities, their 
selves:  
 
Sickness and pain submit experience to the body’s vital rhythms, infusing everyday experience with its 
distorting presence, focusing our awareness on the body as object, alien to the experiencing self, the 
object of cultural practices. (Good 1994: 131) 
 
                                                 
12 Because of a different set-up for the examination, patients where thus positioned that they could not watch the 
monitor.  
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In line with Good and other anthropologists, sociologists have argued for “a more 
experientially grounded view of human embodiment as the existential basis of our being-in-
the-world” (Williams and Bendelow 1998: 8).  
The notion of ‘being-in-the-world’ has been introduced by Martin Heidegger. It can be 
traced back to the work of Edmund Husserl who founded phenomenology at the turn of the 
19
th
 to the 20
th
 century as a method to conceptualize and describe human experience. 
Husserl’s concept of experience included a variety of activities, givens and accomplishments 
that presuppose human consciousness: thinking, imagining, remembering, perceiving and 
willing, but also time-consciousness, intersubjectivity, the self, common sense and 
corporeality (Rogers 1983: 1). Since “human experience includes a sense of ourselves as 
subject and as objects” (Jackson 1996: 21), a phenomenological approach to experience 
addresses both modalities. Phenomenological experience, however, is not exclusively 
individual. Experience is intersubjective, i.e. it results from interactions between human 
beings. Moreover, phenomenologists consider subjectivity and objectivity as essentially 
different, but not opposed. They do not argue for a primacy of subjectivity in descriptions of 
human experience, but oppose to the reduction of experience to scientific, objective data.  
 Mr. Theunissen’s experience includes both what he perceives – i.e. a part of his body - 
and how he perceives it by means of his physical senses. Human embodiment has been a 
central theme in the work of French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), 
especially elaborated in his Phénomenologie de la perception (1945). Like Husserl, Merleau-
Ponty opposed the idea that human experience can be grasped in mathematical and physical 
terms (Jackson 1996: 30). Although people may sometimes experience themselves as 
disembodied or their bodies as objects, human experience in general cannot be reduced to 
quantitative, scientific facts (Jackson 1996: 31). The Cartesian division between mind and 
body, subject and object, impedes a description of the relation between consciousness and 
embodiment in terms of experience. Although a human body is never a thing, it is never bare 
consciousness either. Rather than an attribute of the human mind, which acts upon a physical 
object-body, subjectivity is a bodily being-in-the-world (Jackson 1996: 32). The body is the 
“very medium whereby our world comes into being” (Leder 1990: 5). Illness is a condition of 
a ‘lived body’, a notion introduced in phenomenology by Merleau-Ponty.  
Whereas “the subject-object distinction is a product of analysis, and objects 
themselves are end results of perception rather than being given empirically to perception” 
(Csordas 1990: 9), the notion of a lived body points to the idea that experience “can only be 
understood between mind and body – or across them – in their lived conjunction” (Grosz 
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1994: 95). A body is both what people have and what they are. Embodiment is the condition 
for the objectivation of reality (cf. Csordas 1999: 183) as well as the ground for subjective 
perception. Elizabeth Grosz has emphasized that a shift from mind to body as the locus of 
subjectivity does not imply that notions such as agency and consciousness are redundant. She 
argues for a refiguration of subjective experience in corporeal rather than interior terms and 
for an understanding of the body as “the very ‘stuff’ of subjectivity” (Grosz 1994: ix). Grosz 
proposes a framework in which 
 
the body provides a point of mediation between what is perceived as purely internal and accessible only 
to the subject and what is external and publicly observable, a point from which to rethink the opposition 
between the inside and the outside, the private and the public, the self and the other, and all the other 
binary pairs associated with the mind/body opposition. (Grosz 1994: 21) 
 
In such a framework Mr. Theunissen’s multiple perceptions of his own interior body and 
illness can be described as a unitary process of embodiment rather than in terms of a 
dichotomy between professional and lay perceptions of bodies and selves. Anthropologist 
Thomas Csordas has drawn upon the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to argue that 
“culture does not reside only in objects and representations, but also in the bodily processes of 
perception by which those representations come into being” (Csordas 1999: 183). What 
people see, feel and otherwise experience − Csordas (1993) calls this ‘somatic modes of 
attention’− follows from the culture they embody. One has to look at culture, which in most 
contemporary societies includes biomedical practices, in order to understand embodiment and 
to know that “(a) full understanding of any human body gives, at the same time, a fuller 
understanding of the culture embodied with it” (Helman 2001: 15).  
Merleau-Ponty introduced the psycho-analytical concept of body image in 
phenomenology (cf. Weiss 1999: 34 ff.). Psycho-analysts like Sigmund Freud and especially 
Jacques Lacan emphasized the importance of body images for one’s sense of self. Lacan 
argued that in the so-called ‘mirror stage’ - when an infant (between the age of 6 and 18 
months) learns to identify with its image in a mirror by distinguishing its own body from its 
spatially removed image – the body image becomes an integrated part of one’s body (Lacan 
1953). In chapters 4 and 5 of this book I will argue that the experience of watching real-time 
medical images of one’s interior body shows some similarities with seeing oneself in a mirror. 
The comparison is helpful in understanding the specific features of embodied experience in 
that particular techno-medical practice.  
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The concept of body image originated from neurology where it has served to explain neuro-
pathological forms of body experience. It has been transferred to psychology where ‘body 
image’ has come to refer to the ways in which people conceptualize and experience the shape 
and size of their body, its boundaries, its inner structures and its functions. The psychological 
body image is an integrated part of one’s body and consists of neurological, psychological and 
socio-cultural features: “the body image cannot be reduced to a physiological, psychological 
or purely social phenomenon, since it is the site where all three interact in a complex and 
dynamic fashion” (Weiss 1999: 162). Despite its visual and optical connotations, ‘body 
image’ refers to synesthetic experience, i.e. perception by all five senses. Body image is not 
only what people believe their body to look like, but also how they conceptualize its tactility, 
sound, taste and smell. The body image provides a unity that enables the senses to be 
translated into - or understood in terms of - other senses (Grosz 1994: 100).  
Body images link people’s perceptions of their own body and the bodies of others to 
their identity, sense of self and social relations. When a body or its condition changes, body 
images are adjusted. Although the basis of a stable embodied identity, body images are 
multiple, flexible and dynamic. For Mr. Theunissen, his abnormal medical state had become 
the normal experience of his body over the years. The illness has transformed his perceptions 
of his own body, but over the years, it has become part of his normal body, and of him as a 
person. What an examination shows, affects the body image of Mr. Theunissen. Mr. 
Theunissen has learned how to relate what he feels inside his body to what medical images 
show the doctor. The transformation of his body image evoked by medical visualization 
mediates how his body is present for Mr. Theunissen (cf. Grosz 1994: 62).  
Phenomenologists have mostly written about images of the exterior body, as it can be 
seen in a mirror. Real-time imaging technologies produce images of the interior body. I have 
observed visualizations of parts of patients’ digestive and urinary systems, like kidneys, 
livers, spleens, intestines, bladders, and gallbladders. For the most part, visceral phenomena
13
 
are unavailable to one’s conscious awareness and control. They have largely been neglected 
in phenomenological accounts of embodiment. Where self perceptions of the exterior body 
are direct, visceral perception is largely indirect and requires mediation of some sort, often via 
the surface of the body.
14
 American physician and philosopher Drew Leder has written a 
                                                 
13 “The category of the “visceral” understood broadly includes not only the organs of the digestive system but of 
the respiratory, cardiovascular, urogenital, and endocrine systems, along with the spleen” (Leder 1990: 37). 
14 Although not explicitly about the role of skin in (self) perception, Te Hennepe’s analysis of 19th century 
developments in scientific, medical and public depictions of skin offers an interesting background to think about 
these issues (Te Hennepe 2007). 
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phenomenology of ‘the absent body’ (Leder 1990). He has distinguished different ways in 
which the body can be absent from experience, including disappearance
15
, invisibility and 
inaccessibility. One of the body’s modes of absence is the recessive body. Leder describes the 
body as a field “in which certain organs and abilities come to prominence while others 
recede” (Leder 1990: 24). The organs of the interior body largely recede from conscious 
experience.  
Leder discerns three categories of bodily perceptions: exteroception (perception of the 
surface body through one of the five senses), proprioception (the sense of balance, position 
and muscular tension) and interoception (sensations of the internal organs of the body) (Leder 
1990: 39). Although one can increase one’s awareness of visceral processes such as blood 
pulse, respiration or digestion by attending to them more closely, experiencing the interior 
body is largely an oblivious affair. The disappearance or absence of the interior body is 
reflected in the vocabulary used to describe visceral sensations, which is far less sophisticated 
than the language available to describe various perceptions through one or more of the five 
senses.
16
 When I asked Mr. Theunissen, for example, how he felt whether the infection of his 
intestine was active, he told me that he ‘just felt it’ and referred to the presence of red and 
white spots on the endoscopic pictures to explain how serious it was.  
I share with Leder the intuition that in order to understand embodiment, analyses of 
the ‘higher’ and what Leder has called ‘ecstatic’ regions of the corporeal field should be 
complemented by descriptions of bodies “fully fleshed out with bone and guts” (Leder 1990: 
36). The ‘interior introspection’ made possible by real-time medical imaging technologies 
offers an opportunity to provide such complementary accounts and to include the absent body 
in body images. 
Another mode of bodily absence that Leder describes is the dys-appearing body, when 
the body is a problematic or disharmonious thing and is therefore experienced as “being 
away”(Leder 1990: 70). Illness is one of the forces which may disrupt the temporary 
equilibrium of one’s body image (cf. Weiss 1999: 17).
17
 Disruption and healing of the body’s 
equilibrium affect human bodies as “at once a biological organism, a ground of personal 
identity, and a social construct”(Leder 1990: 99). Instances of pain or other discomfort focus 
                                                 
15 With ‘disappearance’, Leder does not mean “the vanishing of something that was originally present to the 
gaze”, as the term is commonly used, but “that which never shows itself for structural reasons” (Leder 1990: 27). 
Dis-appear thus means not-appear. 
16 In a European or Northern American cultural context, that is, since “a certain degree of visceral disappearance 
can be attributed to Western insensitivities” (Leder 1990: 43). 
17 Sigmund Freud has suggested that illness or pain may magnify afflicted areas in the body image. Such changes 
then feed back into one’s experience of the body (Grosz 1994: 76). 
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attention on one’s own body as an object of experience. The recessive body comes to the fore 
in times of distress: Mr. Theunissen is constantly aware of his intestines because they hurt all 
the time.  
Leder claims that a body or body part affected by pain or dis-ease emerges as 
something foreign to the person experiencing it (Leder 1990: 76). Moreover, in medical 
examinations one’s body is transformed into “a collection of organs, a mass to be studied and 
palpated” (Leder 1990: 98) and the patient incorporates the objectifying gaze of the doctor, as 
we saw in the example of Mr. Theunissen. Katharine Young, whose ethnographic work on 
biomedical practices has been inspired by phenomenology, has made a similar argument when 
she described medical examinations as instances of disembodiment: “(f)rom being a locus of 
self, patients’ bodies are transformed into objects of scrutiny, organs in a sack of flesh” 
(Young 1989: 46).  
Real-time medical imaging involves technological, visual mediations of embodied 
perceptions and experiences of body parts that Leder has described as absent. Leder considers 
comparable mediations, like blood samples, a blood pressure meter or an X-ray, to be 
strategies of reflective observation enabling people to find out about their interior (Leder 
1990: 44). He claims that “the absences that haunt my bodily depths are not effaced by this 
reflective maneuvers” (Leder 1990: 44). The visual perception of one’s own colon for 
example – or rather: of the body parts that can be visualized − does not imply the experience 
of that colon from within: “(t)he mystery of my body is only heightened by the very 
strangeness or the organ before me, its phenomenological noncoincidence with my body-as  
lived” (Leder 1990: 44).
18
 It is only through another body, an instrument, or the outer 
appearance of the own body that one gains access to one’s interior. In her book on body 
images phenomenologist Gail Weiss stated about medical “technologies of the visible”: 
 
That these invasive technologies are often uncomfortable, embarrassing, painful, and alienating, is 
undeniable, but what also must be affirmed is the way in which they open up (…) bodies to experiences 
and possibilities that would not be available otherwise. (Weiss 1999: 124) 
 
A phenomenological description of the experience of Mr. Theunissen presents him as an 
embodied subject, a lived body. The presented fragments are about links between feeling 
                                                 
18 The noncoincidence of perceiver and perceived is not typical for perceptions of the interior body: the eye from 
which one sees does not coincide with its mirror image either. However, self-perceptions of the exterior, surface 
body are direct, where visceral perception is largely indirect and require mediation of some sort, often via the 
surface of the body (Leder 1999: 50). 
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one’s body from within and looking at pictures of the body’s interior. A body part that is 
supposed to be absent from consciousness and that recedes from the patient’s body image 
comes to the fore in a state of dysfunction – it dys-appears (Leder 1990: 83) Phenomenology 
offers a rich vocabulary to overcome the gap between the patient as an ill person and as a 
diseased body. Yet, phenomenological descriptions of technological mediations of 
embodiment present images and bodies as distinct categories of representation and 
experience. My question is how real-time visual representations get translated into embodied 
experiences and vice versa. To address that question, I need a way to describe the work of 
technology that is more specific about the mediating role of technologies than the 
phenomenological framework that I have presented here. 
 
Bodily translations: vocabularies from science and technology studies 
 
Mr. Coenen is in his early fifties. Since an ultrasound examination twenty years ago he knows 
that he suffers from a medical condition that also has affected several of his relatives: 
polycystic kidney disease. Both his kidneys are full of cysts: follicles filled with liquid.  
 
MC I have known that I have this condition for twenty years now. It actually started with 
hypertension. I have been under medical supervision ever since, but well: it is far 
away, it does not really bother you, you just wait and see. And then, at a certain point 
in time, you start having problems here and there, hypertension and stuff… 
MR And you had to come for check-ups? 
MC Yes, every year. But now it is somewhat more intensive, now it is once every six 
weeks that I come here. 
MR You had hypertension, and other symptoms as well? 
MC Yes. My feet are usually somewhat swollen, but actually that was it. Apart from that, 
things went pretty well for me. 
 
Over the past few years, cysts have grown in number and size and Mr. Coenen’s kidney 
functions have deteriorated.  
 
MR Does it affect your daily life? 
MC Yes, lately it does, it has recently started. Once a week I go running a bit with a friend 
of mine. Until two years ago, we ran for ten kilometers, but there is not much left of 
that. If I can keep it up for one kilometer now, well, that is some achievement. I get 
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tired sooner in everyday activities as well. Considerable hypertension lately. That is 
how you come to notice. Fitness goes downhill. That is how you notice. 
 
The attending specialist expects that soon Mr. Coenen’s kidneys will stop functioning 
altogether. Just recently, a series of examinations, including an ultrasound of the abdomen 
and kidneys, has been initiated in preparation for haemodialysis
19
 and ultimately 
transplantation. When his blood values will reach a certain level and his hypertension is 
under control by medication, Mr. Coenen will start dialysis. The next step will be 
transplantation. That may take a long time: the current waiting list for a kidney transplant is 
four years.  
 
Mr. Coenen’s kidney problem was diagnosed by means of ultrasound and monitored through 
a variety of imaging and other technologies: lab technologies measuring the blood value, a 
blood pressure meter, medication. These technologies have become part of Mr. Coenen’s 
experience of his body and illness. Parts of the body that most people usually do not 
consciously experience, have become manifest for Mr. Coenen. He feels that his condition is 
getting worse and he tries to imagine what goes on inside him, informed by medical data 
provided by doctors and technological devices.  
An anthropological description of Mr. Coenen’s situation would most likely be 
phrased in terms of doctor-patient communication and of the impact of a professional 
explanatory model on a lay explanatory model. Equally, from an anthropological framework I 
would focus on expressions of embodiment in Mr. Coenen’s story. A narrative analysis could 
be complemented by an account of Mr. Coenen’s subjectivation, i.e. the way he internalizes 
the biomedical image of his body. From a phenomenological perspective, I would focus more 
closely on Mr. Coenen’s perceptions of his own body as they are grounded in his existence as 
an embodied subject. Yet, what most anthropologists and phenomenologists would ignore is 
how technologies actually interfere with bodies: how does ultrasound mediate how doctors as 
well as patients know what is going on inside their bodies? And how does ultrasound affect 
patients’ experiences? 
 In order to describe what technologies do, I turn to actor-network theory (ANT) as it 
has been shaped and reconceptualized in the work of Bruno Latour (1987, 1999a &b, 2005), 
Michel Callon (1986), John Law (1992, 1999) and Madeleine Akrich (1992).
20
 Initially 
                                                 
19 In hemodialysis, artificial kidneys remove by-products from the blood when the kidneys are unable to do so. 
20 From the large body of ANT-work I have selected here only some of the works that have inspired me.  
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developed as a sociology of objects and objectivation, it has incited a body of work that could 
be called a sociology of subjectivation. To appreciate the latter body of work some 
understanding of its background is indispensable. Before turning to what has been referred to 
as the ‘second wave’ of ANT (Latour 1999b: 23), I therefore present the basic ideas of ANT 
through a short introduction of the work of Latour.  
Latour’s material semiotics is rooted in an a-modern ontology and includes a 
particular conceptualization of how technologies mediate action. Modern distinctions between 
subject and object, nature and society, mind and body, hamper an understanding of the world, 
Latour states. Many entities escape classification in terms of those dichotomies: human bodies 
incorporate technological devices, machines are inscribed with human properties. Such 
hybrids render any a priori distinction between human and non-human actors obsolete. The 
eventual identities of humans and things are not given, but result from the relations between 
entities. To study technological culture means to trace and disentangle the processes that 
transform entities. Only then does it become clear that many entities are actually hybrids of 
human and non-human qualities (Latour 1993a).  
As an alternative to a representationalist epistemology, Latour has introduced the 
concept of ‘circulating reference’ (Latour 1999a: 24-79). The basic idea is that ‘reference’ 
does not start from either a (natural) object or a textual, visual or other representation, but can 
only be understood as the result of a series of transformations and adaptations of both text and 
object, knowledge and world, image and body. An object of knowledge − e.g. a patient’s body 
− does not precede a particular representation. The ultrasound pictures that appear before Mr. 
Coenen neither resemble his kidneys, nor do they depict a fixed condition of polycystic 
kidney disease. Throughout this book I show how medical images and patients’ bodies are 
linked to each other in series of translations that entail material transformations: “phenomena 
are what circulates all along the reversible chain of transformations, at each step losing some 
properties to gain others” (Latour 1999a: 71, emphasis in original). The phenomenon that is 
traced in this investigation is disease/illness – as a category of medical knowledge as well as a 
mode of embodied experience. The particular qualities this phenomenon acquires result from 
the process of real-time imaging and carry its traces. 
The concept of mediation is central to Latour’s philosophy of technology. 
Technological mediation has four meanings: goal translation, composition, reversible 
blackboxing and delegation (Latour 1999a: 174-215). First, a particular network of human 
and non-human actors emerges from an attempt by one of those actors to translate a particular 
goal into the purpose of others, thus enrolling them into the network. In the above example, 
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Mr. Coenen can be described as an actor-network consisting of his body, a physician, an 
imaging device and moving pictures on a monitor. Mr. Coenen’s goal to restore his health or 
manage his illness is translated into a diagnostic purpose that involves imaging technologies. 
In that process Mr. Coenen himself is transformed into an object and into an instrument of 
medical imaging that needs to be prepared in order to play those roles. 
Second, agency is a composed property of associated human and non-human agents 
(Latour 1999a: 182). In the above case, the ultrasound device and the pictures actively shape 
how the radiologist as well as Mr. Coenen produce and acquire knowledge about the latter’s 
kidneys. The work involved in the construction of an actor-network and the composition of 
action is often rendered invisible in philosophical and social-scientific accounts of 
technology. This is the third element of technological mediation: black-boxing. When 
appearing on the monitor, ultrasound pictures do not show how bouncing sound waves have 
been translated into visual representations. The work entailed in producing a representation, 
that is, disappears from view. At first sight, the image just refers to Mr. Coenen’s kidneys. Yet 
for a proper understanding of technological mediation, black boxes need to be opened up to 
show the translations and compositions that underlie particular actions (Latour 1999a: 184-5).  
The fourth meaning of mediation identified by Latour is delegation. Network 
formation can be delegated from humans to things. Translation of a goal then entails a 
material transformation. A speed bump − one of Latour’s examples − translates the 
legislator’s goal to protect pedestrians into the car owner’s interest to protect his car. The 
material presence of the concrete bump invites a certain kind of behavior: slow down your 
driving speed (Latour 1999a: 186 ff.). In the case of real-time imaging, the pictures on the 
monitor may play a similar role. The physician’s goal is to plan medical treatment in order to 
improve Mr. Coenen’s health, yet he delegates the task to localize and identify the object of 
treatment to the ultrasound device. The pictures invite doctor as well as patient to watch them 
rather than focus on the body itself. Madeleine Akrich has introduced the term ‘script’ to 
describe such processes: “like a film script, technical objects define a framework of action 
together with the actors and the space in which they are supposed to act” (Akrich 1992: 208).  
The vocabulary and analytical framework of Latour has been elaborated in empirical 
studies of techno-medical practices, such as in Bernike Pasveer’s work on X-ray technology 
(1989, 1992) and in what Latour has called the ‘second wave’ of science studies (Latour 
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1999b: 23).
21
 Where actor-network theory originated as an alternative to conceptualizations of 
the objective world , several authors engaged in an analogous analysis of subjectivity, since 
“(s)ubjectivity, corporeality, is no more a property of humans, of individuals, of intentional 
subjects, than being an outside reality is a property of nature” (ibid.). The idea that people 
have bodies and are bodies has become a cliché in most contemporary philosophy, social 
sciences and (elite) every-day language (Mol and Law 2004: 1).
22
 ANT-inspired studies like 
Stefan Hirschauer’s description of relations between experience and representation in surgical 
operations (Hirschauer 1991) and Charis Cussins’ account of the medical treatment of female 
patients in an infertility clinic (Cussins 1998), attempt to bypass rather than overcome 
canonical dualisms such as object/subject, nature/culture, body/mind.
23
 In the words of 
Latour, authors from the ‘second wave’ of ANT have prolonged the chains of translation, to 
include lived bodies (Latour 1999a: 70): “(t)he ‘lived body’ is not reduced by its encounters 
with things and technologies – rather, these encounters are what brings it to its specific life” 
(Berg and Akrich 2004: 9). Medical sociological and anthropological concepts of the body, as 
elaborated by authors such as Bryan Turner (1992), Emily Martin (1987, 1994) and Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes and Margaret Lock (1998 (1987)), work done in the field of cultural studies 
(e.g. Cartwright 1995) and feminist work on embodiment (e.g. Butler 1993, Franklin 1997, 
Grosz 1994, Haraway 1991) have been sources of inspiration for those authors. Through this 
expansion of actor-network theory, a material- semiotic approach to embodiment can 
contribute to “acknowledge the body’s active status as agent without implying its immediate, 
pre-fixed presence, in other words considering it as a ‘material-semiotic generative node’ 
which is fundamentally both discursive and material, both historical and real” (Berg and 
Akrich 2004: 3).  
Along similar lines, my analysis of technological mediations of illness experience 
includes the materiality of techno-scientific practices, thus emphasizing the active, mediating 
role of objects (medical images) in shaping categories (illness) that are often considered as 
subjective or social (Berg and Akrich 2004: 2). My aim is to describe “that which allows the 
subject to emerge – never alone, never a pristine individual, but rather always entangled with 
                                                 
21 That so-called ‘second wave’, exemplified by Law and Hassard 1999, involved some of the ‘first wave’ 
authors, such as Michel Callon, John Law and Bruno Latour himself, as well. 
22 When writing about the human body in relation to medicine, Michel Foucault (1975) has suggested that the 
subject/object distinction was only established in the early 19th century. With the ‘birth of the clinic’, an 
epistemic shift occurred, in which diseases were no longer considered as foreign entities that inhabited bodies, 
but as conditions of bodies (Mol and Law 2003: 2). 
23 A particularly interesting selection of work along those lines has been published in a special issue of the 
journal Body and Society, entitled Bodies on Trial: Performances and Politics in Medicine and Biology (Berg & 
Akrich 2004). 
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and generously gifted by a collective, by objects, techniques, constraints” (Gomart and 
Hennion 1999: 220).  
A particularly interesting spin-off of ANT is the work of the Dutch philosopher 
Annemarie Mol. In The Body Multiple (2002) she shows how a particular disease 
(arteriosclerosis) is enacted in socio-material medical practices.24 One of the dualisms Mol 
explicitly attempts to bypass in The Body Multiple is that between illness and disease. She 
presents patients with their perceptions and experiences as co-constituting the object of 
biomedicine: disease. Whereas the implications of her ontology-in-practice for patients’ 
experiences of embodiment and illness are not explicitly addressed in The Body Multiple, Mol 
has hinted at the possibilities of an empirical turn for opening the black box of subjectivity in 
ways analogous to ANT opening the boxes of objectivity (cf. Mol and Law 2004). That move 
fits my primary goal of understanding how illness comes about as a category of experience 
and to find out how the production of disease as an epistemological category affects that 
experience. 
A material-semiotic analysis of the case of Mr. Coenen affords a description of the 
active contribution of ultrasound technology and images to the construction of Mr. Coenen’s 
body as an object of medical examination and the subjectivation it implies. What remains 
un(der)theorized within this approach, however, is how Mr. Coenen’s experience is mediated 
by ultrasound technology. I want to know how technologies interfere with patients’ 
experiences of their bodies and illness. A confrontation of phenomenological and material-
semiotic frameworks could join the best of both worlds, for phenomenology does theorize 
experience but forgets about its ‘mediatedness’, and ANT theorizes mediated subjectivity but 
still leaves the category of experience to itself, that is to remain a subjective category in the 
traditional sense of the word. I turn to post-phenomenology as an example of such a 
confrontation. 
                                                 
24 Mol has introduced the term enact as a ‘neutral’ alternative for make, do, construct or perform, which have 
various distracting connotations (cf. Mol 2002: 32). Enactment “suggests that activities take place – but leaves 
the actors vague. It also suggests that in the act, and only then and there, something is – being enacted” (Mol 
2002: 33).  
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“Bodies in technology”: post-phenomenological vocabularies 
 
Forty-five- year-old Mrs. Timmer is in a wheelchair. Severe arteriosclerosis
25
 - a condition 
that some of her relatives suffer from as well - has caused chronic heart and lung problems, 
amputation of a leg, shriveling of a kidney, and a variety of other problems. She can only 
manage a minimum of physical exercise. She has had over 30 operations. Over the years 
several organs have been removed: the gallbladder, the appendix and parts of the pancreas. 
She has had over eighty radiological examinations - among which many arteriographies
26
 - 
over the past five years and many other tests as well. Six months ago she was released from a 
one-year stay in the hospital. She underwent a major heart operation and additional surgery. 
She has been readmitted twice over the past six months. She is home now and regularly sees 
doctors in the hospital for check-ups who then often refer her for yet another examination. 
Sometimes she does not even know what is checked. This time she has been referred for an 
ultrasound examination by an internist at the request of her regular lung specialist. Only 
upon asking the radiologist, she finds out that this time they are looking at the liver. She does 
not know why, but tells me after the examination that it might have to do with having been an 
alcoholic.  
 Mrs. Timmer checks her own blood pressure regularly with a sphygmomanometer 
provided by the hospital. Because of arteriosclerosis the blood does not flow smoothly to her 
heart, which is then unable to pump the blood around properly, causing hypertension, Mrs. 
Timmer explains to me. When the blood pressure values are too high she has to call the 
doctor. However, since she has become used to the high figures, she only calls when high 
blood pressure coincides with chest pain or an extremely quick pulse: Mrs. Timmer has her 
own pulse meter as well. In case of hypertension with pain or a high pulse, Mrs. Timmer or 
her husband calls the doctor. Usually an ambulance is then sent to take her to the hospital, 
where she is administered nitro-glycerin by pump to dilate the arteries. 
 
The body of Mrs. Timmer has been transformed by various medical technologies many times 
and in many ways. Although Mrs. Timmers does not understand all the implications of high-
tech interventions, devices like the blood-pressure meter and the pulse meter have become 
part of her every-day routine. Through these meters Mrs. Timmer has learned how to perceive 
                                                 
25 Stenosis of the arteries. 
26 Fluoroscopic (X-ray) examination of the arteries with use of contrast fluid. 
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her body in different ways. Absent parts of her body get articulated in numbers and pictures. 
To assess her body’s condition Mrs. Timmer combines such technological representations of 
bodily functions with how she perceives it from inside. Medical objectivations of her body 
have also transformed what is her capacity to perceive, know and act (cf. Willems 2005).  
The case of Mrs. Timmer shows why the three conceptual frameworks presented in 
this chapter are not sufficient for my purpose: an analysis of how real-time medical imaging 
technologies affect patients’ experiences of health and illness. The anthropological distinction 
of illness and disease and the subject/object dualism it implies, hampers an integrated account 
of intertwined processes of objectivation and subjectivation of patients’ bodies. Moreover, 
interpretative medical anthropology and constructivist medical sociology do not do justice to 
the complex workings of technology and the material aspects of embodiment. The strength of 
a phenomenological account would be that it affords a relational understanding of subjectivity 
and objectivity. A person’s body is ultimately an embodied subject. From a phenomenological 
perspective, however, medical objectivations move bodies away from selves (e.g. Leder 1990: 
44). Finally, an actor-network approach allows a description of the active role of technologies 
in the construction of bodies as objects and subjects of knowledge and experience. However, 
ANT lacks the vocabulary to describe how perceptions are translated into experiences that, 
despite having emerged from particular constellations of people and things, feel ‘purely’ 
individual. None of the frames offers an encompassing vocabulary to describe “bodies in 
technology”
 27
: how technological images interfere with embodied experience. 
The technological mediation of human experience is a central theme in the work of 
American philosopher of technology Don Ihde. Ihde has complemented a phenomenological 
interest in human perception with a fascination for technology. The expansion of 
phenomenology emerging from this confrontation has become known as post-
phenomenology.
28
 Ihde and other post-phenomenologists, such as the Dutch philosopher of 
technology Peter-Paul Verbeek, understand phenomenology in terms of the actual 
descriptions and analyses written by scholars like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. 
Phenomenology has inadvertently been presented by its protagonists as a method for the 
description of reality by turning to the things themselves (Verbeek 2005: 107). That image has 
                                                 
27 Cf. Ihde 2002. 
28
 The term ‘postphenomenology’ has been used to refer to various authors and schools of thinking expanding 
phenomenology in one way or another, or to refer to the work of authors such as Derrida, Levinas and Irigaray. 
In my argument, however, post-phenomenology denotes the expansion of phenomenology into the philosophy of 
technology. 
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provoked criticism of phenomenology’s subjectivism and introspection (e.g. Latour in Ihde 
2003: 9).  
What the early phenomenologists actually did, however, is different from what they 
claimed to do. The work of Merleau-Ponty especially offers building blocks for a 
phenomenology that is not susceptible to the above-mentioned criticism. In his 
Phénoménologie de la perception (1962), Merleau-Ponty has not provided a description of 
reality, but has analyzed the relations between human beings and the world. His primary 
object of analysis have been the perceptual interrelations between humans and the world. 
Neither a perceiving subject nor a perceived object are his point of departure, but the relations 
between them. He has described perception as a relation in which an interior subject and an 
exterior object are constituted (Verbeek 2005: 108 ff.). Post-phenomenological analyses of 
technology present experience as a relational category, building on actual phenomenological 
work rather than unsubstantiated claims by phenomenologists and their critics.  
According to post-phenomenological theory, technologies of all kinds mediate 
people’s perceptions and interpretations of the world and the ways in which reality is present 
for people. Analyzing technological mediations of scientific perceptions of the world, Don 
Ihde has identified two dimensions of perception: microperception and macroperception. 
Microperceptions are the sensory perceptions, often mediated by instruments, that (scientific) 
knowledge is built on. A patient’s or a doctor’s visual perceptions of medical images, or the 
interior sensations of a patient, are microperceptions. Macroperceptions are the cultural 
frames of reference against which reality is understood: the medico-cultural knowledge about 
a link between liver problems and alcoholism for example, that led Mrs. Timmer to think that 
her health problems might be related to her heavy drinking. Microperceptions and 
macroperceptions can be analytically distinguished but can never be separated in practice 
(Ihde 1990: 29).  
Technological instruments can mediate micro- as well as macroperceptions. That goes 
for every-day perceptions as much as for scientific observations. People often relate to the 
world via a technical device. Some devices, such as glasses, almost become part of one’s 
body. They are transparent, i.e. they pass aspects of the world without being explicitly present 
as such an aspect themselves. Ihde calls such relations between a person and a technological 
device, embodiment relations (Ihde 1990: 72 ff.). Other devices, such as a thermometer, invite 
a hermeneutical relation: they offer a representation of an aspect of the world, which cannot 
merely be perceived, but requires interpretation (Ihde 1990: 80 ff.). Human-technology 
relations may also be of a different kind than mediation. People may also relate to a 
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technology itself, rather than to the world through a technological device (Ihde 1990: 97 ff.). 
A technology may also form the background for a perception, without being the object of 
perception itself (Ihde 1990: 108 ff.). 
Verbeek has drawn upon the work of Ihde in his search for a vocabulary to describe 
the roles that technological artifacts play in people’s perceptions of the world. He emphasizes 
that technologies do not mediate between subjects and objects, or people and the world, but 
shape the perceptual and experiential relations from which subjects and objects emerge. 
Technological mediations can be situated along a continuum of embodied and hermeneutical 
relations. Mrs. Timmer’s body is affected by medical technology in two interrelated ways: 
technological devices mediate how she perceives her body and at the same time fashion the 
body that appears to her. The numbers on the blood pressure meter represent her body’s 
condition only because she has learned how to interpret them. Medical images, on the other 
hand, seem to present a direct view inside. In fact, the distinction between hermeneutical and 
embodiment relations is not always strict. When Mrs. Timmer watches the monitor during an 
ultrasound examination she sees parts of her body. Much of what she sees, however, she 
would not recognize without the radiologist’s explanations. 
In Bodies in Technology (2002) Don Ihde reflects upon technological mediations of 
embodiment. The post-phenomenological body is an agent of perception, interpretation and 
existence in and of the world. Ihde proposes to substitute ‘embodiment’ for ‘subjectivity’, 
thus taking into account the situatedness and materiality of human experience (Ihde 2002: 11). 
What such a substitution obscures, however, is that people’s bodies are also part of ‘the 
world’ or ‘reality’ and therefore objects of perception and interpretation. In experiences of 
real-time medical imaging, patients are subjects as well as objects of visualization.  
Ihde has distinguished two modes of embodiment: the here-body (or body one) and the 
image-body (or body two). The first is the embodied subject that moves, perceives, senses and 
is-in-the-world (Ihde 2002: xi). The here-body is the patient who talks to me,
29
 feels pain and 
watches a monitor. The body patients talk about, feel and look at is what Ihde has called an 
image-body: one’s own body as an object of perception. The image-body is the object of 
macro-perception: it is the culturally informed and shaped signification of a particular sensory 
microperception (Ihde 2002: 5). The image-body does not coincide with the here-body, but 
they cannot meaningfully be separated either. Mrs. Timmer’s relation to her own body is 
mediated by various technologies. Her own body is the here-body feeling a fast heartbeat and 
                                                 
29 The researcher, MR. 
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reading the blood pressure meter, as well as the body-at-risk, identified as such according to 
exterior, objective medical standards. 
My question about technological mediations of bodies as subjects and as objects of 
(illness) experience, addresses the co-construction of patients’ here-bodies and image-bodies 
in practices of real-time medical imaging. I share with Ihde the specific interest in how people 
experience themselves through or with artifacts (Ihde 2002: xiii). Embodiment is an 
intertwined process of objectivation and subjectivation that can be mediated by technologies. 
An analysis of either here-bodies or image-bodies misses a crucial quality of embodied 
experience: that it is neither objective nor subjective, but enacted in relations between bodies 
and images. To describe such relations, Ihde links bodily materiality to technology, for 
“technologies are the material aspects of our embodied ways of relating to the world” (Ihde 
2002: 20). The strength of post-phenomenology for my analysis lies in its explicit inclusion of 
materiality in perception and experience, in particular of the role of instruments in making the 
world present for people.  
Besides mediating people’s interpretations of reality, technologies interfere with 
people’s existence in the world. Verbeek has extended Ihde’s work on technological 
mediations of perceptions to include praxis, or the existential dimensions of technological 
mediation. Therefore, he has challenged “Latour’s declaration that phenomenology is 
incompatible with his position” (Verbeek 2005: 162) and has read Latour’s work on technical 
mediation through post-phenomenological glasses. Verbeek argues that unlike classical 
phenomenology, a post-phenomenological perspective 
 
comes much closer to Latour’s perspective on the relations between human and non-humans. It deals 
with subjects and objects, not as pregiven entities that assume relations with each other, but as entities 
that are constituted in their mutual relation. Human beings are what they are by virtue of the way in 
which they realize their existence in their world, and their world is what it is by virtue of the way in 
which it can manifest itself in the relations humans have to it. Thus postphenomenology does not draw 
a line between two poles, but rather lets the poles emerge from the line that constitutes them. (Verbeek 
2005: 163) 
 
A major difference between Latour’s actor-network theory and post-phenomenology is that 
the latter analytically distinguishes (human) subjects from (human or nonhuman) objects, 
although it is acknowledged that they can hardly be separated in practice (Verbeek 2005: 
164). Whereas Latour is primarily interested in how hybrid actants come into being in 
networks of relations, post-phenomenology aims at an in-depth understanding of the relations 
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people have with such emerging entities (Verbeek 2005: 164-5). I argue that an analysis of 
techno-visual mediations of embodied experience needs both: an extended description of the 
networks from which bodies emerge as well as a detailed account of how people experience 
those bodies. 
Mrs. Timmer has not only learned how to perceive and interpret her body through 
various technical devices, she has also shaped her existence in relation to a blood pressure 
meter, a pulse meter and an emergency phone number. For Mrs. Timmer, real-time images are 
among many other technological presentations of her interior body. It is this particular 
category of techno-visual mediation that I am interested in. A description of technologically 
mediated embodiment ‘from the middle’ – starting with technological practices – results in a 
body that cannot self-evidently be distinguished as an object or a subject. In my analyses, I 
will show how processes of objectivation and subjectivation of patient bodies are intertwined.  
 
 
Conceptual confrontations 
 
Patients’ trajectories of real-time imaging start at the onset or suspicion of illness. Many 
people visit a doctor when their body feels or looks different than normal or when there is 
other reason to suspect that something might be wrong. The doctor can refer a patient for 
further examination, for instance by means of ultrasound, fluoroscopy or endoscopy – the 
real-time imaging technologies around which I build my analysis, and which may be used for 
diagnostic as well as for screening purposes. Medical anthropology and the sociology of 
health and illness offer a rich vocabulary for the study of illness as a cultural phenomenon and 
a subjective and intersubjective experience which is primarily expressed and 
disclosed in narratives. Their vocabulary to describe the work of (medical) technologies, 
however, is relatively poor. In the anthropological distinction between disease and illness, 
technology is associated with disease, i.e. the medical professional outlook on (ill-)health. 
Moreover, technology plays a one-dimensional role as an intermediary between a physical 
body and a professional observer. Technology is therefore said to widen the gap between 
disease and illness (Helman 2001: 166). Instead of assuming such a gap, I intend to explore 
how the situatedness of biomedical knowledge may constitute and shape particular embodied 
experiences and identities, or the “circumstances under which different modes of experience 
arise” (Jackson 1996: 25).  
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Whereas in anthropology and sociology illness as a category of experience is usually 
distinguished from disease as an object of knowledge, a review of current insights from post-
phenomenology and the sociology of translation suggests that a focus on material practices 
and technological mediation blurs that distinction. What fascinates me is how using and 
producing a particular kind of knowledge - medical knowledge in real-time medical imaging 
practices - is intertwined with using and producing particular kinds of embodied experience – 
illness experiences of patients who go through real-time imaging.  
Anthropological conceptualizations of embodiment have focused more on ideas than 
on practices. To address anthropological questions about illness experience, however, the turn 
to practices is just as essential as it has been for understanding the construction of medical 
knowledge (cf. Mol 2002). Studying experience through its (narrative) expressions, as 
anthropologists have done, affords descriptions of illness as a socio-cultural phenomenon. 
What is largely missing from anthropological accounts of illness experience is the body’s 
materiality. A narrative bias, a poor vocabulary for material aspects of experience, an 
instrumental definition of technology, and the illness/disease dualism are the main 
shortcomings of an interpretative social-scientific framework. My analysis aims at an 
integrated understanding of illness as a material-discursive phenomenon. With its detailed 
accounts of expressions of illness experience grounded in profound ethnographic fieldwork, 
however, medical anthropology offers an indispensable background for my argument. 
 Phenomenology offers an alternative for narrative analyses of experience. It situates 
all human experience, including illness, inside the body and it offers an elaborate conceptual 
framework to describe embodied experience. My question is how the material translation of 
the interior body in images may affect patients’ body images at the level of individual 
microperceptions as well as at the level of socio-cultural macroperceptions and how imaging 
may establish links between those levels. A phenomenological framework is also appealing 
because it presents experience not merely as a relation between objects and subjects, but as a 
constitutive force combining both. Phenomenological analyses of illness and other bodily 
perceptions, however, are somewhat unsatisfactory. With regard to my research question, 
what is problematic about phenomenology is that it presupposes that technology is an 
intermediary that alienates bodies from selves. 
 The main strength of actor-network theory is the presentation of technology as a 
mediator rather than an intermediary. For me as a medical anthropologist, the inclusion of 
material actors offers a refreshing perspective on well-known problems that usually have been 
framed in discursive terms, and a way out of unproductive dualisms such as disease and 
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illness. However, an analysis in terms of emerging agencies leaves little room for perception 
and experience as embodied qualities of human beings: 
 
The facts that technological artifacts can be conceived as constructions, always exist in a context, and 
are interpreted by human beings in terms of their specific frameworks of reference do not erase the fact 
that systematic reflection can be undertaken of the role that these contextual and interpreted 
constructions play concretely in the experience and behavior of human beings. That “the things 
themselves” are accessible only in mediated ways does not interfere with our ability to say something 
about the roles that they play, thanks to their mediated identities, in their environment. And it is 
precisely the postphenomenological perspective that offers a new way of so doing. (Verbeek 2005: 113) 
 
Post-phenomenology has resulted from attempts to merge the best of both worlds, being 
phenomenology and actor-network theory. It presents technology as constitutive of embodied 
subjectivity as well as of the objectifications of bodies, yet maintains the distinction between 
human subjects and objects that may be human as well as non-human. Experience is 
relational, situated, material and embodied yet ultimately belongs to the human realm. In a 
(post-)phenomenological framework, “what the world ‘is’, and what subjects ‘are’, arises 
from the interplay between humans and reality” (Verbeek 2003: 93). Yet it assumes that 
objectivity is an attribute of the world, whereas subjectivity is ascribed to “those who are 
experiencing and existing in it” (ibid.).  
A philosophy that is to have any hope of grasping the every-day reality of human beings needs to 
acknowledge this difference and to show that making a distinction between them can never imply an 
actual separation. (Verbeek 2005: 167) 
 
A major drawback of the post-phenomenological focus on experiential relations is that it risks 
to loose sight of the conditions under which such relations emerge – the kind that ANT can 
describe so well. I will argue that real-time imaging offers a context in which the emergence 
of here-bodies and image-bodies is inextricably intertwined.  
The matrix on the next page provides a schematic summary of the building blocks 
collected in this chapter in order to develop a more comprehensive analytical frame 
throughout this book. Missing from the matrix are the specific characteristics of the empirical 
field; the technology in question is a visualization technology that produces moving pictures 
of parts of patients’ interior bodies which can be watched in real-time by both doctors and 
patients. In the following chapters I use empirical material to introduce these specific features 
of the particular kind of technologically mediated embodied experiences that I am interested 
in. It will result in a more sophisticated, layered understanding of illness. 
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Medical 
anthropology / 
sociology of health 
and illness 
 
 
Phenomenology 
 
Actor-network 
theory 
 
Post-
phenomenology 
 
Embodiment 
body is object of 
individual perception, 
social relations and 
political structures; 
‘mindful body’ 
- body is basis of 
all subjective 
experience; 
‘lived body’ 
- body image is 
constitutive of 
embodied 
identity 
 
bodies are 
articulated in 
networks of 
humans and non-
humans 
body is both 
embodied subject 
and (disembodied) 
object of perception 
;‘here-body / image-
body’ 
 
Experience 
experience is (inter-) 
subjective and mainly 
represented by and 
disclosed in 
narratives 
- experience 
denotes relation 
between subject 
and object 
- all experience is 
embodied 
- part of body is 
absent from 
experience 
- analysis in 
terms of 
agency rather 
than 
experience 
- no essential 
difference 
between 
humans and 
non-humans 
- subjectivity 
and objectivity 
are circulating 
capacities  
 
- technological 
devices mediate 
embodied 
subject and 
perceived body 
- human 
experience is 
situated and 
material 
 
Illness 
contrast between 
disease (object of 
professional 
knowledge) and 
illness (object of lay 
experience) 
- illness alienates 
body from self 
- disease 
emerges from 
hybrid 
configurations 
of actors, 
including 
patients’ 
bodies 
not explicitly 
addressed 
 
Technological 
mediation 
- technology 
widens gap 
between disease 
and illness 
- technology is 
intermediary 
between subject 
and object 
technological 
representations of 
body’s functions 
transform object of 
perception yet do 
not alter embodied 
experience 
- technology is 
congealed 
labor 
- technology 
mediates 
action and 
transforms 
entities 
involved in 
action 
 
technology mediates 
embodied perception 
as well as embodied 
existence/action 
 
Main strength 
with regard to 
research 
question 
rich vocabulary for 
study of illness as a 
cultural phenomenon 
- rich vocabulary 
for study of 
embodied 
experience 
- body image as 
mediator 
between body 
and self 
- rich 
vocabulary for 
study of 
material 
agency and 
emergence of 
hybrid actors 
- non-dualist 
framework 
 
rich vocabulary for 
study of 
technological 
mediation of 
embodiment 
 
Main weakness 
with regard to 
research 
question 
- narrative bias 
- illness/disease 
dualism 
- instrumental view 
of technology 
- technology is 
passive 
intermediary 
- technology 
implies 
alienation 
 
poor vocabulary to 
describe 
technological 
mediation of 
perception and 
experience  
focus on experiential 
relation between 
subject and object 
too narrow 
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After the explorations of conceptual and theoretical grounds in this chapter, I can now 
formulate a research question that does not presuppose a distinction between bodies as objects 
and as subjects and which explicitly reflects my interest in this issue as a medical 
anthropologist: 
 
How do real-time medical imaging technologies that enable doctors as well as 
patients to watch live moving pictures of part of the interior body, mediate patients’ 
embodied experiences of illness and health? 
 
I have introduced the core concepts for this question: embodiment, experience, illness and 
technological mediation. In the following chapters I will sow those conceptual ‘seeds’ into the 
‘soil’ of real-time imaging practices. 
Real-time imaging provides a point of entrance to address relations between 
technologies and people’s existence and perceptions as embodied beings, especially in times 
of illness. Although my research question about techno-visual mediations of embodied 
experience resonates with post-phenomenology, it is impossible for me to decide which 
subject-object relation to focus on without a thorough exploration of the field of real-time 
imaging in a broad sense. In my argument I will present an actor-network analysis of the 
enactment of patient bodies as composite objects, instruments and subjects of medical 
imaging (in chapters 3 and 4) before initiating an analysis of embodied experience (in chapter 
5). I develop a framework to address the hermeneutic and existential significations of real-
time image perception and to evaluate which are the patient bodies that are presented to and 
present for the various actors involved.  
Mol has convincingly shown how the empirical turn in philosophy – starting from 
practices rather than from ideas – affords a shift from epistemological questions about 
doctors’ ability to know bodies to the ontological question of which bodies are enacted in 
particular practices (Mol 2002). It opens up the black box of ‘objectivity’ and renders 
problematic dualisms between subject and object obsolete. In the same vein, I look for 
alternative ways to address anthropological and phenomenological concerns about illness as a 
mode of technologically mediated embodied experience, thus opening up the black box of 
‘subjectivity’. Mol includes patients’ experiences in her reconceptualization of disease. I 
include a description of medical knowledge production involving bodies, machines, flesh and 
blood in a reconceptualization of illness. The experienced body is ‘contaminated’ by the body 
as an object of medical knowledge (Akrich and Pasveer 2004: 81). If the notion of an 
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embodied person is taken seriously, the physical and lived body often appear to be practiced 
as one. However, they can be separated in the same practices. Embodiment, health and illness 
may come in different modalities that result from rather than explain particular practices. How 
that actually happens in practices of real-time medical imaging is the topic of the following 
chapters.
   41 
3 Patient compositions: preparing bodies for real-
time imaging 
 
 
 
 
Not just any body can be visualized. Bodies need to be prepared in order to be translated into 
medical images. In this chapter I discuss how bodies are transformed in preparations for real-
time imaging by various human and non-human actors involved: visualization devices, 
professional image-makers, patients and papers. The aggregate analysis of the emergence of a 
generic patient body ‘ready for real-time imaging’ is based on field observations of individual 
patients and of particular ultrasound, fluoroscopy and endoscopy examinations. I use an actor-
network approach to describe what happens to bodies before they end up on an examination 
table and on a monitor. Thus I show how preparations set up the conditions under which real-
time medical images can eventually transform embodied experience. 
To produce meaningful data, real-time imaging requires the simultaneous presence of 
an appropriate and working imaging device, a competent doctor, a collaborative patient, a 
prepared body and a well-articulated request. The first four sections of the chapter 
subsequently discuss the configuration of imaging devices, medical professionals, patients 
and request forms for their eventual positions in networks of real-time imaging. The 
individual and joint preparations of the human and non-human actors in those networks 
constitute a process of collective embodiment: a body ‘ready-for-imaging’ that is both singular 
and multiple (cf. Mol 2002: 84). In preparations for real-time imaging, bodies and their 
potential medical conditions are articulated in various modes: as passive objects of 
examination, as active co-producers of knowledge, as material entities of a particular kind, as 
a person, or as some other kind of entity – or a combination of many of these. Collective 
embodiment entails both objectivations and subjectivations of patients’ bodies: the 
configuration of patients’ bodies as objects of medical examination and sensory perception 
affects how their agency as eventual spectators and collaborators in a real-time imaging event 
is shaped. Patients’ active contribution to their body’s preparation, in turn, transforms the 
body that will appear on the monitor in an examination room.  
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Bodies in machines 
 
The cases for my analysis of technological mediation of embodiment and illness experience 
are three medical imaging technologies: ultrasound, fluoroscopy and endoscopy. The three 
technologies differ in their technical specifications, in their clinical applications and in their 
professional contexts of use. Ultrasound and fluoroscopy are radiological technologies, 
whereas endoscopy belongs to the realm of surgery. Ultrasound, fluoroscopy and endoscopy 
can all be used to visualize various parts of the interior body. Endoscopes are used to enter 
bodily cavities such as the stomach, the uterus or the prostate, but also lungs or knee joints, 
both with a camera and with small surgical instruments. Ultrasound is best known for its 
obstetric and gynecological uses, in particular during pregnancy. My analysis, however, is 
limited to radiological and endoscopic visualizations of parts of the intestinal and of the 
urinary tract made primarily for diagnostic reasons, i.e. in order to locate physical 
abnormalities that cause illness or increase the risk for illness. Moreover, I have selected only 
those examinations that enable patients to watch the moving images produced by means of 
those devices in real-time. The apparently direct visual access to one’s own interior body has 
triggered my fascination for the relation between technological representations and embodied 
experiences of human bodies. In the present section, I provide a concise introduction to the 
technical set-up of each of those types of machines, as they are used in the radiology and 
endoscopy departments where I carried out my fieldwork.  
 
 
Moving x-ray pictures: fluoroscopic spectacles and spectators 
 
X-rays, discovered in 1895 by the German physicist Wilhelm Röntgen, are invisible electro-
magnetic waves that are sent through a human body. Since Röntgen’s discovery, X-ray 
images have become cultural icons for clinical diagnostics of the living body’s interior. X-
rays are able to penetrate soft tissue, but are absorbed by bones. A sheet of sensitive film 
placed behind the body is struck by different quantities of X-rays, resulting in an image that 
shows interior body structures on the basis of the variety in tissue composition and mass. 
Body parts can be distinguished because they react differently to X-rays. Bones, containing 
calcium, do not allow much radiation to pass, and result in white shapes on an X-ray film. The 
air-filled lungs allow nearly all X-rays to pass, resulting in a black film image. When body 
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parts are not distinctive enough, external substances must be added to the body to produce 
contrast. Different degrees of permeability in bodily tissue and contrast substances render 
normal and abnormal structures inside the body visually discernable.  
 The use of contrast substances is particular common in fluoroscopic examinations, 
which use X-rays to produce moving images of a particular organ in action. Fluoroscopic 
images on a monitor are negatives of normal X-ray pictures: bones appear as black, air as 
white. Moving, fluoroscopic images depict more than the structures common X-ray pictures 
present. Fluoroscopic pictures show how particular organs or objects inside the body move, or 
are obstructed. The clinical implications of such pictures are not self-evident. Radiologists 
receive specialized training to interpret and compare fluoroscopic pictures to visual and 
numerical information obtained by other means.
30
 
 During a regular X-ray event a relatively high dose of radiation is emitted once or 
during a few subsequent instances. During a fluoroscopy the X-ray tube is left on, emitting 
radiation of lower intensity, yet constantly, over a longer period of time. In today’s 
fluoroscopy equipment, like the Philips Diagnost 97-DSI that was used in the examinations I 
observed, X-rays strike an image intensifier tube rather than a film. The image intensifier 
produces brighter images than would be possible using a fluorescent screen, as was common 
in the early days of fluoroscopy. The intensifier tube is connected through a video camera, 
making images appear on a monitor. If connected to a computer, the fluoroscopic output can 
be digitally processed and enhanced. The machine can be set to show only the required 
parameters for a particular purpose, and suppress irrelevant information.  
The fluoroscopic examinations of the upper and lower gastro-intestinal and the urinary 
tract that I observed require patients to take contrast agents, since soft tissues are not clearly 
visualized with (low-intensity) X-rays. Substances or liquids like barium or iodine absorb X-
rays more effectively than the surrounding tissue. For an examination of the upper gastro-
intestinal tract, patients need to swallow a barium compound, whereas for inspection of the 
lower part of the digestive system a contrast agent is administered rectally. To examine 
bladder and kidney functions, a liquid contrast is administered through a catheter.  
The configuration of the fluoroscopic examinations included in my sample allowed 
patients to watch real-time moving pictures of their own interior body on a monitor, at least 
during part of the examination. During such examinations, patients are active as spectators. 
They also contribute to the material transformations of their bodies. For example, during an 
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examination to check for possible reflux of urine to the kidneys the radiologist needs the 
patient to indicate when his or her bladder is full, and then to empty the bladder on command. 
And during fluoroscopic examination of the gastro-intestinal tract patients swallow contrast 
fluid and in addition turn their bodies around on the examination table and alternately adjust 
to the flexible table's horizontal and vertical positions, operated by the radiologist.  
 X-rays render the exterior body transparent and the interior body visible for 
physicians as well as for patients. Many patients are familiar with the kind of (X-ray) pictures 
that fluoroscopy produces, even if they do not exactly recognize the structures they see or are 
unaware that the black contours which outline their intestines are caused by contrast 
substance. While physicians are watching the monitor, they compare what they see to other 
information on the patient’s condition and on the normal fluoroscopic appearance of 
particular parts of the body. The fluoroscopic representation of an interior body provides them 
with a visual data-set. In sum, fluoroscopy implies patients’ bodies as dynamic visual objects, 
data-sets and pictures, as well as actors and spectators. 
 
  
Seeing with sound
31
 
 
Ultrasound is another real-time radiological technology that provides both physicians and 
patients with visual access to the latter’s interior bodies. Like fluoroscopy, it is particularly 
apt to visualize dynamic moving structures inside living bodies. In ultrasound examinations, 
however, it is not radiation but pulses of very high-frequency sound that pass through the skin 
into the body. Because different soft tissues and fluids reflect the waves at different speeds, 
images represent the boundaries between tissues. Since ultrasound is reflected by air or gas, 
this technology is not very useful to image the bowels. Neither is it possible to visualize what 
is inside or behind a bony structure. Soft tissues, however, which are hard to visualize by 
conventional X-ray, can be visualized by means of ultrasound.  
 The equipment used in the radiology department where I observed examinations was 
an ATL HDI 5000 ultrasound machine. It produced 2D grey-scale images, sometimes 
complemented by blue and red indicators of blood flows. Through a microphone-like  
transducer probe, pressed firmly against the patient’s body, high-frequency sound pulses are 
transmitted into the body and hit boundaries between tissues. Gel is applied to the probe for 
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good acoustic contact between body and transducer, eliminating any air between them. The 
transducer functions as a loudspeaker that transmits sound waves, as well as a microphone 
recording the sounds echoed back. The probe is linked to the central processing unit (CPU) of 
the ultrasound machine and picks up waves which are reflected when they have reached a 
boundary between tissues of different density and passes them on to the machine. The CPU 
calculates distances from probe to boundary, using the speed of sound in tissue and the time 
of the each echo’s return. The machine displays the distances and intensities of the echoes on 
the monitor, forming two-dimensional images of a part of a patient’s interior body. Bones and 
muscles reflecting sound waves show up as white, whereas softer areas and fluids appear 
dark. The ATL HDI 5000 uses real-time compound imaging, enabling transducers to transmit 
and receive signals in many different directions, thus increasing the amount of diagnostic 
information acquired and processed. It is equipped with various programs, with pre-settings 
for the examination of a particular organs or area. The machine can also visualize the speed of 
blood flow, e.g. through the kidneys, by calculating the Doppler effect, which is the 
difference between the high frequency of the transmitted waves and the frequency of the 
returning sound waves, which is lower as the reflecting surface is more distant.  
 Whereas a fluoroscopic device directly produces visual data, an ultrasound machine 
mechanically translates sound waves into numerical data and numbers into pictures. Although 
both devices produce images, ultrasound does not first of all present the interior body as a 
visual object, but as a collection of structures and substances with different material 
characteristics. Where fluoroscopy primarily visualizes structures and movements, ultrasound 
rather aims at the identification of normal and abnormal locations and distributions of tissue 
and fluid. The objects of fluoroscopic and ultrasound are therefore distinctively different.  
 Patients' experiences of ultrasound and fluoroscopic examinations, however, do not 
seem that different. Most set-ups for ultrasound examinations allow patients to watch the 
monitor on which the ultrasonographer watches the moving images resulting from her 
operations of the transducer probe. Many patients are at least as familiar with obstetric 
ultrasound pictures as they are with X-rays, either from own experience or from the media. 
The first picture in a new-born baby’s photo album today is often an ultrasound scan. 
However, when the object of imaging is not a baby, but a kidney or another organ, it is not 
obviously recognized as part of one’s own body. The grey-scale images that appear during an 
ultrasound examination are not easily recognizable as body parts. Although experienced 
patients may learn to read ultrasound pictures, to most patients ultrasound presents an 
unfamiliar sight of their body. 
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Ultrasound examinations require limited activity from patients. Usually no drastic dietary 
preparations are required. The ultrasound device mostly stays outside the interior body it is 
supposed to visualize. Small ultrasound probes can be entered through various bodily orifices 
and ultrasound can be used to monitor an invasive procedure such as a puncture, yet most 
examinations I observed involved abdominal ultrasound, whereby the transducer was moved 
across a patient’s abdomen or pelvic area. Compared to a fluoroscopic examination, an 
ultrasound machine requires less physical activity from a patient in order to produce images 
that are usable for physicians. In different respects, ultrasound stays ‘outside’ the patient's 
body. Ultrasound implies ‘patient bodies’ that can be active spectators on the one hand, but 
seem to be rather passive objects on the other. 
 
 
Interior inspections: endoscopic views inside the body 
 
Endoscopy is different from the previously described imaging technologies. An endoscope 
does not render parts of the body transparent or translate hidden interior parts into visible 
structures, but literally enters a patient’s body. Classifying endoscopy as an imaging 
technology is not self-evident, since it is a surgical rather than a radiological technique. 
Endoscopies are performed by surgeons and specialized physicians, such as 
gastroenterologists, urologists, gynaecologists, or orthopaedists. Other than a radiological 
body, an endoscopic body is produced by physicians for whom imaging is only one among 
many tools for data collection.  
 An endoscope can enter the body through one of its natural orifices or through an 
artificial opening. In the latter case it is called laparoscopy. In the endoscopy department 
where my fieldwork was situated, surgeons and gastroenterologists performed endoscopic 
inspections of various parts of the digestive tract, including the stomach, intestines and bile 
ducts. During an examination, the monitor shows real-time images transmitted by the lens of a 
video cable inside the tube of the endoscope. The tube is attached to a control head through 
which the physician operates the scope. At the other end the control panel is connected to a 
video processor and a light source. Video-endoscopes are flexible tubes that contain channels 
for the transmission of light, air and water, a lens, and a passage for small surgical 
instruments. Endoscopes differ in length, width and available options. A scope used for 
sigmoidoscopy − the inspection of the first sixty centimeters of the colon − is shorter than a 
scope used for a colonoscopy, covering the entire large intestine. For my observations, I only 
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selected examinations of the large intestine by means of an endoscope inserted in a patient's 
rectum, since only during those examinations the patient’s and the monitor’s positions 
allowed patients to watch the monitor showing real-time images.  
 Endoscopy is used for diagnostic as well as therapeutic purposes, such as the 
selection of locations for tissue sampling or other interventions, which then produce the actual 
results of the examination. Endoscopes are for instance used for the removal of gallstones by 
means of a small mechanical device entered through the tube. Endoscopy’s main strength 
today is believed to be its therapeutic potential, since its diagnostic uses are expected to be 
taken over by virtual endoscopy, in which CT or MRI images are translated by computers into 
3D endoscopic views (Lauridsen 1998: 95).
32
 Another recent development in the diagnostic 
realm has been the introduction of the M2A (mouth to anus) camera pill,
33
 which is 
swallowed by a patient and records images of the small intestine which could not be made 
using conventional endoscopy.  
A patient’s body as it is anticipated in endoscopic equipment has some features that 
differ from those of fluoroscopic and ultrasound bodies. Endoscopic images are video pictures 
of an imaging device moving through a living body. The endoscope transforms the dark 
tunnels of the interior body into spaces available for visual inspection. Once inside, however, 
the body is not merely a visual object, but can also be touched, albeit only through 
technological instruments. The body is available as a source for the acquisition of tissue and 
as the site of surgical intervention. Unlike fluoroscopy and ultrasound, endoscopy does not 
render the exterior body transparent, but actually enters the patient’s body. Therefore it meets 
the interior body’s material resistance in the form of curvy and crampy intestines. Endoscopy 
is invasive and demanding for patients and may cause considerable discomfort preparing for, 
during and after an examination.
34
 Besides involving patients as spectators, endoscopic 
devices also evoke their active participation in subjecting their bodies to the machine's 
requirements. 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 In the Netherlands clinical applications of virtual endoscopy have been limited so far. Therefore I leave those 
developments aside for now, although they may have interesting implications for how medical images affect 
patients’ bodies. 
33 By Given Imaging Ltd. in 2001. 
34 Physicians call any intervention that does not involve access to a patient’s body through an artificial opening, 
non-invasive or minimally invasive. I use ‘invasive’ in another sense here, indicating the intrusion upon patients’ 
physical and mental state of being (cf. Lammer 2002). 
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Machine-body interactions 
 
Imaging devices are actively involved in the configuration of the bodies that are being 
examined, visualized, perceived and experienced in real-time imaging events. Before any 
physical connection has actually been established between them, instruments of real-time 
imaging already affect the bodies they will be applied to. Imaging devices anticipate opaque 
and closed bodies, to be rendered transparent and accessible. Conversely, the anticipated 
bodies shape the design, set-up and intended uses of real-time imaging devices. Intestines, for 
example, are narrow and curved and can only be entered by flexible endoscopes that dilate the 
bowels with air.  
Each technology brings along its own particular views of the body. Endoscopic and 
radiological real-time devices approach a body as a container of materially distinct parts or 
organs. Imaging concerns the translation of material differences into visual distinctions. 
Machine and body can be adjusted when such differences are not visually obvious. However, 
imaging devices do not exclusively produce visual data. Neither the machines nor their 
operator reduce material differences to visual distinctions. Making pictures is one amongst 
other means to identify or exclude the presence of abnormalities in an interior body’s 
structures and functions.  
Imaging devices inscribe the bodies to be translated into real-time images with 
particular qualities. Visualization techniques anticipate opaque bodies and interiors that are 
invisible from the outside, which must be rendered transparent and visible. Bodies are 
potential objects of visualization as well as objects of other sensory perceptions. To name but 
a few examples: it is because of a colon’s material resistance and the pain it can cause for 
patients, that endoscopes are made of flexible material; patients’ dislike of the sensation of 
cold gel, used to connect their body to an ultrasound transducer, is the reason behind the 
installation of gel-warmers in some ultrasound rooms; and a machine used for fluoroscopic 
examinations of the colon contains a kind of ball that the radiologist can use to pressurize 
intestinal curves for better pictures. 
The configuration of real-time imaging devices thus also takes account of the 
involvement of bodies as part of the imaging apparatus. The machines are designed to 
minimize physical resistances and their success is in part dependent on the right balance 
between the body’s passive compliance and active collaboration. For a real-time imaging 
machine to work, i.e. to produce images that physicians can use, bodies need to be passive 
objects as well as active cooperators. Required actions vary from activities resembling 
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gymnastic exercises during a colon fluoroscopy to compliance with breathing instructions 
during an ultrasound examination. Relations between bodies and imaging devices are already 
being established in the design, set-up and intended use of such devices. The configuration of 
the machine is closely connected to how patients’ interior bodies are prepared to interact with 
the machine and become visible entities (cf. Prentice 2005). 
Typical for the particular applications of real-time imaging that I have studied, when 
compared to many other medical imaging and other diagnostic practices, is that they allow – 
or actually invite – patients to be engaged in the examination as spectators. The material 
qualities of these particular imaging devices affect patient bodies as objects, instruments and 
also as subjects of imaging. Besides expanding patients’ visual views of their body, imaging 
devices extend their haptic reach as well. Even before visualizing the body’s interior – during 
an actual examination, that is – technological devices affect how patients feel their body. The 
patient-spectator of real-time medical images is never a mere spectator, but is always also 
physically engaged with the object and instrument of visualization − one’s own body.  
 
 
Professional preparations 
 
Imaging devices need an operator to produce meaningful images. Various medical 
professionals are involved in real-time imaging and in the configuration of a body that is fit 
for imaging. Imaging and images occupy rather different roles in the work of radiologists and 
endoscopists. Radiologists are specialists in imaging. Endoscopists are surgeons or 
gastroenterologists who also perform other examinations and actually treat patients. Except 
for those working with real-time imaging technologies, radiologists hardly ever see a patient. 
Images are produced by technicians who then send them to the radiologist for interpretation. 
 My focus in this section is not on medical professionals’ preparations for a singular 
imaging event, but on the formation of physicians, technicians and nurses into skilled 
performers of particular types of examinations through professional training.
35
 Professionals 
acquire a bifocal vision: they learn how to see wholes as well as parts and how to relate the 
different levels. Furthermore, to learn to perform real-time imaging they need to develop 
visual as well as haptic skills. 
 
                                                 
35 Some light on such individual preparations will be shed in the next chapter. However, I did not systematically 
collect information on individual professionals’ preparations for particular examinations. The focus during my 
fieldwork has been on following two actors: patients and images.  
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 A bifocal vision: how medicine constructs visual body-objects 
 
Basic medical training has a strong visual orientation. Images, from anatomical pictures to 
microscopic visualizations, are central to physicians’ professional training in the identification 
of normalities and abnormalities on and inside patients’ bodies. To untrained eyes, most 
microscopic as well as macroscopic medical images merely show unrecognizable shapes and 
structures. Candidate physicians, however, acquire a specific visual literacy to ‘read’ bodies 
and the devices used to image them.
36
  
Like other modes of clinical imaging, radiological and endoscopic vision results from 
the confrontation of two levels of viewing: reading a full, contextualized body and reading 
fragmented body parts. Physicians are trained to see and interpret anatomical details of the 
whole body and to narrow down their vision to assess the pathology of particular parts. 
Among the principal teaching instruments, we find anatomical atlases showing organs and 
structures in the context of a whole body-complex. In these atlases, bodies are “made 
notational” (Prasad 2005: 292), i.e. “converted into sets of isolable, disjoint, and differentiable 
parts” (idem: 291).  
Textbooks used in medical curricula often feature radiological or endoscopic pictures 
next to anatomical pictures, images made with other (imaging) technologies or similar images 
of the same or another body. Combinations of schematic, anatomical, or other images provide 
medical students with a comparative framework for reading medical images, including 
radiological and endoscopic representations, which merges graphic properties of different 
types of visualizations. By means of lines, arrows or figures, images are inscribed with 
particular standards and readings. 
 
Examples of schematic representations of ultrasound images, from Wicke, L. et al. (eds) (1994), Atlas of 
Radiologic Anatomy. Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger. 
 
                                                 
36 Cf. (Te Hennepe 2007) on the concept of visual literacy. 
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The juxtaposition of different types of images of the ‘same’ object affords the combination of 
information acquired by various means to identify what is the condition of a particular 
patient.
37
 Thus textbooks as well as anatomical atlases train medical students to acquire a 
bifocal vision (Prasad 2005: 292). Images acquired by means of various techniques enable the 
visual distinction of the object of diagnosis situated inside a body. The presentation of images 
in textbooks and atlases suggests that, even if acquired by different means and sometimes 
depicting different body parts or structures, each picture ultimately refers to the same object, 
which is either a generic or a specific patient body. In the next chapter I will argue that the 
ultimate presentation of the body as a unit obscures that this unity actually results from 
coordinating multiple phenomena, including X-rays or ultrasound waves, tissues and fluids, 
blood flows and bowel movements, colors and numbers (cf. Mol 2002).  
Real-time imaging differs from many other forms of medical representation because 
of the simultaneous presence of the whole body under examination and the fragmented 
representations of that body on the monitor during image production and interpretation. 
Novice radiologists and endoscopists therefore need to learn how to make, watch and interpret 
moving images all at the same time. Protocols, guidelines and checklists, such as the list on 
the next page, originally posted on a cupboard in the ultrasound room, serve as handles. 
 
I have included this list to indicate that medical imaging is as much about measuring and the 
interpretation of numbers as it is about seeing and the interpretation of pictures. Medical 
                                                 
37 I have put ‘same’ in quotation marks to indicate a constructivist notion of representation rather than the 
reflective notion implied in this statement.   
Quantification organs and tumor size 
Aorta: 
Determine the maximum AP-exterior diameter measured on a 
transection. Over 3 centimeters is deviant. 
Liver: 
Determine the maximum midcalvicular craniocaudal length of 
the liver on the patient lying on the back. More than 15 
centimeter could be an indication for hepatomegaly. 
Choledochus: 
Measured in the liver hilus. Diameter over 6 mm deviant. 
Gallbladder: 
Length over 3 cm deviant, diameter over 4 cm deviant. Wall 
thickness (measured ventrally) over 3 mm deviant. 
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professionals use imaging in combination with other data collection.
38
 The results of an 
imaging event include visual data as well as numbers taken from measurements (e.g. the size 
of an organ, a tumor or a cyst) and punctures or biopsies (i.e. samples of bodily fluid or 
tissue).  
Characteristic for real-time imaging is that most of the measuring and interpretation 
work takes place during the imaging event. Fluoroscopy, ultrasound and endoscopy produce 
dynamic representations that show the body in action. Still images can be stored and printed 
during a real-time examination, to be inspected afterwards or for inclusion in textbooks, yet 
they provide another type of information than real-time images. As real-time images, the 
pictures only exist while they are made. When still images are stored, moved and combined 
with other images, the direct link with the material patient body is lost. Although multimedia 
materials, such as CD-ROMs and websites, are able to show moving pictures, they fail to 
convey the ‘real-timeness’ of ultrasound, fluoroscopic or endoscopic pictures.  
For the interpretation of still images, physicians acquire an extensive frame of 
reference through education and working experience. Conventions for imaging, looking and 
reporting provide them with standard images of a normal body and its possible deviations. For 
real-time images, however, that visual frame of reference is of limited value, because 
physicians are not merely interpreters of medical images, but also their producers. To a 
certain extent, reading images can be learned ‘from books’. Making images, however, can 
only be learned by doing (cf. Pasveer 1992).  
 
 
Learning by doing: haptic skills in real-time imaging 
 
In a radiology department, most of the training for novice radiologists takes place in the 
reading room. Supervised by a senior, residents watch pictures on light boxes and computer 
screens; they describe what they see and compare the images to those in atlases available in 
the reading room and to images from other examinations. Another important teaching venue 
is the conference room, where cases and images are presented and discussed by attending 
                                                 
38 The position of imaging and images in the work of radiologists and in the work of physicians performing 
endoscopies is rather different. Radiologists are specialists in imaging, whereas endoscopy is a common 
diagnostic and therapeutic tool in some clinical specializations, like surgery or internal medicine. Doctors 
working in an endoscopy department see and treat patients as well. Radiologists may see and talk to patients 
during the production and reading of images, but are not involved in their treatment nor do they communicate 
diagnoses. 
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physicians, radiologists, residents and students at fixed times every day.
39
 Conversely, except 
for the X-rays and stored still produced during a fluoroscopic examination, ultrasound and 
fluoroscopic images never make it to the reading room and they seldom appear in the 
conference room.
 
In the endoscopy unit, there are no such things as reading and conference 
rooms. Some still images taken from ultrasound, fluoroscopy or endoscopy examinations may 
be stored or printed and a final report may be postponed until lab results arrive, yet the 
majority of the images I address in my analysis are read during the examination itself.  
Since real-time images are read while they are made, learning how to read them is 
done while learning how to produce them. Most professional training for radiological or 
endoscopic imaging occurs on the spot, in actual clinical practice rather than in a classroom. 
Most of the examinations I observed during my fieldwork in the radiology department, and 
some in the endoscopy department, were performed by – more or less experienced – residents. 
The following quote by an experienced surgeon supervising a new resident during one of her 
first endoscopic examinations illustrates the haptic nature of real-time imaging.
40
 
 
This I cannot teach you, you have to feel it. This is not something you learn in a 
correspondence course. It is like cycling, you have to feel for yourself how to steer. (....) You 
just have to do it, nice instructions do not help. You just have to feel it, and then it comes by 
itself. 
 
Learning to perform an endoscopy involves the development of visual as well as haptic skills. 
Like the “knowledge of the object is embodied in the surgeon at the same time that the 
surgeon brings that object into being” (Prentice 2005: 841) during the training of surgeons, 
not only the eyes of the novice endoscopist are trained, but her body is as well. Endoscopists 
as well as radiologists performing an ultrasound or a fluoroscopy get to know the interior of a 
patient’s body by watching a representation that they are producing at the same time. As in 
surgical practices, the production of a patient’s body as an object of visual knowledge in 
practices of medical imaging involves physicians’ hands as much as their eyes (cf. Hirschauer 
1991). The coordination of visual and haptic information is key to real-time imaging 
procedures.
41
 
                                                 
39 For an eloquent and elaborate description of the construction and articulation of radiological gazes in a CT 
suite, see Saunders (forthcoming). 
40Haptic includes tactile perception, i.e. perception by means of (exterior) touch, as well as kinaesthetic, interior 
perception of one’s own bodily movement. 
41 The development of endoscopic simulators for the training of novice endoscopists illustrates the technology’s 
haptic nature as well. Simulators consist of a plastic torso with an endoscope entered orally or rectally and a 
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Whereas X-ray, CT and MRI show a standard, objectified body, readable for everyone who 
has acquired a professional radiological gaze, real-time images are only meaningful to those 
who actually made them. The supposed subjectivity of real-time imaging among medical 
professionals is largely due to the haptic nature of real-time imaging. In their preparations for 
imaging, professionals learn to anticipate a particular kind of body. It can be passively or 
actively involved in imaging, yet a patient’s body is ultimately presented as an opaque 
material object in need of visual penetration. That does not mean that patients are exclusively 
passive objects: they are actively involved in their own objectivation. 
 
 
Patient preparations 
 
Besides machines and doctors, a real-time imaging event also requires a prepared patient.  
The first step towards an ultrasound, fluoroscopy or endoscopy is often a visit to the family 
doctor. If anamnesis and a physical examination do not provide enough information for a 
diagnosis or therapy, a general practitioner (GP) refers a patient either directly to the 
Radiology or Endoscopy department for a particular examination or to a specialist for further 
examination and subsequent referral for imaging if necessary. Some examinations are 
performed for screening purposes rather than for diagnostic reasons, for instance when a 
patient has a genetic predisposition or has reached the age where population screening is 
indicated.  
The examinations I observed in the Endoscopy and Radiology departments were 
mostly common procedures. For many patients, the examination I observed was among the 
first medical interventions after a visit to their GP.
42
 In the Netherlands general practitioners 
can directly refer a patient for an ultrasound, sigmoidoscopy
43
, X-colon
44
, Sellinck
45
, or 
                                                                                                                                                        
monitor showing computer-generated images that react to every move of the endoscope. The simulator makes 
the performer of an examination feel resistance when trying to pass a virtual twist in the bowel. To make the 
simulator more real, it can be set to moan in case of pain or gag upon introduction of the scope in the esophagus. 
42 Patients with chronic conditions sometimes can bypass the GP and immediately make an appointment with 
their attending specialist. In the case of regular check-ups, like a yearly endoscopy to monitor a patient’s 
condition after surgery, patients also set an appointment directly with the department. 
43 Endoscopic examination of the first sixty centimeters of the colon (sigmoid), from the anus upwards. 
44 Fluoroscopic examination of the large intestine (colon), using contrast liquid to visualize the colon using X-
rays. 
45 Fluoroscopic examination of the first part of the small intestine (duodenum), using contrast liquid to visualize 
the duodenum using X-rays. 
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MCU.
46
 These examinations therefore often feature relatively early in a diagnostic trajectory. 
For other examinations, like a colonoscopy, a specialist’s referral is required.  
  Informed by the media or by their own previous experiences or those of others, some 
patients who visit a GP or specialist suggest, or even require, a referral for a particular 
examination. Usually, however, patients do not visit a doctor with the explicit objective to be 
referred for an ultrasound, fluoroscopy or endoscopy. Whether upon their own request or not, 
however, the submission of one’s body to a medical regime requires the active participation 
of any patient. Submission to medical requirements implies the objectivation of one’s own 
body and occurs at two levels: physical preparation and information collection.  
 
 
Preparing one’s body 
 
In its natural state, a body may contain substances and fluids that obstruct a technologically 
mediated view into its interior. A body may also lack matter that provides the contrast that 
enables a radiologist or endoscopist to distinguish between normality and abnormality. When 
they are referred for a particular examination, patients usually receive specific instructions. 
They are required to bring their bodies in a proper condition for imaging. Each examination 
requires its own particular preparations that start somewhere between a few hours and a few 
days before the examination. The necessary transformation may merely entail being at the 
right place at the right time, but some examinations require substantial preparations before 
any meaningful image can be produced. 
 Requirements for ultrasound examinations may differ, depending on which body part 
is the object of visualization.
47
 An ultrasound of the kidneys demands no special preparation, 
but an ultrasound examination of the lower abdomen calls for a full bladder. Since ultrasound 
can visualize fluid but not air, patients are required to drink one liter of water one hour before 
the examination. Due to ultrasonic impenetrability of air, patients are not allowed to eat or 
drink any gas-inducing products, such as onions and carbonated drinks, from the day before 
an ultrasound of the upper abdomen. From a few hours before the examination, eating, 
drinking or smoking is not permitted at all.  
                                                 
46 Fluoroscopic examination of the kidneys and bladder, using contrast liquid to visualize the filling and 
emptying of the bladder. 
47 Preparatory requirements described here may vary among hospitals. Elsewhere, patients may be required to 
keep a diet for a longer (or shorter) period of time, have another variety of food and drinks or take a different 
kind of laxative. 
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Intestinal examinations by means of fluoroscopy require patients to refrain from eating two 
days prior to the examination, and to drink lots of clear liquids until the night before the 
examination, after which eating, drinking or smoking is no longer permitted. Moreover, the 
intestines must be cleaned by taking laxatives, which make stools loose and stimulate 
peristaltic movements, causing considerable discomfort and frequent toilet visits. For a  
fluoroscopic inspection of the stomach, patients need to consume effervescent powder and a 
contrast substance immediately before the examination. 
 Although there are differences,
48
 preparations for sigmoidoscopies and colonoscopies 
are comparable to the preparations for a fluoroscopic examination of the colon. Many patients 
have a hard time preparing for an endoscopic bowel examination. The frequent defecation 
induced by laxatives makes it necessary to be close to a toilet all the time, necessitating many 
patients to take a day off from work or school. Besides by frequent and sometimes painful 
passing of stool, patients are troubled by the amount of liquid intake required and by the foul-
tasting fluid laxative. Especially the intake of three liters of salty lavage fluid within three 
hours, required for a colonoscopy, is hard for many people. A patient who already had 
problems keeping her weight up told me that preparing for a colonoscopy cost her two 
kilograms, which she did not regain. The combination of drinking laxative fluids and fasting 
makes some patients nauseated, weak, irritable and prone to headaches.  
Preparations that transform bodies into compliant objects for real-time imaging also 
inform those bodies as objects and subjects of patients’ perceptions and experience. Patients 
do not perceive their interior body visually yet – as they will during the real-time imaging 
examination – but they feel how it is being affected by a diet and by laxatives. Draining the 
body or filling it with unnatural substances cause physical and emotional discomfort, and 
affect the body as an object of a patient’s sensory perception. Preparations affect how patients 
imagine their inner bodies. Preparations often trigger emotions connected to one’s body as 
well, such as anxiety about the eventual results or memories of previous examinations or 
illness episodes.  
 Preparing for imaging is a form of ‘active dispossession’ (cf. Gomart and Hennion 
1999): patients are actively involved in transforming their bodies from their everyday state 
into an extraordinary state of potential visibility. In order to comply with the conditions of the 
imaging apparatus – consisting of imaging device, physician and body - patients are required 
                                                 
48
 For a sigmoidoscopy it takes only one day of not eating, drinking a lot, and purging. Furthermore, on the day 
of the examination in the hospital, it is completed by a clysma. For a colonoscopy, the regime is similar, but 
takes longer: a patient must refrain from eating for two days and is supposed to drink an additional three liters of 
liquid for lavage of the colon. No clysma is then required.  
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to do things they would rather not and refrain from activities they usually enjoy. While they 
translate a body into an object of medical visualization, preparations for real-time imaging 
affect the body that is an object of a patient’s sensory perceptions, emotions and reflections as 
well. What is more, they transform patients’ agency, perception and experience. Preparations 
allow a particular subject to emerge: a patient who perceives his or her body in unprecedented 
ways and experiences a body that is usually absent from conscious experience (cf. Leder 
1990). Medical imaging affects a patient body long before any machine has entered the scene. 
Patients’ preparations for real-time imaging illustrate how embodiment is both a mode of 
objectivity as well as a subjective state of being. 
 
Collecting information 
 
You lie down on your left side. The endoscope is inserted via the anus into the large 
intestine and is carefully moved upwards. The moving of the tube, during which some 
air is inflated into the intestine as well, may cause cramps in the abdomen. These 
cramps usually disappear when the tube is slowly pulled backwards. The intestinal 
mucus is carefully inspected, if necessary tissue samples are taken. In most cases we 
can tell directly after the examination whether abnormalities were found. If tissue 
samples have to be sent to the Pathology laboratory, results will be sent to the 
requesting physician who can discuss them with you after one to two weeks. In case 
you are troubled by gas after the examination, a visit to the toilet usually provides 
relief. 
 Quote from patient information flyer on sigmoidoscopy 
 
During this examination you will be lying on a table. A small tube is guided through 
your mouth or nose via your stomach to the small intestine. A contrast substance is 
administered through this tube; this is necessary to visualize the small intestine. Then 
a number of pictures are taken. The examination takes about one hour, depending on 
how fast your bowels work. During the examination you wear a disposable paper 
apron. 
  Quote from patient information flyer about fluoroscopy of the small intestine 
 
A small tube is guided via the urethra to the bladder. Through this tube the bladder is 
filled with contrast fluid. During the filling and emptying of the bladder pictures are 
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 taken. During the examination you wear a disposable paper apron. The examination 
takes about half an hour. 
Quote from patient information flyer about fluoroscopy of the bladder. 
 
During an ultrasound the organs in the body are visualized by sound waves (which 
you cannot hear). A small machine sends and receives those sound waves and scans 
the skin. To optimize contact, a kind of jelly is put on the skin. NO X-rays are used. 
The examination is painless. An ultrasound examination takes about twenty minutes. 
Quote from patient information flyer about ultrasound  
 
The above quotes are taken from information flyers preparing patients for various real-time 
imaging examinations. Patients usually receive information on the procedure through written 
or verbal instructions from the referring physician or from the desk personnel making the 
appointment. Patients are addressed as owners of bodies (“The examination takes about one 
hour, depending on how fast your bowels work”) as well as subjects of sensory perception 
(“the examination is not painful”) and purposeful action (“If after the examination you are 
troubled by gas, a visit to the toilet usually provides relief”). Brochures also describe the need 
for preparation and hold patients co-responsible for the success of an imaging event. An 
endoscopy flyer, for example, states that in rare cases an endoscope may cause perforation of 
the intestine, yet thorough cleaning of the colon by the patient taking laxatives reduces that 
risk. Flyers provide information on the general purpose and procedures of an examination, on 
its duration, on the area of investigation, on possible complications and on the aftermath of an 
examination, including the communication of results. Patients are encouraged to ask questions 
and all brochures provide a telephone number for further inquiries.  
Patients’ organizations publish information on examinations and imaging procedures 
as well.
49
 On websites, for example, they discuss possibilities to make an endoscopic 
examination less embarrassing by choosing a comfortable position and to make it less painful 
by asking for sedation. They also provide flyers on specific diseases and examinations with 
information on the body part to be imaged, the technology being used, the possible problems 
it helps diagnose, possible interventions performed during an examination, alternative 
examinations, preparations, the course of an examination and its risks, and possible pain and 
discomfort. Information from patient organizations serves a different purpose than hospital 
                                                 
49 For example the Dutch Crohn Colitis Ulcerosa Association (http://www.crohn-colitis.nl ) and the Stomach 
Liver Bowel Foundation (Maag Lever Darm Stichting, http://www.mlds.nl) 
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brochures. Whereas hospital flyers aim to prepare patient bodies for imaging machines, 
information from patient organizations emphasizes physical and emotional coping procedures 
for patients. Hospital flyers address patients as managers of their own interior bodies, whereas 
patient organizations primarily consider patients as persons with physical and emotional 
feelings. 
 Hospital flyers for colon fluoroscopy and colonoscopy mention the use of sedatives, 
relaxing the intestines, yet also temporarily rendering a patient less conscious, prohibiting 
their ability to drive a car for several hours after the examination. Brochures emphasize the 
relaxing effect of medication and most patients expect to be unconscious or semi-conscious 
during an examination. In the next chapter, I describe how sedatives may affect patients 
differently. Some patients fall asleep, whereas others are aware of what happens; some 
patients are able to react to the doctor’s questions and instructions, verbally as well as 
physically, and can watch the live, moving pictures on the monitor during most of the 
examination.  
This last feature, the possibility for patients to watch the monitor during an 
examination, is never mentioned in any flyer, although the possibility to watch live images of 
one’s own interior does feature in the illustrations of some patient organizations’ brochures. 
 
Illustrations from MLD flyer on sigmoidoscopy 
 
Neither hospital flyers nor those by patients’ organizations mention what the images might 
actually show, why a particular technology can or cannot visualize particular body parts and 
organs or how particular preparations improve the quality of the images. Flyers inform 
patients about what they ought to do in order to make the machines visualize their interior, but 
they do not anticipate patients’ own potential spectatorship. They present the need for patients  
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to actively engage in the transformation of their bodies and anticipate what they will feel and 
do during an examination, yet do not prepare them for what they will see.  
Doctors and patients get their information on real-time imaging from different sources. 
Doctors regard images as a possible source of data and use them to exclude possible 
diagnoses, rather than to establish a diagnosis. The presence of gallstones, for instance, is 
sometimes not directly visible, but can be inferred from the dilatation of a bile duct visualized 
by ultrasound. Many physicians claim that patients expect an examination to result in a 
diagnosis and subsequent possibilities for treatment. They expect too much, since in the case 
of medical imaging, what you see is not what you get. In light of the clinical setting, including 
the flyers, it is hard to see what should temper their expectations. By obscuring the practices 
of looking and emphasizing physical processes, flyers contribute to the cultural discourse of a 
‘transparent body’ and of imaging as ‘seeing what is wrong’ (cf. Van Dijck 2005).  
Patients’ physical as well as their mental preparations for a real-time imaging event 
actively engage them in the objectivation of their own body. Preparations also contribute to 
the formation of a particular subject position:
50
 the position of patients as managers of their 
own bodies. Although patients in many cases will be spectators of the real-time images 
produced during an examination, they are not explicitly being prepared for that role. Patients 
are not alerted that in the cause of preparations, they are transformed into an object that is 
rather different from their usual body. Patients’ own preparations of their body for imaging 
results in expectations that professionals deem unrealistic. In the next chapter we will meet 
several patients who believe that during a real-time imaging event they – or at least the 
doctor, who has been trained for it – can see what is inside their body. However, a doctor can 
only see something thanks to an accurately orchestrated composition of elements.  
 
 
Paper work: request forms as coordination devices 
 
Notes pinned up on the wall of the central ultrasound office familiarize inexperienced 
radiologists with standards for ultrasound measurements of particular organs as well as with 
guidelines for the layout of an ultrasound report. Hospital flyers present to patients the 
standard order of an examination. Guidelines for the use of imaging machines indicate how 
equipment should be used in order to produce meaningful images. Detailed digital protocols 
                                                 
50 Michel Foucault has coined the notion of ‘subject position’ to describe that what a subject can do or say 
follows from its position in a particular discursive and institutional context (Foucault 1972 (1969)).  
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for nurses and administrators aim at patients’ active compliance with imaging requirements. 
All such ‘papers’ are means to orchestrate the collective body in anticipation of real-time 
imaging. Individual preparations for an examination by imaging machines, professional 
imagers and patients are guided by implicit or explicit standards attached to a certain job or a 
particular piece of equipment. Such guidelines contribute to the enactment of particular 
bodies alongside such standards. Protocols, guidelines, patient files and records – increasingly 
digitalized – are benchmarks in the various actors’ work done to produce meaningful images.  
Of particular importance in the preparatory phase of imaging are request forms, 
coordinating the actors that have been introduced in this chapter’s previous sections into an 
apparatus fit for real-time imaging. Every real-time imaging examination starts with a 
standard request form completed by the referring physician or the hospital’s diagnostic center. 
It is patients’ passport to the radiology or endoscopy department. Except in emergency cases 
and for particular follow-up examinations, patients cannot make an appointment without a 
request form. Standard request forms are at the disposal of all physicians working in a clinical 
department. Patients referred by a physician outside the hospital need to exchange their 
referral notes for the standard hospital form at the diagnostic center. This center is a 
gatekeeper, providing patients with the right key for access to certain diagnostic and 
therapeutic facilities. At the diagnostic center the information provided by the referring doctor 
is translated into the categories listed on the form: the name of the requesting physician and 
her or his department, date of the request, type of examination requested, indication and 
question the examination should address, other relevant clinical data, and the date of the last 
examination the patient had in the same department. Different forms are used for the 
radiology and the endoscopy department, yet the categories largely correspond. The 
endoscopy form includes more specific categories about the patient’s condition (use of 
medication, presence of or therapy for blood coagulation problems, other specific measures 
required), whereas the radiology form leaves some room for the radiologist to write down 
remarks during the examination.  
The categorized information on the request form presents a fragmented body. Divided 
into possible objects of visualization, the body appears as a potential source of data that can 
be compared to other data in order to identify the normality or abnormality of the body’s 
medical condition. The present section describes the categorization of patients’ bodies and the 
work that is involved in the translation of complaints and of symptoms diagnosed by a doctor 
into an indication for a particular examination.  
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Bodies in categories 
 
Sifting through a request form yields a lot of information on the translation of a patient’s body 
into an object of medical imaging. By means of electronic or paper records, doctors are 
informed about a particular part of patients’ pasts, thus allowing for medical continuities, yet 
losing sight of illness as it is embedded in patients’ lives. In the endoscopy department, the 
performing physician receives a paper record, including the most recent request form. The 
record contains all request forms and reports of endoscopic examinations undergone by 
patients in this hospital. New requests and reports are put in front of the previous ones. The 
first page of the file consists of a chronological list of all examinations. In the radiology 
department, patients’ records are electronically accessible from any computer terminal in the 
department. With a few clicks, a doctor has access to a chronological list of radiological and 
endoscopic examinations a patient has had and to reports of all those examinations, unless 
they have been performed before 1990. Flipping or clicking through a patient’s record, 
doctors can easily travel through patients’ histories of examinations in their department.  
It is relevant to distinguish the origin of a request form. Patients cannot request 
examinations themselves. They are referred by their general practitioner, their attending 
physician from one of the hospital’s outpatient’s clinics or wards, the Emergency Room 
physician, or a physician from another hospital. The name and location of the physician who 
requested the examination usually provides quite some information on the history of the 
request. A request filed by a general practitioner, for example, is often one of the first steps 
towards identifying illness or health. In such cases, it is not clear what to look for and what to 
expect, neither for the imaging physician, nor for the patient.  
If a general practitioner suspects a problem in a patient’s colon, he or she can either 
refer the patient to a specialist for further anamnesis or immediately request a sigmoidoscopy, 
an endoscopic inspection of the last sixty centimeters of the colon.
51
 General practitioners are 
not allowed to request colonoscopies, examinations of the entire colon. Some 
sigmoidoscopies therefore are requested as a ‘first step’ that is likely to be followed by a 
colonoscopy. Patients then need to prepare for an examination twice, whereas a specialist 
might have decided to perform a colonoscopy in the first place. 
The history of seemingly similar requests may result in outcomes that affect patient 
bodies rather differently. Since surgeons and gastroenterologists have their own distinct ways 
                                                 
51 The specialist may be a surgeon or a gastroenterologist, depending on the suspected nature of the problem. 
                                        PATIENT COMPOSITIONS: PREPARING BODIES FOR REAL-TIME MEDICAL IMAGING 
                                                                                                                      63                                                                                                                                           
of performing endoscopies it is particularly relevant who requests and performs an endoscopic 
examination.
52
 The suspected nature of the problem leads a general practitioner to refer a 
patient to either a surgeon or a gastroenterologist.
53
 When patients are referred for an 
endoscopy by a surgeon, the examination will also be performed by a surgeon. The same goes 
for gastroenterologists: they only request examinations from their colleagues. That is not due 
to nepotism, but to the suspected nature of a problem: surgical problems should be solved by 
surgeons, gastroenterological ones by gastroenterologists.  
Central on a request form are the type of examination requested and the question it 
should address. Different technologies are used to depict different things: X-rays and CT are 
good for visualizing solid structures, ultrasound and MRI are particularly apt for imaging soft 
tissues. There is a hierarchy among radiological imaging technologies. An assistant in the 
radiology department told me: “It seems that patients are referred for an ultrasound on any 
suspicion. First ultrasound, then a CT, then a MRI, that is the order. They start with a shower 
of shot.” Among the imaging technologies able to visualize soft tissue, ultrasound is often the 
first to be applied: it is relatively cheap, fast, and relatively ‘non-invasive’. CT and MRI 
images, however, are generally considered to be more accurate and objective, since their 
interpretation is not inextricably bound up with their production. 
From a specific preliminary diagnosis or indication the choice for a particular 
examination logically follows. Some problems can be made visible with a particular 
technology, but not with another. For a check-up of the colon after the removal of polyps, for 
example, a colonoscopy should be requested. To measure the size of polycystic kidneys, an 
ultrasound is the examination to request. Many of the examinations performed in the 
radiology and endoscopy department, however, are not guided by such specific questions. 
Although not always the first step, imaging often starts off a diagnostic trajectory. General 
complaints such as abdominal pain can have innumerable causes. Based on anamnesis, 
physical examination and sometimes urine tests, blood tests or other diagnostic instruments, a 
physician usually develops some idea of what might be the cause of the problems before 
deciding upon the most appropriate visualization technique. The choice for a particular 
examination brings along a specific set-up for an imaging machine, a certain scope of medical 
interpretation and definite requirements for patients.  
 
                                                 
52 E.g. sedation is more common in endoscopies performed by gastroenterologists than in surgical inspections. 
53 Unlike for a radiological examination, for an endoscopy the requesting physician can be the one who performs 
the actual examination. A physician then knows the patient and his or her particularities and potential 
complexities. 
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On the request form, the examinations are not described merely as ‘ultrasound’, 
‘fluoroscopy’, or ‘endoscopy’, but specified in terms of the specific area or part of the body to 
be visualized. The object of examination is a fragment of a body rather than a whole. For 
example, referring doctors may request an ultrasound examination of the liver, the bladder or 
the right kidney, which are then translated by the diagnostic center or the personnel of the 
radiology department into examinations of the ‘upper abdomen’ or ‘lower abdomen’. Each  
specific examination has its own inbuilt settings in an imaging machine. For an ultrasound of 
the upper abdomen, for example, different parameters are selected than for an ultrasound of 
the kidneys, in terms of scope and contrast. The interior body is constructed as an object of 
imaging that gets recontextualized when it moves from one clinical space to another. 
Radiological or endoscopic categorizations may eclipse those of the requesting physician. I 
observed the endoscopic examination of a patient’s sigmoid, performed by a 
gastroenterologist. Upon his arrival in the examination room, the nurse noticed that the 
examination was indicated for hemorrhoids. The gastroenterologist then decided that the 
patient had to come back for an examination by a surgeon − who was not available at the time 
− because a surgeon would not only be able to diagnose the likely cause of his problems but 
would treat it as well. Physicians require some idea about the nature of the patient’s problem 
in order to decide who should perform a particular examination. If that is not clear, patients 
suffer the consequences. The patient with hemorrhoids, who did prepare for the 
sigmoidoscopy by means of a diet and laxatives, was sent back home and another 
appointment was made.  
 The indication, i.e. the symptoms or preliminary diagnosis underlying a request for a 
particular examination, constitutes a separate category on the request form. Whereas a 
physician can only choose from a limited number of examinations for visualizing parts of the 
inner body, the ‘indication’ or ‘question’ category on the request form has a wider scope. The 
guiding question for an examination is complemented by other relevant clinical data if 
deemed necessary by the requesting physician. In their articulation of the question, physicians 
anticipate the standard report of an examination. Usually, however, a requesting doctor is not 
so much interested in a patient body’s correspondence to a standard body, but in its deviations 
from it. That is why attending physicians are often interested in results or images that are not 
included in the standard scope of an examination. During fluoroscopic examinations, for 
example, standard images are produced at fixed points in time, e.g. before filling up the 
bladder with contrast fluid (MCU), or while releasing the rectum (defaecogram). If requesting 
physicians want to know about other body parts or moments, they need to indicate that on the 
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request form. Usually, specialists from the hospital will be more aware of such standards than 
general practitioners. General practitioners, however, also have their standardized ways of 
interpreting, classifying and reporting an anamnesis (cf. Timmermans and Berg 2003). Thus, 
although the question category seems to leave more room for doctors’ free expression than the 
category of requested examination does, framing a question always entails very specific  
translations of a patient’s story and physical matter − translations that are highly standardized 
and standardizing.  
 
 
Translation, multiplication, coordination: the work of request forms 
 
Request forms translate patients into textual, standardized and fragmented objects. Their 
bodies are distributed among departments, specializations and physicians, who divide them 
into relevant and irrelevant areas and parts and who classify a body according to general 
criteria. It is transformed from a lived body “into a juxtaposition of organs, parameters, rows 
of numbers, graphs, and so forth” (Berg and Bowker 1997: 514). A request for imaging does 
not straightforwardly result in images of interior body parts, but materially reconfigures that 
body by directing what will happen, where it will be touched, and what it needs to do. This is 
an example of ‘alignment convergence’ (Bowker 1994: 46) of the request form and the body 
it represents: the request form inscribes its categories and classifications on the body it seems 
to represent (cf. Berg and Bowker 1997: 519). The body that is the site for diagnostic or 
therapeutic visualization is thus the product of what the request form does: framing the setting 
for a diagnostic or therapeutic intervention by coordinating the work of the various actors.  
Request forms convey information on the trajectory of which a planned examination is 
part. That trajectory is a network of examinations and medical interactions that includes a 
patient’s anamnesis. An analysis of request forms exemplifies how “the categories used in 
discussing health conditions are shaped” (Mol & Berg 1998: 1) in networks of patients’ 
bodies, physicians and imaging technologies. A request only works when it is related to other 
actors, introduced earlier in this chapter: patient bodies, doctors, machines, guidelines and 
protocols. Connected to a variety of human and non-human actors, request forms “constitute 
the network, or the dispositif, within which the body acquires its specific ontology” (Berg and 
Bowker 1997: 514). Although request forms present fragmented bodies, they undoubtedly 
also refer to a single body. In the words of Annemarie Mol, they constitute a body multiple 
(Mol 2002).  
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Their recontextualization into diagnostic practices renders objectified body fragments part of 
new wholes. A request form inscribes a patient’s body with a particular history, linking past 
and present conditions and examinations. Request forms render bodies comparable as bearers 
of textbook diseases and yet they preserve some of the patients’ particularities, not only by 
including their name and date of birth. Requests forms present not mere body parts, but also 
persons. On the request form for a colonoscopy of a young woman with Crohn’s disease, for 
example, the requesting physician indicates that good sedation is necessary, since the woman 
has been terrified by previous examinations. Another example is an ultrasound request stating 
“C2H5OH” in the question area of the form. The chemical formula for ethanol indicates that 
the patient in question has an alcohol problem. 
Request forms coordinate the embodied, materially heterogeneous work involved in 
preparing bodies as objects and subjects of real-time imaging. The choice for a certain 
examination and the phrasing of the question aims at translating what can be felt in something 
that can be seen. A sigmoidoscopy request, for example, aims at translating abdominal pain 
and rectal blood loss into a visible cause, like polyps or hemorrhoids. The request form 
coordinates the anticipated visible body with other medical bodies, enacted by words 
(anamnesis), touch (physical examination) or other visualizations (e.g. microscopic images). 
Thus request forms contribute to the robustness of a body’s visible interior that machines, 
doctors and patients prepare for. 
 
 
Collective embodiment and the enactment of disease and illness 
 
Actor-network theory provides a method and vocabulary to describe a body’s preparation for 
real-time imaging as a material-semiotic process of collective embodiment: a matter of 
meaning as well as a matter of matter (cf. Barad 2003). We have come a long way from the 
painful belly of Mr. Bergmans in chapter 2 to a body-collective of doctors, patients, machines, 
and request forms now.  
Particular assemblies of machines, bodies, physicians and forms provide all actors 
involved with specific abilities to act. In the present chapter, I have described how various 
elements, which enable patients to act and perceive during an examination and which enable 
images to appear, already get connected before an actual examination takes place. Patients’ 
bodies are composed into competent ‘bodies-for-imaging’ in various preparing practices that 
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come together in an examination room at the time of a real-time imaging event. In this 
process of composition, patients appear in multiple modes: as potential objects of 
visualization, as potential spectators and as actors managing their own body. Patients are 
actively involved in the transformation of their own bodies into objects of imaging and – 
although less explicitly so – into prospective spectators of images of their interior. They 
subject themselves to a regime of physical preparations and information to align their bodies 
with machines and physicians. The body that patients act upon is materially resistant, yet 
adaptable; it is opaque, yet potentially visible. The body they act with is capable of sensory 
perception, communication, emotion and cognition.  
The preparations of bodies by imaging devices, doctors, patients and request forms 
condition bodies for real-time imaging. Preparations constitute processes of objectivation as 
well as subjectivation of patients’ bodies, including their state of health or illness. What gets 
articulated in the production and operation of imaging machines, training of physicians, 
preparations of patient bodies and categorizations of request forms, is what anthropologists 
usually describe as disease: a potential attribute of bodies and a prospective object of medical 
diagnosis and therapy. Simultaneously, real-time imaging preparations inscribe patients’ 
bodies with potential illness: the word used by anthropologist to describe patients’ subjective 
experience of their embodied condition. Illness is a subjective experience that may be linked 
to a disease once it is connected to technology and professional medical expertise. Yet from 
the moment a patient’s experiencing and experienced body meets the physician’s objectified 
image of a body, the development of both modes of embodiment is interconnected and the 
distinction between illness and disease that is central to medical anthropology, actually looses 
its descriptive and analytical power.  
During a body’s preparation for real-time imaging, illness/disease is enacted as a 
phenomenon that is both discursive and material (cf. Barad 1998: 105, 2003: 816). As 
summarized in the conceptual matrix in chapter 2: ‘bodies are articulated in networks of 
humans and non-humans’ and ‘disease emerges from hybrid configurations of actors, 
including patients’ bodies’. In the present chapter I have argued that the enactment of disease 
involves embodied experience as much as techno-medical knowledge. The production of 
medical knowledge starts (long) before physician and patient meet during an examination.  
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Patients’ embodied experience is one of its constituents. Others are the normal body to which 
physicians compare a patient’s body, the standardized, equipped body that an imaging device 
is set up for and the fragmented body anticipated on a request form. In the build-up to the 
examination the experiencing and experienced patient’s body meets these other bodies. 
Connections are made that result in the emergence of a body that is fit for imaging – or not.
   69 
4 Moving pictures: productions of presence in 
real-time imaging events 
 
 
 
 
On the examination table lies a patient. She watches the radiology assistant who sets the 
machine for an ultrasound examination of her lower abdomen. Somewhere in another room, 
waiting for the gastroenterologist to come in and start the endoscopic examination of his 
colon, a patient watches indefinable grey contours on a monitor. At some other place in the 
hospital, a patient in a green apron feels burpy after taking the effervescent powder that 
should fill her stomach with air in order to make it visible for the radiologist, who can come 
in and start the fluoroscopic examination any time. In a few minutes, the bodies of those 
patients on the examination tables will also appear as moving pictures on the monitors next to 
them. They are ready for action.  
  Herein lies the origin of the fascination that triggered this book: in the examination, a 
real-time imaging event that produces visual representations of parts of patients’ interior 
bodies while patients themselves are watching. There is the aura of transparency, of 
immediacy, of direct access to one’s own body on the one hand, and the technological 
transformation and complex reading on the other. The present chapter describes how bodies 
are translated into real-time images. It explores the conditions of technologically mediated 
illness experience: the various ways in which patients’ bodies and real-time images are 
connected during medical imaging events.  
 In the previous chapter I described the process of collective embodiment that 
precedes an imaging event. The bodies that are translated into real-time images are 
composites. What a body is and what images are is different for each of its constituents: a 
patient, a physician, a nurse, a technician, a machine. Differences are not merely a matter of 
interpretation and meaning, but of materiality as well. To address some particular material 
and perceptual characteristics that distinguish real-time images from other medical 
representations of bodies, like medical files, request forms and printed or still pictures, one 
needs a specific vocabulary. First, real-time images are evanescent: they appear instantly upon 
acquisition and they disappear immediately afterwards. Second, the object of real-time 
medical imaging – a patient’s body – is present as a spectator of the images’ appearance and 
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is actively involved in their production. Based on my observations of real-time imaging 
events and on the conceptual frameworks from anthropology, phenomenology and science 
and technology studies introduced in chapter 2, the present chapter develops a vocabulary to 
describe the particularities of real-time medical imaging. 
The chapter starts with three elaborate case stories. We enter examination rooms 
during examinations and come to know about both the evanescence and the inescapability of 
real-time images. The stories indicate that, despite their similarities, real-time imaging events 
produce a variety of body-image connections. In the second section, I describe four categories 
of connection, or modes of attachment. They include professional real-time reading of images 
as well as patients’ perceptions, actions and emotions. In the third section the specificities of 
real-time-ness will be connected to the four modes of attachment by introducing the concept 
of presence. I conclude with a preliminary assessment of the value of my analysis for an 
understanding of illness experience.  
 
 
Of bodies and images in real-time  
 
Mr. Coenen’s ultrasonic kidneys 
 
Mr. Coenen, whom we have met before in chapter 2, lies on the examination table in an 
ultrasound room. Diagnosed with polycystic kidney disease almost twenty years ago, he has 
recently entered a medical trajectory preparing for dialysis and, ultimately, a kidney 
transplant. He is now in his early fifties, and over the years his condition has gradually 
deteriorated. The increasing number and size of cysts in his kidneys causes hypertension, 
bloating, fatigue, and decreasing physical stamina. Today’s ultrasound of the abdomen and 
kidneys is one in a series of examinations to assess whether he is eligible for dialysis once it is 
indicated by a certain blood value. 
 The ultrasound room is scarcely lit. Next to the examination table, there is a monitor 
with a control panel. Mr. Coenen, on the table, has undressed his upper body, his bare chest 
covered by a towel. His right arm put behind his head, as the radio diagnostics assistant asked 
him to, he watches the assistant setting the machine for the examination. As soon as an 
assistant radiologist enters the room, the diagnostics assistant leaves. The radiologist looks at 
the request form and while glossing over Mr. Coenen’s medical situation, takes an ultrasound 
probe from its holder and applies some gel.  
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Placed on Mr. Coenen’s abdomen, the transducer probe transmits high-frequency sound 
pulses, which enter his body and bounce back as soon as they hit boundaries between tissues 
that absorb different amounts of sound waves: kidney tissue and liquid-filled cysts, for 
example. The probe picks up reflections of waves when they have reached a boundary. The 
machine measures the time of each echo’s return and calculates distances from probe to 
boundaries. The two-dimensional images that appear on the monitor display the distances and 
intensities of the reflections. 
The monitor hardly shows its first grayish images when Mr. Coenen asks: “Are those 
the kidneys you see?” “Yes, all those black follicles are cysts”, the radiologist responds. “And 
the light pieces are what is still ok?” “That is the kidney center”. Both the radiologist and Mr. 
Coenen watch the moving pictures of his right kidney on screen. Occasionally, the radiologist 
pushes a button to store a digital still image of a large cyst for future reference. “Let me look 
to the other side”, the radiologist says. Mr. Coenen asks whether he needs to turn. “ No, just 
stay like this”, the radiologist replies. To see the other kidney, she moves the transducer to the 
left side of the lower abdomen. She types something on the keyboard of the machine’s control 
panel. The word ‘left’ appears left of the image on the monitor. “Is it worse than the other 
side?” Mr. Coenen asks. “Hard to say, it is difficult to quantify. Can you hold your breath for 
a moment?”  
Using the mouse attached to the 
machine’s CPU, the radiologist moves 
a pointer across the screen. By clicking 
the mouse, she freezes the image. She 
marks the outline of the black circle. 
“What is this?” 
“Another cyst.” 
“A big one, isn’t it?” 
With another mouse-click, the cyst is 
measured. Its size appears in the lower left corner of the image on the monitor. It is indeed the 
largest cyst measured during this examination. The radiologist stores the image by pressing 
another button. She applies what she has learned about the specific grammar of dynamic, 
moving images (cf. Ihde 2003: 17) by training and experience: how to produce a meaningful 
image of a kidney, how to identify a black circle as a large cyst, how to measure it and 
compare its appearance and size to normal images and values, and which images to store for 
future reference or for the patient’s record.  
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While Mr. Coenen alternately holds his breath and breathes normally, he feels the transducer 
across his abdomen and watches the shifting shapes, words and numbers on the monitor. They 
show something that he has never seen, yet with which he is so familiar: his illness. Mr. 
Coenen watches the monitor attentively and asks questions to understand what he sees. Thus 
he comes to share the radiologist’s reading of the images, most of which only exist for the 
duration of the examination. The transducer moves up a bit, to show the liver as the doctor 
explains. “I also see some cysts here,” the doctor says. “Don’t worry, it is quite normal. When 
you have a disposition for cysts, you can have them everywhere. There are not many, and you 
do not have any complaints, do you?” No, he has not, Mr. Coenen replies. “Ok, that was it 
then”, the doctor says. “Goodbye.” 
After Mr. Coenen has left the examination room, the radiologist goes straight to the 
dictation machine in the department office and dictates the report of the examination. The 
pictures stored during the examination can be retrieved from a digital storage system and 
watched on a large monitor in the office.
54
 Pictures are only retrieved occasionally and the 
radiologist who examined Mr. Coenen does not use the storage system at all. She reports from 
memory and from the few notes she took during the examination.  
 
 
A fluoroscopic view of Mrs. Vermeulen’s bladder 
 
Because of chronic infections of the urinary tract 
and frequent lower abdominal pain, Mrs. Vermeulen 
has been scheduled for a micturating cysto-urogram 
(MCU). The purpose of the fluoroscopic 
examination is to find out whether her bladder fully 
empties when she urinates, as remaining urine could 
be the source of infection. The images produced 
during an MCU result from the transmission of 
Bladder catheterization  
http://kidney.niddk.nih.gov/kudiseases/pubs/urodynamic/ 
                                                 
54 With this system, the ultrasound unit went ahead of many other radiology and hospital departments, where 
digital storing systems for images had not yet been introduced. It would be interesting to see how the digital 
storage of medical images, which increasingly is becoming common practice in Dutch hospitals, has affected, 
and will further affect, practices of reading real-time images. It might be that the necessity of real-time reading 
decreases, and that the production and reading of images will become more distributed over time, space and 
people.  
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attenuated X-ray beams through a patient’s body and appear on two monitors: one situated 
next to Mrs. Vermeulen and one in the control area of the room, separated from the 
examination area by a window.  
 The radiologist explains to Mrs. Vermeulen how her bladder will be filled with 
contrast fluid through a catheter. To produce diagnostically useful images the bladder needs to 
be filled to its maximum. The doctor cannot see what that maximum is and needs Mrs. 
Vermeulen to tell her when her bladder is full. At that point, Mrs. Vermeulen will be asked to 
urinate in a special bag the radiology assistant shows her. Both the process of filling and of 
emptying of the bladder will be imaged. The radiologist inserts the catheter, attaches it to a 
tube and fixes it to a bottle filled with iodine-base contrast. The assistant turns off the light 
and starts the flow of contrast fluid. The monitors show images of Mrs. Vermeulen’s lower 
abdomen. At the center, slowly a black spot appears: the filling bladder. 
Both monitors – the one in front of the radiologist in the control area, and the one next 
to Mrs Vermeulen – only show real-time images when the radiologist turns on the 
fluoroscope. During those periods, which last between several seconds to a few minutes, the 
radiologist stores some still images with a click on the device’s control panel, into a digital 
file for future reference. Moreover, during the examination she takes some standard X-ray 
pictures according to the MCU protocol, e.g. of the urinary tract before insertion of contrast, 
and of the full and empty bladder. Those regular X-ray pictures are printed, and of better 
quality than stored fluoroscopic images. However, they cost more in terms of radiation, time 
and money. 
Mrs. Vermeulen watches the monitor. “You can see for yourself”, the radiologist says. 
When after ten minutes the bottle of contrast fluid is empty, the assistant fixes another 200cc 
bottle to the machine. When that one is empty as well, she asks Mrs. Vermeulen whether she 
is still okay. “I feel some urge, but I can hold it, no problem”. The black spot on the monitor 
continues to grow bigger. The radiologist tells Mrs. Vermeulen again to signal when she feels 
“as if you are about to burst, that you can just barely manage to hold it.”  
While Mrs. Vermeulen feels the contrast fluid filling up her bladder, she alternately 
watches the monitor, the emptying bottle of contrast fluid, the radiology assistant next to her, 
and the radiologist behind the window. Halfway during the third bottle, Mrs. Vermeulen’s 
toes start to move. The radiologist explains to the intern that this reflex signals that the 
bladder is almost full. Yet Mrs. Vermeulen does not object to having another bottle, a 50cc 
one this time. “Are you going to break the record?” the radiologist asks her jokingly. Mrs. 
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Vermeulen wants to know: “How much do you usually give people?” “To an adult?”, the 
radiologist replies. “Usually two or three bottles.” 
The fourth bottle finishes quickly. For the radiologist, the sight of the large black spot 
on the monitor combined with the number of empty bottles triggers a sensory perception. “I 
almost have to pee myself when I see this”, the radiologist whispers to the intern. Yet Mrs. 
Vermeulen seems okay. She does not know what a full bladder normally looks like. Unlike 
the radiologist, she has not learned to relate what the monitor shows to what her body feels, or 
should feel. It is the radiologist who notifies her about such a relation. 
 Another 50cc bottle is installed, and again it is finished within a few minutes. Since 
there are only cold bottles of the contrast fluid - iodine - left, the radiologist decides to add 
100cc of saline water. Mrs. Vermeulen asks: “Can I pee now?” “You have a serious urge?” 
“Yes.” “800cc”, the radiologist jots down on the request form. To obtain useful information, 
the radiologist cannot depend on the pictures alone. She also needs Mrs. Vermeulen’s 
indication of how she feels. The body of Mrs. Vermeulen is not merely the referent for the 
images, it also indicates the start of the next phase in the examination. 
The radiologist asks Mrs. Vermeulen to lie down with her legs straight and then turn 
to her left and right side, to have bladder pictures taken. Then the assistant removes the 
catheter and hands her the plastic bag. The examination table is put upright. “Yes, you can 
pee now”. The monitor shows a black stream. From her present position, Mrs. Vermeulen 
cannot watch it herself. “If you think it is empty, let me know”, the assistant tells the patient. 
A few instants later, Mrs. Vermeulen says she is ready. The examination is over. While the 
radiologist flips through the stored images behind the control panel, Mrs. Vermeulen gets up 
and leaves the examination room, about 45 minutes after having entered it. The radiologist 
behind the control panel glances through the stored images on the monitor. They confirm her 
reading of the real-time images: there is no urine reflux. 
 
 
Endoscopic inspections of Mrs. den Hartog’s large intestine 
 
In endoscopy room 4, Mrs. den Hartog lies on the examination table, the lower part of her 
body partly covered by a towel. She is scheduled for a sigmoidoscopy: an inspection of the 
first sixty centimeters of the large intestine. Mrs. den Hartog is in her mid-forties and 
regularly suffers from abdominal pain and increasingly frequent bowel movements. She is 
worried because the pain reminds her of her father’s illness, who died of colon cancer a few 
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years ago. Her general practitioner first referred her for a gynecological ultrasound. When this 
appeared to be normal, a sigmoidoscopy was scheduled. 
Lying on her left side, Mrs. den Hartog faces a monitor. It shows images transmitted 
to a video processor by the lens of the video cable inside a flexible tube, which also contains a 
light, a channel to transmit air and water, and a channel for the passage of small surgical 
instruments (e.g. for biopsies). The monitor shows grayish images of the endoscopy room 
from the viewpoint of the endoscope in the hands of the assisting nurse.  
The nurse dims the light in the examination room. The doctor smoothens the 
endoscope with a lubricant to facilitate the insertion of the tube and to ease some of the 
patient’s discomfort when the endoscope enters. Standing behind the patient, the doctor enters 
the scope into the anus and guides the flexible tube through the patient’s intestines. She 
pushes a button on the control head of the endoscope to blow air into the intestine. While the 
endoscope passes from outside to inside her body, Mrs. den Hartog watches the monitor and 
sees how the grey contours of the imaging room and the outside of her own body give way to 
moving color images of fleshy, moist structures. The air unfolds the bowel, providing a clear 
view of the intestinal lumen. “It may cause cramps”, the assisting nurse explains to Mrs. den 
Hartog. “You can just let it pass, it is odorless, it is just clean air that we blow in”.  
The endoscope does not enter easily. The doctor tries to adjust its position. “Ouch,” 
Mrs. den Hartog calls out. The doctor tells her that there are many curves. When talking to the 
doctor, Mrs. den Hartog seems to relax a bit. She watches the monitor. After a few minutes, 
the doctor says: “We are going back now. I saw a small polyp on the way up. I will look for it 
on the way back.”  
A few instants later, the endoscope stops moving. “Yes, here it is,” Mrs. den Hartog 
says. She has never seen a polyp before, yet she recognizes the bulge in the intestinal lining 
shown on the monitor. It must be a polyp, since it looks different from its surroundings and 
the doctor said that she saw a polyp. “Yes, there is one here”, the doctor confirms, “but there 
is also one more a bit further down”. “How big is a polyp anyway?”, Mrs. den Hartog wants 
to know. “What should I imagine?” “Small, very small”, the doctor replies. “Not like a 
pinhead, is it?”, Mrs. den Hartog wonders. “Usually they are about two to three millimeters.” 
“Really? It looks much bigger.” The nurse gives the endoscopist a small biopsy forceps, 
which she inserts into one of the channels inside the endoscope. On the monitor, a pair of 
cutters appears. Mrs. den Hartog does not look at the monitor. On the doctor’s command, the 
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nurse ‘takes a small bite’
55
 from the polyp and pulls back the forceps. She drops the small 
piece of tissue in a jar, which is marked and set aside.  
The doctor continues. Mrs. den Hartog closes her eyes every now and then, sighs and 
moans softly. She needs all her attention to cope with the pain caused by cramps inside. “You 
can pass some gas”, the nurse says. “I try to, but I am not used to that. A lot is between the 
ears you know.” Mrs. den Hartog has learned that it is impolite to fart in the company of 
others.  
 After about 15 minutes, the examination is over. Four polyps have been found, in three 
different areas of the sigmoid. Two were burnt away, the others were sampled. While Mrs. 
den Hartog gets dressed, the physician tells her that irrespective of the lab results of the 
sampled tissue, it is very unlikely that her symptoms have been caused by the polyps. The 
polyps are too small too cause pain and they do not look actively malignant. There was no 
indication for any other cause either. Since polyps further up the colon could cause the kind of 
pain Mrs. den Hartog suffers from, the radiologist proposes to schedule an examination of the 
entire large intestine, a colonoscopy.  
 
Ten weeks after the sigmoidoscopy, Mrs. den Hartog is back on the same examination table. 
Since she will undergo a colonoscopy this time she receives a sedative administered by drip  
during the examination.
56
 A monitor shows her pulse and blood pressure, which is measured 
by a clip on one of her fingers. Although the medication makes her sleepy, Mrs. den Hartog 
sometimes watches the monitor and talks to the nurse, who encourages her to pass gas in case 
of cramps. This time, however, Mrs. den Hartog is not bothered by any cramps. 
Occasionally, the monitor shows some yellow spots: excrements, the doctor explains. 
Mrs. den Hartog remarks that it is dirty, compared to what she saw ten weeks ago. She is 
unpleasantly surprised that her intestines are not clean after she drank three liters of laxative. 
The doctor explains that it is normal; regardless of the preparations, some fluid stools from  
                                                 
55 Literal translation of the Dutch ‘een hapje nemen’. The expression is used in physicians’ and nurses’ 
communication with patients, as well as among themselves. 
56
 Because a colonoscopy takes longer than a sigmoidoscopy and enters further into the intestine, it is more 
likely that the pain caused by the examination interferes with the aim of a successful examination. The main 
effect of the medication is the relaxation of patients’ muscles and bowels, making the examination easier for 
them as well as for the physician. In many countries, sedation is standard for colonoscopies. In the department 
where I did my observations, all gastroenterologists and some of the surgeons perform colonoscopies with 
sedation. Sigmoidoscopies are usually done without, unless the patient explicitly requested it, or was known as 
having had serious problems during a previous examination. Other surgeons prefer the patient to be as conscious 
as possible, in order for them to comply during the performance of interventions, like biopsies. 
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the small intestine enter the colon, but they can easily be sucked or flushed away through the 
endoscope. However, Mrs. den Hartog feels responsible and embarrassed. She repeatedly 
mentions how well she prepared for the examination, keeping the diet and taking the 
laxatives.  
When the doctor announces she is nearing the end, Mrs. den Hartog asks how many 
centimeters she is in. “A meter now,” the doctor replies. She asks Mrs. den Hartog to turn 
back to her left side. “We are almost there……. There we are!,” the doctor says. Mrs. den 
Hartog: “That is the stomach, isn’t it?” She thinks what she sees on the monitor now, is her 
stomach. It is not, however. In fact, it would be impossible to reach the stomach with an 
endoscope. The doctor links Mrs. den Hartog’s remark not to what she sees but to what she 
must feel: “Do you feel this in your stomach? That is possible, the colon partly goes across 
the front of the stomach. Or actually, it goes behind it, I should say. We are at the beginning 
of the colon now. Now we go back and I spray it clean a bit.”  
In order to make sure she has seen the entire colon, the doctor asks Mrs. den Hartog to 
turn on her back again. Responding to Mrs. den Hartog’s question whether she saw anything 
odd, she says she did not. The endoscopy has not identified any tangible cause of abdominal 
pain which would justify a diagnosis or treatment. “So the pain has been caused by something 
like a spastic colon then?” Mrs. den Hartog asks. “That might be. It cannot be the polyps. 
They are too small. A polyp can only cause pain when it obstructs part of the bowel. But not 
in this case. We will take another look in six years.” 
 
 
Momentary compositions 
 
The real-time imaging technologies that were used to examine Mr. Coenen, Mrs. Vermeulen, 
Mrs. den Hartog and the other patients whom I observed in the hospital, produce momentary 
images. Doctors as well as patients can watch images of bodily interiors while they are being 
made, and only then, since the images vanish immediately, except for some prints or stored 
stills. The monitor provides a ‘live’ view inside a body. Real-time imaging leaves few 
material traces. In ultrasound and fluoroscopic examinations, a limited number of prints and 
digital stills are saved for future reference. Most endoscopic examinations do not produce any 
visual ‘immutable mobiles’.
57
 The majority of ultrasound, fluoroscopic and endoscopic 
                                                 
57 Bruno Latour has introduced this term to describe two-dimensional, compact, stable and transferable pictures 
that can be easily compared to other data (cf. Latour 1990: 22). 
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images exist only temporarily, at a particular moment and in a particular place. They are 
composites of heterogeneous elements, including the hardware and software of a 
technological imaging device; a doctor and a patient, each with her or his own particular 
behavior; sensory perceptions; request forms and protocols; physical body parts; and a 
particular time-frame. What real-time images show, results from a specific configuration of 
elements at a particular point in space and time. 
Although the ability to watch images is distributed among a variety of human and non-
human actors involved in the production of connected body-networks and image-networks, 
visual perception is usually attributed to a singular entity: a doctor, a patient, a machine. 
Moreover, there is no doubt about the images’ referent: during an examination, neither the 
physician nor the patient questions whether the pictures on the monitor represent the body on 
the examination table. However, a lot of work by physicians as well as by patients and 
machines is required in order to establish that relation. That work already starts before the 
examination, as described in the previous chapter. The ‘body on the examination table’ in 
itself is many things. For the physician, it is an imaging instrument and an object of 
visualization. For the patient, it is the object of examination and at the same time it is both 
source and object of visual and sensory perception.  
During an examination, yet another body appears: the body on the monitor. The 
simultaneous presence of patients’ bodies in various modes triggered the central question for 
this inquiry: what happens to embodied experiences of health or illness when one is able to 
have a real-time look into one’s own interior? How do various modes of embodiment interact 
and affect one another? During imaging events, various modes of embodiment are enacted: 
the body a patient sees, feels and acts with; the body on the examination table that is the 
ultimate object of medical examination; and the body on the monitor as black and white 
shapes or colorful structures. A real-time imaging event present different modes of 
embodiment at the same time. After the event, bodies and images are disconnected. They get 
reconnected in various expressions of experience, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
However, the real-time connection of bodies and images is actively being produced as well.  
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Image-body attachments 
 
Medical imaging technologies mediate doctors’ perceptions of patients’ bodies as well as 
patients’ perceptions of their own bodies and their conditions. Turning patients into potential 
spectators of their own interior bodies, real-time imaging technologies transform patients’  
perceptions and present their bodies in ways that differ from everyday experience.
58
 The here-
body on the examination table watches the monitor, listens to the doctor and feels the 
movement of the imaging device either on the inside or on the outside. The image-body on 
the monitor presents the patient’s body as an object of visualization and observation, 
coinciding with but also different from the embodied spectator.
 
 
Sometimes an imaging event fails to construct a correspondence between the visual 
representations of a patient’s interior and the supposed referent of those representations. In 
some cases the physician fails to establish a diagnosis and attributes this failure to a flawed 
imaging device or to the physical resistance of the patient’s body. It may also be the patient 
whose physical sensations are at odds with what the monitor shows. The colonoscopy of Mrs. 
den Hartog provides an example of the latter. During the second inspection of her colon, Mrs. 
den Hartog linked what she saw on the monitor to what she felt inside her body. She thought 
she saw her stomach. The radiologist dismissed that conjecture and made a distinction 
between seeing and feeling.
59
 Thus the radiologist presented herself as an expert in seeing and 
the patient as an expert in feeling: Mrs. den Hartog does not know what the radiologist sees, 
the radiologist does not know what Mrs. den Hartog feels. The separation of seeing and 
feeling and the privilege of the first over the latter is a feature of the entire set-up of real-time 
imaging rather than an individual action of the radiologist. It enacts an agential cut (cf. Barad 
1996: 171). The radiologist grants herself with the agency to see and thus to obtain objective 
knowledge. The radiologist grants the patient her subjective experience, i.e. the agency to 
feel.  
During a clinical examination physicians and patients alike tend to privilege medical 
expertise over embodied expertise.
60
 Yet the story of Mrs. Vermeulen’s agency in the 
                                                 
58 Other medical images, like CT, MRI or PET scans, sometimes meet the eyes of the patient as well, and can 
become a powerful force in various public socio-cultural arenas (cf. Dumit 2004), but only after being processed 
and translated by experts in producing, interpreting and representing them.  
59 The actual expression that “there is a difference between seeing pain and feeling pain” comes from another 
imaging event I observed. During an endoscopy, the patient attributed the pain that he felt to a recent operation. 
The examination, however, did not indicate any such cause. 
60 See for instance Jose van Dijck’s description of her own illness experience, in the Introduction to The 
Transparent Body (2005). Despite sharp pain attacks and continuous nausea for several weeks, she began to 
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production of fluoroscopic pictures of her bladder provides a counter-example. It showed that 
a doctor may need to know what a patient feels in order to understand what medical images 
are showing. In that case the doctor needed both the images and the patient’s verbal 
expressions to ‘see’ whether or not something was wrong.. The distinction between 
knowledge as ‘what doctors see’ and experience as ‘what patients feel’ is not an intrinsic 
property of real-time medical imaging devices or events. 
The stories of Mrs. Vermeulen and Mrs. den Hartog illustrate two ways in which 
patients’ bodies are connected to images during real-time imaging events. The stories indicate 
that attachments like this can take various shapes. As an object of examination, a visualization 
instrument or as a spectator, a body can comply with or resist an imaging procedure. A patient 
can watch the monitor during the examination, yet she may also refuse to watch. Patients may 
recognize their own body on screen or think of what they see as pictures of an unknown 
world. Sometimes doctors and patients have lively conversations, other examinations take 
place in silence.  
Despite the evanescence of the event and the images, real-time imaging is conditional 
upon the constitution of links between bodies and images. These attachments may last longer 
than the imaging event itself. Four modes of attachment can be identified, which are 
interlinked and may occur simultaneously during an examination: the real-time interpretation 
of images by medical professionals; patients’ visual perceptions of images of their own 
interior body and simultaneous sensory perceptions of the imaging procedure; patients’ 
physical agency during imaging; and patients’ emotional responses to the images and the 
imaging procedure.  
 
 
Real-time readings 
 
Since the majority of images produced during real-time imaging events only make a one-time 
appearance, the interpretation of the images is mainly a real-time affair. A radiologist or a 
physician who performs an endoscopy has to decide during the examination which images 
potentially provide relevant data, for an immediate diagnosis, for future reference or to plan 
an intervention. Physicians’ processing of pictures starts during the examination; they adjust 
contrast and colors, change angles, and add numbers, marks and words, thus translating 
                                                                                                                                                        
doubt her symptoms when both a gastroscopy and an ultrasound did not show any possible cause. When a blood-
test showed that something was seriously wrong, she underwent emergency surgery. 
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pictures into data. They constantly go back and forth: between monitor and body, request and 
image, pictures and words, shapes and numbers. The patient is the physician’s witness; Mr. 
Coenen, for example, attentively observed how the radiologist zoomed in, made marks, 
performed measurements and added text and numbers to the pictures.  
Medical imagers are paradoxically iconoclastic, especially when they compare 
themselves to patients. When introducing myself and my research topic – simply put as ‘the 
impact of real-time imaging on patients – several radiologists mentioned their surprise about 
what they considered patients’ high expectations of imaging. “Patients always think we can 
see everything,” a radiology resident said, “whereas, actually, only in about 30 % of the 
examinations we are able to see something.” The radiologist did not mean to say that the other 
70 % of the patients were okay. In many cases, imaging technologies were just not able to 
visualize the cause of a complaint. And in response to a patient who during an ultrasound 
examination remarked that the liver looked quite large, another radiologist stated: “You think 
it is large? You can have it any size you want,” while he zoomed in and out, thus completely 
altering the image on the monitor. To professional imagers, imaging is about producing data, 
that can be represented visually, numerically or otherwise (Beaulieu 2002, cf. also Dumit 
2004, Prasad 2005). Many radiological techniques actually involve the translation of audio 
(ultrasound) or numerical (MRI) into visual data, “as an afterthought that is markedly lacking 
in any aspect of visuality” (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 300). Physicians need pictures in 
order to localize, estimate, measure and intervene, as instruments or data sources rather than 
as results or data. They regard images as objects to read rather than as objects to see.  
During an examination, physicians address a patient’s body as an object of 
investigation, which must be disclosed in order to show its possible deficiencies. Imaging 
technologies do not simply render bodies transparent, nor do they make disease or health 
visible. For physicians, images are semi-finished data sets that need to be transformed into 
data. It is from this perspective that a doctor points out to a patient what the monitor shows. 
To Mr. Coenen’s question whether his left kidney looks worse than the right, for example, the 
radiologist replied: “Hard to say, it is difficult to quantify.” Patients may feel that the relation 
between doctor and imaging technology is one of embodiment, whereby the monitor serves as 
a window to the patient’s interior body. For doctors, however, their relation to the images and 
the imaging device is a hermeneutic one: they mark, measure and count, rather than merely 
look. 
Although real-time images can be translated into two-dimensional, compact, stable 
and transferable pictures that may be easily compared to other data (cf. Latour 1990: 26), even 
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prints, recordings and stored digital visual results of real-time imaging events never obtain the 
objective status of other visual medical data like X-rays or MRI-scans. The products of real-
time imaging are unable to speak for themselves to physicians who have not been involved in 
their production. When the results of real-time imaging are communicated to the physician 
who requested the examination, the report usually consists of words and numbers and does 
not include visual data. Although pictures can be transferred to other physicians, they rarely 
are. A radiologist explained to me: 
 
It makes little sense to send prints of ultrasound images to the requesting doctor. You know, 
you can compare those stills to a frozen video image, they are just as hazy. Moreover, the 
saved images are only an anthology from the moving pictures. We have noticed that pictures 
do not add much to the report, as they are hardly looked at. Clinicians usually cannot do much 
with ultrasound stills, contrary to CT- and MRI-scans. Those are objective images, which 
clinicians themselves can interpret as well. 
 
Yet while pictures of real-time imaging events are harder to read than quantitative data, they 
are still more tangible than the patients’ bodies themselves. Doctors can do things with 
images they cannot do with bodies: save them, edit them and compare them. That gain, 
however, implies a considerable loss. Whereas real-time imaging for doctors involves feeling 
the imaging device and listening to the patient, such additional ‘live’ information is lost 
outside the examination room. That is even true for the video recordings made of particular 
fluoroscopic and endoscopic examinations.
61
 Even moving pictures of a full examination are 
not a mere copy of a real-time imaging event, but a translation. The images are detached from 
the bodies they supposedly refer to. One can take time to read the pictures, rewind them, 
freeze them and rerun them. Their value may be compared to a recorded live television 
broadcast: the recorded images mean something different from the live ones, since it is 
exactly the simultaneity of the event and the image transmission that gives live television its 
particular impact. Nevertheless, recorded images contain traces of the actual event.  
Images do not show health or disease. What they can show is abnormality compared to 
normal images: whether a lump is solid or filled with liquid or whether tissue is red or pink. A 
similar image in two different patients can come to refer to different ‘causes’. What is the start 
                                                 
61 A video recorder is a standard feature of endoscopy and fluoroscopy machines. Endoscopic examinations are 
rarely recorded, except for educational purposes or on special request, e.g. of an attending doctor who has not 
been able to perform the examination him- or herself. For some fluoroscopic examinations video recording is 
standard, like in defaecographies (recording the movements while a patient discharges contrast fluid from the 
bowels) and HSG exams (scouring the Fallopian tubes with contrast liquid). 
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of an infection in one person can be improvement or stabilization of the condition of another 
patient. What counts as health or disease is not simply decided on the basis of pictures. It is 
only in the pathology lab where an irregularity spotted through the endoscope turns out to be a 
malignant polyp. 
The presence of the actual object of imaging – the patient’s body – during the 
examination, as well as the conscious attendance of the patient, gives a real-time imaging 
event its distinct character when compared with other examinations like MRI- and CT-scans 
or X-ray. Most discussions about non-real-time medical images, take place in radiological 
reading and conference rooms. Although patients sometimes get to see some of the pictures 
after an examination or during a follow-up consultation, doctors are commonly the only ones 
to see medical images. A radiologist who translates X-rays or CT-scans into reports has 
usually not been involved in the hands-on production of the images, nor has she or he seen the 
actual patient.
 62
 In the reading room radiologists retrieve and interpret printed or digital 
pictures produced during various procedures and dictate the reports of those examinations. In 
a conference room, radiologists, assistants, students and physicians from other departments 
discuss a selection of pictures that are particularly interesting for educational or broader 
diagnostic purposes. In the case of real-time imaging, the examination room functions as 
production room, reading room and conference room all in one.  
For non-real-time images, professional intersubjectivity, institutionalized in reading 
and conference rooms, translates initial deliberations into the most objective findings 
possible. Real-time imaging requires a different routine. Although real-time reading follows 
similar routes and protocols, those remain inaccessible to other physicians. The few pictures 
that continue to have some kind of material presence – either in print or digital – are relatively 
insignificant as results of a real-time imaging event. They rather serve as reminders, or 
anchors for the reading of images that have ceased to exist materially.  
Real-time imaging allows for constant feedback between monitor, physician, nurse 
and patient. Patients like Mr. Coenen and Mrs. den Hartog ask the doctor what he or she sees, 
what the doctor is looking at or whether a particular image is normal. They thus evoke the 
expression of a particular reading, which may include elements that may not directly follow 
from, or be that relevant to, the reason why the examination has been requested. During an 
abdominal ultrasound examination I recorded the following conversation between a 
                                                 
62 Image acquisition is the job of radiology assistants or technicians. 
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radiologist and a patient, who had just explained that one of her kidneys had been surgically 
removed: 
 
 R And where is your gallbladder? Gone as well? 
 P Yes, ha-ha, you could search for that for a long time!  
 R Could you please tell me what else you are missing? 
 P My appendix, parts of my pancreas. 
R This happened to me before this week, that I was looking for over a minute to 
find the uterus, and then the lady told me it had been removed! 
 
In this example, the radiologist benefited from the patient’s presence in the interpretation of 
the images on the monitor. The eventual report, however, usually does not contain such 
information. Characteristic for real-time imaging is that research data (real-time images) only 
exist during an examination, where they are connected – both materially and in time – with 
their eventual referent (the patient’s body). Physicians filter those qualities from the data as 
much as possible by storing only still pictures and their translations into numbers and words. 
The evanescence of the images and the presence of the patient, however, inform patients 
about the process of knowledge production.  
Some physicians extensively inform patients about what they do and see during an 
examination. Intentionally or unintentionally, doctors communicate ‘results’ to patients 
during or immediately upon the examination, although they themselves do not consider them 
as results yet. Sometimes physicians explicitly reflect upon the limited value of an 
examination. I observed radiologists stating to a patient after an ultrasound that “the kidneys 
look ok, but that does not tell you anything about how they function” or that “the liver looks a 
bit fatty, but that can indicate many things”. 
Patients usually hear the final results of a real-time imaging event from a physician 
who has not seen the images. The final results are communicated several days or weeks after 
the examination, yet patients are often told some preliminary results – something like “the 
ultrasound does not show anything special” – during or immediately after the examination 
from the performing physician. They have witnessed a crucial phase in the interpretation of 
the images, but there is no actual diagnosis yet. The results of real-time imaging that patients 
eventually obtain, do not carry any material trace of the imaging event. Yet they do refer to 
that event somehow. In the next chapter I will argue that both the results and patients’ own 
memories of the examination are sources that may contribute to the enactment of patients’ 
illness experience. 
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Doctors’ real-time readings inform patients’ perceptions of their own body. The endoscopic 
pictures of Mrs. den Hartog’s intestine, for instance, showed polyps − something obvious to 
the doctor, who, has learned through training and experience what normal colons and polyps 
look like. Mrs. den Hartog saw polyps as well, for the first time in her life. When the doctor 
pointed out what a polyp looked like, Mrs. den Hartog started to look for them. She assessed 
anything she saw: is it normal, and if not, could it be a polyp? Thus during the examination, 
Mrs. den Hartog acquired potential visual referents for her physical inconveniences, as well as 
a new way to perceive her own body. 
The quantity and quality of verbal and non-verbal communication between doctors 
and patients during examinations diverged significantly. Sometimes, doctors actively involve 
patients in the production of images and in watching them. Some physicians explicitly point 
to the possibility of watching the monitor during an examination. Yet during the examination, 
they may not explain anything about what is shown. Others give an almost streaming 
commentary.
63
 Patient’s presence during the interpretation of real-time images affects how 
doctors talk about images. Besides a biomedical vocabulary doctors use another language to 
talk about images in real-time imaging events, which is used to address the patient. It consists 
of every-day language, featuring elements from what could be called a psycho-social 
vocabulary. In endoscopic events, this is usually the main vocabulary of the nurse during an 
examination.  
Language does not merely express visual observations, but transforms the object of 
real-time imaging , since “by the use of a certain vocabulary, a reality is created in which 
people, things, facts, values and acts get allotted their own place and meaning“ (Mesman 
2002: 43, translation MR). That is why an analysis of doctor-patient communication in real-
time imaging events is crucial to understand technological mediations of embodied 
experience. In their interactions with doctors, instruments, nurses and images, patients obtain 
a particular ‘endoscopic’ gaze (cf. Van Dijck 2001) that informs their embodied experience.
64
 
Doctors and patients delegate part of their search for diagnosis and treatment to imaging 
devices. The collective work of doctors, machines and bodies in real-time imaging gives 
patients the impression that doctors can see what is wrong with them.
65
  
                                                 
63 Not only a patient might require or invite a more or less detailed commentary by the doctor, my presence as a 
researcher might have done that as well. Some doctors and nurses told me that some doctors tended to explain 
patients more, since they knew I was interested in how patients experienced examinations. 
64 ‘Endoscopic’ not in the medical, but in the literal sense of ‘a view within’, derived from the Greek endo 
(within), and skopein (to view). 
65 This argument will be further developed in chapter 5. 
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It is not my primary aim to describe technological mediations of medical professionals’ 
agency and experience.
66
 However, during real-time imaging, knowledge production, agency 
and perception are distributed among physicians, patients and imaging technologies. An 
account of patients’ mediated embodied experience – which is my primary aim − therefore 
must include the work of medical professionals. Patients’ presence during physicians’ real-
time readings of medical images – i.e. the translation of patients’ bodies into discursive 
objects via images – transforms patients’ perceptions of their body as it lies on the 
examination table and appears on the monitor. The same goes for the technical and 
professional preparations described in the previous chapter and for the diagnostic work 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
Seeing one’s own interior 
 
The possibility for patients to watch the imaging being produced in real-time constitutes 
another mode of attachment. Apart from for example fluoroscopic examinations of the colon, 
which require positions and physical activities from patients that do not allow them to watch 
the monitor, the set-up of most other examinations I observed enabled patients to watch the 
monitor at least during part of the examination. Indeed, the sight of the monitor was hard to 
avoid in examination rooms, since it is the main source of light in a scarcely lit room and the 
main object of attention for the doctor. Often doctors invite patients to watch the monitor and 
‘see for themselves’. That is what Mr. Coenen did. He carefully screened the monitor during 
the examination, asked questions about what he saw and shared his own interpretations with 
the radiologist. However, I also observed patients who did not watch the monitor at all during 
the examination. One of them was Mr. Simons. During the ultrasound examination of his 
kidneys, he looked at the ceiling and the walls of the examination room and not once inquired 
about what the radiologist did or saw. He felt the transducer, heard the beeps, changed 
position, and regulated his breathing upon the doctor’s request, but he did not look at the 
monitor. When I asked him after the examination why he had not watched the monitor, he 
replied: “I do not see anything anyway. Those people know more than I do.”  
Unlike Mr. Simons, Mr. Coenen and Mrs. den Hartog were fascinated by the images, 
even if they had no medical background either and were unfamiliar with the kind of images 
                                                 
66 Several authors have done that thoroughly and eloquently among whom Blume (1992), Pasveer (1989) and 
Saunders (forthcoming). 
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that appeared on the monitor. Just like any other patient, they had received an information 
flyer that focused on the physical preparations required for their examination and on the 
possible inconveniences, but that contained no information about what the monitor would 
show and what that could tell them. Mr. Coenen and Mrs. den Hartog, however, expected the 
monitor to show something about themselves. Like many other patients, they did not 
recognize the images that appeared on the monitor, yet they had no doubt that what they were 
watching was their own body. While Mrs. den Hartog looked at the screen, she felt the 
endoscope inside her body and the cramps caused by the inflated air. When the doctor 
removed a polyp, Mrs. den Hartog averted her eyes, apparently not wishing to see this 
surgical intervention, although she later told me that she did not feel the sample being taken 
or the polyps being removed. In response to a question I posed to him after the endoscopic 
examination of his colon, Mr. Theunissen, who was introduced in chapter 2, remarked: 
 
MR When you see those images, you know that: this is my body, this is me? 
MT Yes. You feel that, you know? You feel that tube right here in your guts. You can feel 
approximately where they are with that tube.  
 
During the production of images, fluoroscopy, ultrasound and endoscopy establish bodies as 
objects of patients’ tactile perception to various degrees. A fluoroscopy machine sends and 
receives X-rays, without physically touching the body. The high-frequency sound signals 
emitted by an ultrasound transducer only reach their destination – and are bounced back – 
when the probe moves across the skin rubbed with gel. An endoscope literally enters the 
body; it temporally becomes part of it, touching the body on the inside. Since patients know 
that the images on the monitor are produced by a camera in the tube that they feel moving 
inside them, it must be their own body appearing on the screen. Pain and discomfort cause 
doctor and patient to constantly shift focus from body to monitor and vice versa.  
Mr. Simons and other patients who do not watch the monitor during an examination, 
undo the simultaneous presence of their image-body as an object of visual exteroception and 
their proprioceptive here-body.
67
 Mr. Simons did not establish a visual link between his own 
lived body and the real-time pictures on the screen, yet he created other links that enabled the 
production of usable images, actively complying to the doctor’s breathing instructions. To the 
construction of a medical, diagnostic meaning for the examination, it is irrelevant whether or 
                                                 
67 In psychology and phenomenology, the term exteroception is used to describe perception by means of the five 
senses open to the external world: sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. Proprioception is the "unconscious" 
awareness of where the various regions of the body are located at any one time and includes balance, position, 
and muscular tension (Leder 1990: 39).  
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not a patient watches the monitor. It is significant, however, for my analysis of the enactment 
of embodied experiences of illness. The previous and present chapters constitute the first steps 
in that analysis, which will be completed in the next chapter. When a patient does not watch 
the monitor during an examination, a characteristic constituent of real-time medical imaging 
experience - i.e. the possibility to go back and forth between the body on the monitor and the 
body on the examination table provided by the collective set-up of the examination- largely 
disappears. By not watching the monitor, Mr. Simons perceptually separated his image-body 
from his here-body. His body was instrument and object of imaging, but not a spectator of the 
images. For Mr. Coenen, however, real-time images provided opportunities to perceive, act, 
communicate and understand. As a spectator, he experienced his body through the images, not 
merely as an object of medical investigation but as his own. 
However, even when a patient does actually watch the monitor, it is not self-evident 
that the visible body on the screen refers to her or his own body. The simultaneity of seeing 
and feeling one’s body that makes real-time imaging stand out from many other medical 
mediations of embodiment, does not automatically result in a patient’s identification with the 
images on the monitor. The story of the fluoroscopic examination of Mrs. Vermeulen’s 
urinary tract, for example, showed how the simultaneous presence of a growing black spot on 
the monitor and the sensations of an increasingly full bladder occurred simultaneously, yet the 
visual perception and the physical sensation emerged separately. Whereas for the radiologist 
the sight of a patient’s bladder filled with contrast fluid evoked an almost physical sensation 
of urge, Mrs. Vermeulen endured the increasing pressure on her bladder for a long time. She 
saw her bladder growing bigger on the monitor, yet she lacked the visual literacy to interpret 
that perception as abnormal. 
On the other hand, I have also observed patients who were able to predict what the 
images would show on the basis of physical sensations. Patients with chronic conditions often 
become experienced spectators. One of them was Mr. Theunissen. Suffering from a chronic 
bowel infection, he has experienced numerous endoscopic examinations. I observed the 
examination and afterwards asked him what he saw. 
 
MT You immediately saw those red and white spots, that is not okay. It was even worse 
than last time. 
MR Why was it worse? 
MT Well, you saw many of those white spots, those are infections. Actually, that is not 
good. 
(…) 
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MR What did you expect from this examination? 
MT In fact, it is always the same, you know. You feel it has just stayed the same. 
MR And that is also what the doctor said now? 
MT Yes, it is just a check-up, they want to have a look. 
Medical inspection by means of visualization and by means of physical examination are often 
complementary. Successful real-time imaging requires and evokes visual as well as haptic 
involvement of doctors and patients. Real-time imaging produces both images patients can 
see and sensations they can feel. The real-time simultaneity of seeing and feeling may 
constitute an unique perceptual link between the images on the monitor and one’s own body. 
Sedatives interfere with this simultaneity of seeing and feeling one’s own body. In 
endoscopic examinations the use of sedatives (a ‘glow’, or in Dutch a ‘roesje’) is fairly 
common. For most colonoscopies it is standard. For sigmoidoscopies it is not, because of the 
limited duration of the examination.
68
 When a patient is sedated during an endoscopic 
examination, the link between feeling (pain) and seeing one’s own interior body is partly 
discontinued. During her second endoscopy, Mrs. den Hartog received a sedative. Compared 
to the first examination, the association between her visual perceptions of the images on the 
monitor and the endoscope moving through her body appeared to be weaker. The medication 
often affects both patients’ visceral perceptions and their ability to watch the monitor. The 
sedative makes them sleepy and they regularly doze off. Although Mrs. den Hartog largely 
stayed awake and was aware of what happened on the monitor and in the examination room, 
her body was affected rather differently by the second examination compared to the first one. 
During the second examination, Mrs. den Hartog was not seriously bothered by cramps or 
other physical discomfort. The relaxation of her muscles and bowels made the examination 
easier on her and gave the physician smoother access to her interior body. The sedatives made 
the simultaneous haptic and visual perception of her interior body less urgent. They also 
affected her ability to act. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 For some fluoroscopic examinations, patients also receive medication to relax their muscles and prevent 
bodily resistances. Ultrasound examinations do not require such interventions, since the procedure is largely 
painless, even if the pressure on a patient’s body may hurt in some cases. 
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Active dispossession  
 
A particular kind of ‘ability to act’ constitutes a third mode of attachment that may be 
constitutive for a patient’s experience of illness. It is the agency to be passive. The stories of 
Mr. Coenen, Mrs. Vermeulen and Mrs. den Hartog have shown examples. All four 
examinations that were presented, called for the patient’s active participation in submitting 
her or his body to the imaging apparatus, which required more or less physical effort. Despite 
sometimes unpleasant sensations, the three patients attempted to relax, breathe on command 
and move when required. Like most patients, they were cooperative, because they considered 
their examination to be a prerequisite for diagnosis and possible treatment, resulting in the 
recovery or improvement of their abilities to cope with everyday life. 
The success of real-time imaging depends on a delicate balance between patient’s 
passivity and activity. Patients’ cooperation and compliance are necessary conditions for 
successful imaging (cf. Burri 2001: 280). Real-time examinations may fail to result in 
diagnostically or therapeutically useful medical data. Even when a patient intends to subject 
her or his body to medical inspection, the body may not comply with real-time imaging 
requirements. Bowels can still contain excrements despite the patient’s intake of prescribed 
laxatives, as in the case of Mrs. den Hartog. A curve in the large intestine can prevent the 
progress of an endoscopy. Sometimes contrast fluid is not distributed evenly during a colon 
fluoroscopy. And when a patient has been not been able to drink enough water and hold it, it 
is impossible to produce a meaningful ultrasound image of the maximum contents of a 
bladder. The body has a material agency to resist the process of collective embodiment and 
equipment of a body fit-for-imaging that I described in the previous chapter.  
 The responsibility for a body’s compliance is distributed among patient, imaging 
machine, and doctor. In the first endoscopic examination of Mrs. den Hartog, the endoscopy 
was able to pass a curve in the bowel. By pushing on Mrs. den Hartog’s abdomen, the nurse 
attempted to make her body comply. In addition, the doctor asked Mrs. den Hartog to move in 
order to manipulate her unwilling body. In the case of Mrs. Vermeulen, the radiologist was 
fully dependent on not only her body’s compliance, but on Mrs. Vermeulen’s verbal and 
embodied expressions of her physical experiences as well.  
Actively attaching their bodies to the imaging apparatus, patients share in a collective, 
distributed agency. In the present and in the previous chapter, I have identified the 
“techniques, settings, devices and collective carriers which make this active dis-possession 
possible” (Gomart & Hennion 1999: 221). Bruno Latour has called it actantiality: “what 
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provides actants with their actions, with their subjectivity, with their intentionality, with their 
morality” (Latour 1999b: 18).  
 Real-time images would not exist without patients’ cooperation and compliance. The 
simultaneous active and passive involvement of patients’ bodies in image production is 
visualized and materialized by the pictures on the monitor. It informs patients’ embodied 
experience. For their part, images provide patients with the possibility of spectatorship, 
another form of active engagement.  
 
 
Moved by pictures 
 
Besides visual and sensory perceptions, emotions are a way in which patients are attached to 
real-time images and to the imaging procedure. When the inability of images to present a 
readable body is ascribed to a non-compliant body, patients sometimes get angry, 
disappointed, or embarrassed, like Mrs. den Hartog when she discovered that her colon was 
not entirely free from excrements despite her laborious purging. Although both the nurse and 
the physician told her that this was not uncommon and that it could be solved by 
technological means, i.e. by flushing water through the endoscope, Mrs. den Hartog felt 
responsible and somewhat guilty. 
The story of Mrs. den Hartog exemplifies another mode of patients’ affective 
attachment to images as well. During her first endoscopy, Mrs. den Hartog suffered from 
painful cramps, caused by the air inserted into her colon to provide the physician visual 
access. The nurse encouraged Mrs. den Hartog to relieve the discomfort and break wind. She 
assured her that this was an entirely normal thing to do in this situation and nothing to be 
embarrassed about. Since it would only be the clean inflated air that would be relieved, it 
would not even smell. Yet Mrs. den Hartog could not do it. Even in this extraordinary 
situation she could not give up the idea that breaking wind in the company of others is 
indecent. Although in theory Mrs. den Hartog did have the agency to relieve some of the 
discomfort that the examination caused her, her embarrassment prevented her to do so in 
practice. A similar emotion arose when the doctor identified the yellow spots that appeared on 
the monitor as excrements. At first, the monitor showed images that Mrs. den Hartog felt that 
she was physically connected to, yet did not represent her body as a recognizable part of 
herself. Then the doctor translated the images into a recognizable feature of one’s body – 
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something one usually prefers to keep for oneself, so intimate that is a cause of 
embarrassment when seen by others. 
A very common emotion for patients in real-time imaging events is fear. For many 
patients, the period before an examination is one of uncertainty. They worry about complaints 
they have sometimes been experiencing for a long time already or about symptoms which 
have deteriorated over a period of time. The examination might show that something serious 
is wrong. Several patients regard the images on the monitor with mixed feelings: awe and 
fascination on the one hand, fear and avoidance on the other. Sometimes an examination 
arouses sadness and feelings of loss, evoking old sores, reminders of past illnesses and 
medical treatments. Patients affective attachment to images and imaging has “to do with 
entering into a world of strong sensations; of accepting that ‘external’ factors take possession 
of the self; of being ‘under the influence’ of something else; of bracketing away one’s own 
control and will in order to be expelled or rendered ‘beside oneself’ “(Gomart & Hennion 
1999: 221). When emotions come into play, it becomes apparent that imaging does not merely 
affect one’s body, but oneself.  
 
 
Images of bodies 
 
In the preceding paragraphs I have identified four ways in which patients’ bodies are attached 
to images over the course of real-time imaging events. First, bodies and images are connected 
in physician’s real-time readings of the images and in the communication between doctors 
and patients during an examination. In the second mode of attachment, the simultaneous 
visual and haptic involvement of patients in the production and watching of the images 
contributes to the possibility of patients to identify with the images on the monitor. Third, 
imaging makes patients participate in a network of distributed agency, being active and 
passive at the same time. And finally, patients may get emotionally attached to imaging and 
images.  
One way of reading these modes would be to consider the first as a mode of patients’ 
bodies’ objectivation, and the others as modes of subjectivation. In those terms, the last three 
modes of attachments (sensory, agential and emotional) constitute links between subjects and 
their objectified bodies that result from the first mode of attachment (professional real-time 
reading). However, the fact that these modes of attachments occur in real-time and often 
simultaneously, renders distinctions between body-objects and embodied subjects, which may 
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seem clear-cut in other practices of (medical) representation, problematic. What happens 
when image, reading, perception, agency and feeling are joined in space and time and 
collectively come to form the referent for a stream of real-time images? How does real-time 
imaging inform or transform people’s notions and experiences of selves? What happens to the 
relation between represented and experienced bodies in real-time imaging events, and to the 
relation between image-body and here-body, that phenomenologists continue to distinguish 
despite their relational, constructivist notions of experience? And what about the 
anthropological distinction between disease and illness?  
Understanding experience in terms of attachment opens up paths to address those 
questions. In networks that consist of discursive, visual, haptic, agential and affective links 
between bodies and images, real-time images can become ‘subjectifiers’ (Latour 2005: 212): 
representations of patients’ own bodies. A description of real-time imaging as an event shows 
“how artifacts actively co-shape the events around them, and to understand these events not 
only in terms of action but in terms of experience as well” (Verbeek 2005b: 134, emphasis in 
original).  
Real-time medical imaging interferes with patients’ perceptions as well as with their 
physical bodies, thus offering particular possibilities for the images to re-present one’s body, 
oneself and/or one’s illness. The establishment and maintenance of material, discursive, 
agential, perceptual and emotional links between body and image can create a synecdochal 
relation between the objectified patient body on the monitor and the lived body on the table 
(cf. Cussins 1998). Synecdoche – images that come to stand for an embodied condition − is 
not a self-evident outcome of a real-time imaging event, however. A patient may feel pain, 
even if the doctor cannot see any cause for it. In examinations carried out for screening 
purposes, something may be found while the potential ‘patient’ feels fine. When visual and 
tactile perceptions of one’s body do not match, or even contradict, one’s own body is not a 
consistent referent of the produced pictures. The extent to which patient bodies get attached to 
an imaging apparatus, and the degree of correspondence between embodied spectator and 
corporeal spectacle, vary. Such different experiences of real-time imaging may reflect what I 
have called agential cuts. Various modes of agency – perceiving, knowing, feeling, 
experiencing - are distributed in an imaging event-network, yet both doctors and patients 
mistakenly attribute them to a singular actor, whether a body, a patient, a doctor or a 
technological device.  
Like any other technology, real-time imaging affects existential as well as hermeneutic 
relations between people and their bodies. Technologies transform people’s embodied 
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existence in the world, as well as their embodied perception of the world, including their own 
bodies. However, the particularities of real-time imaging − the evanescence of the produced 
images and the real-time attachment between image-body and here-body − require an 
analytical frame geared to its specific nature.  
 
 
Productions of presence 
 
In the previous chapter I have used an actor-network approach to account for the enactment of 
patients’ bodies as both potential objects and subjects of real-time imaging in various actors’ 
preparations for imaging events. In the present chapter I have extended that approach to 
include the emergence of embodied subject positions in real-time imaging events. I have 
described which relations are established between bodies and images. However, to attain my 
ultimate goal − an understanding of technological mediations of embodied illness experience 
− I need to describe the specificities of real-time attachments of bodies to images: the 
ephemerality of the images and the simultaneity of seeing and feeling one’s body. How do the 
black circles on the ultrasound images affect Mr. Coenen’s understanding and experience of 
his illness? Does Mrs. Vermeulen have a different body now that the fluoroscopic 
examination showed she has an abnormally large bladder? Does Mrs. den Hartog still feel ill 
now that the endoscopies have not found any cause for her complaints? What do images do in 
relations between bodies, images and selves? In the next chapter, I will deal with these type of 
questions. To be able to do so, however, I need a more specific vocabulary to describe the 
attachments of bodies and images in real-time. 
  Many, but not all people have experienced real-time medical imaging, yet most people 
regularly watch real-time images of their own bodies in the mirror. In addition, many people 
have the experience of seeing live pictures of themselves on security monitors in department 
stores and supermarkets. When projected onto mirrors and screens, one sees oneself as if 
through the eyes of somebody else. Furthermore, a mirror undeniably shows an image of 
oneself. 
 Mirror-images serve as a subtext for patients’ reading of real-time medical images. At 
first sight, the differences between mirror images and real-time medical images may be more 
striking than the similarities. A mirror shows the outside of the body, which is immediately 
recognizable as one’s own body. By contrast, the interior body visualized in medical images 
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does not resemble one’s body as one knows it. A mirror image is indexical,
69
 whereas a 
medical image is iconic and requires some knowledge about the depicted object and the 
technology of representation. Similar to a mirror,
70
 however, a monitor showing real-time 
images transforms not only one’s perception, but also one’s agency, because it allows one to 
go back and forth between being a body and having a body (cf. Callon and Rabeharisoa n.d.).  
The certainty of knowing a mirror to reflect oneself is not merely a matter of 
immediate recognition of one’s outer appearance, but also has to do with the real-time nature 
of the mirror image. When standing in front of the mirror, we immediately see every move we 
make. The spectator of mirror images is not only subject of vision but also the producer of 
images. The simultaneity of acting and seeing one’s actions and their affects establishes a 
direct link between the body in the mirror and the person in front of it. A mirror makes one’s 
body present in a particular way. It is in this production of presence (Gumbrecht 2004) that 
mirror images and real-time medical images are comparable. The subtext of the mirror 
structures patients’ attachments to real-time medical images. 
An analysis of real-time medical imaging in terms of embodied experience involves 
the body as both subject and object of experience. Different modes of being and having a 
body, resulting from particular practices of embodiment, give rise to particular experiences of 
one’s own body. Those experiences do not merely consist of ideas about what particular 
phenomena mean in relation to oneself, but they also entail the material, perceptual impact of 
those phenomena on one’s body and senses. In a plea for an analysis of aesthetic experience 
beyond semiotics, literary scholar Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht refers to that impact as ‘presence’ 
(Gumbrecht 2004). Gumbrecht argues that a description of (aesthetic) experience cannot be 
limited to the interpretation of meanings. An account of experience should address how 
objects are presented in such way that they initiate or intensify a tangible, immediate impact  
on human bodies and their senses (Gumbrecht 2004: xiii).
71
 Such perspective is not an 
alternative to interpretative frameworks, but an indispensable supplement. 
                                                 
69 An index is a physical sign or mark left by an object, e.g. a fingerprint. In the case of a mirror image, there is a 
direct physical link between the body in front of the mirror and the body reflected in it. 
70 Or rather, to ‘a hall of mirrors’, as Francisco Varela has described his experiences with medical imaging 
following a liver transplant (Varela 2001: 261). 
71 Mark Hansen has presented a similar idea in his Embodying Technesis: Technology beyond writing (2000). In 
the introduction to that book, Katherine Hayles states that Hansen argues that “a highly sensitive and interactive 
realm of experience exists that precedes linguistic expression and legitimately counts as cognition (….) such 
experiences function as nonverbal avenues through which humans experience technology in its robust 
materiality. By attending to these “shocks”, we can understand technology as an important experience in our 
lives beyond how it is represented in language” (Hayles in Hansen 2000: vii). What Hansen calls ‘shocks’, 
Gumbrecht calls ‘productions of presence’. 
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The preceding analysis of technologically mediated embodiment and the distributions of 
agency it implies, has not sufficiently addressed the agency of one of the two protagonists in 
my argument: the images. It has mainly focused on (collective) patient bodies. The concept of 
presence describes the role of images in distributions of perceptual agency. Although 
technologically mediated experiences of health and illness hardly qualify as aesthetic, the 
concept of ‘presence’ is very relevant to my analysis of such experiences.  
The idea of ‘presence’ as constitutive of experience resonates with the phenomenological 
concept of ‘being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger 1962). It is a relational quality, not an individual 
attribute. It characterizes human existence as physically and spatially immersed in its 
environment, which cannot be described in terms of distinct subjects and objects. Human 
beings exist in their interactions with the world. From a confrontation between this 
perspective and an ANT-approach (cf. Verbeek 2005a) it follows that ‘the world’ exists in 
interactions with human, non-human and hybrid. Beings exist in their ability to act, in their 
agency. The concept of ‘presence’ can describe perception as an analogous mode of being. 
Perception, as a particular category of action, constitutes observer and observed in relation to 
each other. ‘Presence’ is the result of such a relation. The modes of attachment I have 
described are such relations, as they constitute particular embodied presences. Like mirrors, 
real-time medical images constitute a direct perceptual link between body and image. 
The limits to semiotic readings of experience become particularly problematic in the 
study of experiences of moving pictures (Gumbrecht 1998). The real-timeness of 
fluoroscopic, ultrasound and endoscopic pictures makes the need to address productions of 
presence as well as meaning particularly urgent, because the primary products of real-time 
imaging events materially vanish as soon as they have been made. The same is true for mirror 
images: they only exist as long as one stands in front of the mirror. The physical link gives 
mirror images their indexicality. Unlike other medical images, real-time medical images share 
these indexical qualities. They are icons, i.e. they need an informed reader to be medically 
meaningful, yet they are able to show non-informed spectators something about themselves 
by means of simultaneous visual, sensory, agential and emotional attachment.  
Real-time imaging presents patients’ bodies that have been prepared as hybrid 
collectives upon entering the examination room. Attached to imaging technologies, bodies are 
present in several modes at once. The evanescence of that simultaneous, distributed and 
hybrid presence gives real-time imaging its public aura of immediacy and transparency, an 
aura often at odds with professional notions and patients’ perceptions of imaging in actual 
practice.  
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Real-time imaging is a particularly interesting case for challenging common distinctions 
between representations and experiences of one’s own body, because it simultaneously 
mediates the visual experience of one’s own body (when patients see the images) and one’s 
sensory and emotional experience of the body (when patients feel the imaging device). 
Visual, sensory and emotional experiences are co-shaped in their mediation. The adagio “for 
every change in what is seen (…) there is a noticeable change in how (…) it is seen” (Ihde 
1990: 79) is true for feeling as well. In real-time imaging, the seen and the felt, the seeing and 
the feeling body can not self-evidently be distinguished. What is more: a change in what is 
seen affects how it is felt, an alteration of what is felt affects how it is seen. By making parts 
of the interior body visible, real-time imaging transforms how that body is experienced. 
The simultaneity of seeing, feeling and ‘doing’ one’s body, however, does not imply 
that body and image coincide. Patients may identify with the images on the monitor, yet they 
are only indirectly affected. Phenomenologists have called the space between the body that 
perceives and the body that is perceived ‘écart’ (cf. Weiss 1999: 120; see also Varela 2001: 
265). Technology enters that space and affects the lived body that is always both perceiver 
and perceived (cf. Ihde 2002: xi; Leder 1990: 63). By mediating between oneself as an 
embodied subject and one’s body as an object, technologies offer patients particular 
possibilities to appropriate, or incorporate, material and perceptual features of their bodies 
that have been produced in their connections with others they would not be able to perceive 
otherwise. In the case of real-time imaging, those features include the visibility and 
spectatorship of one’s own interior and one’s sensory, active and emotional involvement in 
the production of the images.  
From the analysis of processes of collective embodiment in the previous chapter and 
the collective productions of embodied presence in the present chapter, it becomes possible to 
address technological mediations of embodied experience in the next. The questions that I 
posed earlier in this section about how black circles affected Mr. Coenen’s illness experience, 
whether Mrs. Vermeulen’s body has changed and if Mrs. den Hartog still feels ill, are 
questions about experience rather than presence. Mr. Coenen’s attentive spectatorship, Mrs. 
Vermeulen’s active dispossession and Mrs. den Hartog’s haptic and affective attachment 
constitute ‘productions of presence’ that condition technologically mediated experiences of 
illness.  
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Real-time presence and illness experience 
 
After the notion of illness has been confronted with a composite, material body in the 
previous chapter, the present chapter has addressed the techno-visual mediation of 
embodiment. The use of actor-network theory to describe experience has resulted in an 
analysis that bears resemblance to the post-phenomenological approach introduced in chapter 
2. Rather than the technological mediation of (illness) experience, however, the present 
chapter has described conditions for such experience: discursive, material, agential and 
emotional attachments of patients’ bodies and real-time images. In medical anthropology, 
technology has commonly been described as widening the gap between ‘disease’ and 
‘illness’. With my analysis of attachments and productions of presence, I have shown how 
real-time imaging technologies mediate bodies that are ‘objects’ as well as ‘subjects’ of 
perception, knowledge and experience. 
 The anthropological distinction between illness and disease is a specific form of the 
subject/object separation that phenomenology attempts to overcome and that actor-network 
theory seeks to bypass. Describing productions of embodied presence renders both objectives 
feasible. I have presented professional real-time readings, patients’ simultaneous visual and 
haptic perceptions, as well as their emotions and their bodies’ material agency as alternative 
modes of attachment that cannot be understood independently. The construction of disease as 
a medical category and of illness as a mode of embodied experience converges in a real-time 
imaging event. 
 Anthropologists have studied illness experience through people’s verbal, visual or 
behavioral expressions. Phenomenologists have complemented this approach with analyses of 
embodied perception. Yet, what has hardly been addressed in both anthropological and 
traditional phenomenological accounts of illness is the agency of materiality. An actor-
network approach allows for an account of embodiment that includes the materialities of 
bodies and mediating technologies.  
My analysis of the specific ‘productions of presence’ aligns a post-phenomenological 
frame with an actor-network account. The previous and the present chapter have provided a 
description of the equipment of patients’ bodies as objects and subjects of medical 
visualization and of their attachment to images during real-time imaging events. Simultaneous 
presentations of bodies as objects of medical examination and as subjects of embodied 
perception enable the co-construction of what anthropologists have called disease and illness. 
What I prefer to call illness, to indicate that my ultimate object of analysis are patients’ 
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experiences, emerges in real-time imaging events as something one can see as well as feel, 
perceive as well as understand, and experience as well as know. 
 The four modes of attachment do not coincide with four categories of illness 
experience, but indicate various ways in which patients’ bodies are produced in real-time 
imaging events. A body’s presence is different when patients do or do not watch the monitor 
during an examination; when an instrument enters one’s body or remains outside; when 
patients actively participate in the event, or when they do not. Various levels of physical 
activity and pain evoked by real-time imaging make patient bodies present in particular ways, 
since they relate patients’ agency and the objectivation of their bodies. A more active 
involvement in that objectivation is more likely to constitute a perceptual link between 
oneself as an embodied actor and one’s body as a medical object.  
To obtain a durable referent, real-time images require translation. Two translation 
trajectories set off after an imaging event: one that aims at diagnoses and another that 
produces various expressions of experience. The first – the professional translation of imaging 
results into examination reports that contribute to a medical diagnosis – produces an 
‘objective’ referent. The referent produced in the second trajectory is ‘subjective’: it is a 
patient’s embodied experience mainly expressed in narratives. Those seemingly distinct 
referents, however, bear the marks of their joint origin that lies in the preparations of a body 
for real-time imaging – described in chapter 3 – and in the production of real-time images, 
described in the present chapter.
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5 After the pictures: the embodiment of real-time 
medical images 
 
 
 
 
When the pictures have vanished – except for a few stills or prints – and the patient has gone 
home, the next stage of real-time imaging sets in. The real-time connection of referent (body) 
and representation (real-time images) is broken after the examination. The present chapter 
inquires whether and how bodies and images get reconnected. ‘Going after’ the pictures, we 
follow translations of real-time image-body presences into embodied experiences of health 
and illness. Such translations actually take place at two distinct yet connected stages. First, 
medical professionals translate real-time imaging events into reports that may eventually 
contribute to a diagnosis. Second, patients translate real-time images into narratives that 
represent and construct their experience.  
 In chapter 2 I argued that neither medical anthropology nor (post-) phenomenology 
nor actor-network theory by itself affords a comprehensive analysis of technologically 
mediated illness experience in real-time imaging practices. In chapters 3 and 4 I showed why: 
an analysis of how bodies and images are presented requires insight in the configuration of a 
body-collective that precedes an examination. How real-time images affect patients’ bodies 
depends on the networks in which they are acquired, shown, discussed and translated. Each 
configuration of actors inscribes images with a particular script that invites patients to have 
certain experiences (cf. Akrich 1992). Therefore I describe the entire network that enables 
images to affect the bodies of patients, including professional translations.  
Physicians use stored pictures, words, numbers, other images and protocols to translate 
real-time imaging events into imaging reports. In the first part of this chapter, I describe their 
translation work and that of patients, as well as the connections between the various 
translations. For the larger part, patients express their experiences of imaging and 
embodiment narratively. They include and transform professional practices of reading and 
writing in their translations of imaging events. Professionals’ and patients’ translation 
trajectories cross ways and shape the other’s direction. During consultation visits, physicians 
communicate examination results to patients. Consultations are the final destination of a 
medical-professional translation of real-time medical images into knowledge about disease. 
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Yet the patient’s visit to the attending physician also presents a next stage in the translation of 
real-time medical images into patients’ embodied identities and experiences of illness.  
 In the second part of this chapter, I describe how patients’ and physicians’ translations 
of real-time imaging events result in image-bodies, which – as objects of patients’ experience 
– are part of patients’ experiences of illness. Substituting the notion of ‘mediation’ by that of 
‘a body learning to be affected’ makes it possible to describe the interconnected hermeneutic, 
material and existential interferences of real-time imaging with embodied illness.  
 
 
Translation trajectories 
 
Most of the images produced during a real-time imaging event disappear once the 
examination has passed. Yet real-time images do leave traces in the form of stills and prints, 
tissue samples, spoken and written words, numbers, reports and stories. Those are all 
translations of the real-time imaging event in which images and bodies are simultaneously 
produced. After the examination, the actors that collectively constituted an imaging network 
go separate ways. Their trajectories meet again during a follow-up visit to the doctor several 
days or weeks later, when an attending physician or general practitioner tells a patient the 
results of the examination and sometimes discusses a diagnosis or proposes a treatment plan.  
In the meantime, doctors have discussed their findings, edited and stored stills, 
dictated reports and checked the written version. Assistants have sent tissue samples to the 
laboratory where they have been translated in more numbers and words. While a referent for 
the real-time images of their interior is being produced in the hospital, patients take their 
memories of the examination home with them: the sensations, the pictures, the doctor’s 
explanations. Awaiting diagnosis, patients translate their experiences during real-time 
imaging events into mental images and into words and stories told to relatives, friends or an 
inquisitive anthropologist. Patients’ experiences include their observations of professionals 
performing the examination. The results of the examination they eventually receive through 
their attending physician some days or weeks after the event, becomes part of patients’ 
experience as well.  
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From images to reports 
 
After she has pushed a button to stop the transmission of ultrasound signals, the 
radiologist puts back the transducer in its holder at the side of the monitor. She wipes 
the gel off Mr. Coenen’s belly, says goodbye and leaves the examination room. In the 
central room of the ultrasound unit, right across the hallway, she walks straight to the 
dictation machine. She puts the request form, on which she has scribbled the sizes of 
the measured cysts and some other remarks during the examination, in front of her, 
turns on the recorder, and starts dictating: “Examination in preparation of kidney 
transplant, to check size of polycystic kidneys and presence of stones in gallbladder 
and urological tract. Both kidneys contain a pronounced quantity of cysts of various 
sizes….” Although the radiologist digitally stored several still images during the 
examination, she does not retrieve them. It takes the radiologist only a few minutes to 
finish dictating the report, during which she stops the recorder several times, to make 
corrections and rephrase remarks.  
The recorded dictation is sent to the administration unit of the Radiology 
department. A clerk types it out and inserts it into the format for a radiological report. 
Order and phrasing are preserved for the most part, yet the clerk deletes some 
redundancies, and adds a few words to make a correct sentence. With another press of 
a button, the finished report is saved in the electronic patient file, where it can be 
retrieved by anyone who has access. 
The next day, the performing radiologist − an assistant − finds the report in a 
pile of printed reports from other examinations she performed and which she has to 
check and sign. She quickly reads through it, finds no mistakes, and enters her initials. 
The report is sent back to the administration. A line is added to the digital report, 
stating that it has been confirmed, and including the names of the assistant and the 
supervising radiologists.  
In the Internal Medicine Department, Mr. Coenen’s attending physician 
retrieves the ultrasound report from the hospital network, along with the reports of the 
X-rays taken of the abdomen and of the jaw and teeth, which were performed right 
before the ultrasound. Including the chest X-ray performed two weeks earlier, none of 
the radiological examinations showed any contraindications for the start of dialysis 
and eventually a kidney transplant. Since an ECG and a duplex (ultrasound) 
examination of the blood vessels of the arm did neither, Mr. Coenen is ‘diagnosed’ as 
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fit for dialysis and transplantation. In due time, when his condition deteriorates, 
dialysis will start. It may take years before transplantation, because kidneys are 
scarce.  
 
This is how the story of Mr. Coenen’s ultrasonic kidneys (chapter 4) continued. Although the 
radiologist started reading in real-time, as I described in the previous chapter, image 
interpretation does not stop when image acquisition does. The moving pictures on the monitor 
in the examination room are ultimately translated into a diagnosis: an assessment of Mr. 
Coenen’s fitness for dialysis. Although some still images are saved, the most sustainable 
result of imaging, which directs the further diagnostic and therapeutic trajectory of Mr. 
Coenen, is the written report. A physician who requested real-time imaging usually does not 
receive any pictures, but only a report by the physician who performed the examination. The 
images themselves are considered of little value for readers who have not been involved in 
their production. Since the only proper reader of real-time images is the person who produced 
them, other readers better confide in her or his informed reading. This is different for non-
real-time pictures. X-rays, for example, are often sent to the requesting doctor right away, or 
physically taken there by the patient, to be followed only later by a radiologist’s report. The 
attending physician may then compare his or her own reading to that of the specialized 
imager. The readings of real-time images by their producers usually lack such comparison.  
In order to represent bodies according to medical standards of objectivity, real-time 
images require translation into non-visual data. X-rays, CT-scans or MRI-scans bring along 
their own context for interpretation. Conversely, the context required to read real-time images 
only exists during their production. Although all knowledge produced by means of imaging 
technologies is contextual, or situated (Haraway 1988), information needed to read still 
images is inscribed in the pictures themselves, rendering them ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour 
1990: 22), which can be read by professionals who have not been directly involved in their 
production. A still image can only be a read from a limited number of angles, whereas 
viewpoints are constantly being adjusted during real-time imaging. Real-time imaging reports 
represent evanescent images and owe their authority to their writers who have performed the 
search for the represented objects themselves. Written reports transform the simultaneous 
presence of professional reader, images and the object of visualization into an objective 
context supposed to compensate for the subjective status of real-time images among medical 
professionals. 
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 It takes several stages of translation from images to report: from real-time pictures to verbal 
and written expressions made by the doctor during the examination, via a recording of a 
spoken interpretation and a transcribed report, to a juxtaposition of various images and reports 
and ultimately a therapeutic plan. To be diagnostically meaningful, real-time images usually 
need to be combined with other data sources. These can be produced in the context of an 
imaging event, such as tissue samples collected during an endoscopic examination, or they 
may result from other visual examinations or blood tests. Imaging results and other findings 
may be contradictory. An ultrasound, for example, may not show the presence of small 
gallstones that may nonetheless cause a patient a lot of pain reminding her of previous gall 
stone attacks. After a blood test indicates that something indeed is wrong, the gallstones can 
be visualized and removed during an endoscopic examination.
72
 This example shows that a 
doctor might value a negative ultrasound over a patient’s previous experiences and 
expressions of pain. A blood test, however, can overrule ultrasound results, after which 
endoscopy is used to verify and treat the problem. Images are thus weighed in relation to 
other findings. The decisive factor for a diagnosis can be the order of examinations, whether 
certain examinations and results are contested or not, or possibilities for treatment. From a 
variety of visual and other data, imaging physicians compose findings, which are further 
translated into diagnoses by attending physicians. Rather than representing a fixed body, 
pictures refer to other data and vice versa. A diagnosis represents a complex of referential 
chains. 
 The first translations of images, described in chapter 4, take place during the 
examination. Chapter 3 showed how the translation of bodies already starts before the 
examination. The material transformation of streaming images into stills or prints implies a 
change of meaning: the pictures are taken out of their context of production to be used in 
other settings. Endoscopy sessions usually leave few visual reminders of real-time imaging 
events. Prints are made only upon request of the referring physician, or to illustrate a 
diagnosis to patient or colleagues. Radiological examinations yield more ‘immutable mobiles’ 
in the form of stills, prints or video recordings. 
During an ultrasound examination it is common practice to include at least one digital 
still of each examined organ. The visual record after an abdominal ultrasound, for example, 
usually contains at least one image of all major organs: liver, gallbladder and bile ducts, 
spleen, pancreas and aorta, and sometimes the kidneys. A radiologist may decide to freeze a 
                                                 
72 Cf. Van Dijck 2005, ix-x. 
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picture because of particularly clear abnormalities considered illustrative for a specific 
condition (e.g. the large kidney cysts in the ultrasound examination of Mr Coenen) or, on the 
contrary, because of an unexpected situation (e.g. the cysts in Mr Coenen’s liver found during 
the same examination) or one allowing multiple interpretations, even if it is neither 
immediately relevant to the presented question, nor cause for immediate clinical action .  
Fluoroscopic examinations produce both digitally ‘frozen’ pictures and X-ray prints.
73
 
At set intervals stipulated in the examination protocol, the radiologist takes an X-ray picture 
of a particular situation, or asks the assistant to do so. For a micturating cysto-urogram 
(MCU), such as Mrs. Vermeulen’s examination described in the previous chapter, six 
standard prints are made: before the catheter is entered, when the bladder is full, of the 
kidneys at this point, of the bladder and kidneys when urination starts, during urination, and 
of the bladder and kidneys after urination. These pictures are automatically sent to the printer 
and the prints are taken to the reading room to be examined by the radiologist later.  
Apart from storage and editing, real-time images are translated into findings through 
talking. In the case of real-time imaging, the examination room functions as production room, 
reading room and conference room at once. Real-time images themselves do not appear in 
reading and conference rooms, and prints and digital stills produced during real-time imaging 
events do not frequently end up there, since their meaning is closely connected to the context 
of production. Despite several similarities between the verbal translation of real-time and non-
real-time images, their role in the construction of medical findings is different.  
Conversations about real-time images primarily occur in examination rooms during an 
examination. Real-time imaging escapes the routine of professional intersubjectivity 
symbolized by the radiological reading room: although real-time reading follows outlines and 
protocols similar to those for other examinations, its results remain inaccessible to other 
physicians. The few pictures that continue to have some kind of material presence – either in 
print or digital – are relatively insignificant as results of a real-time imaging event. They 
rather serve as reminders or anchors for the reading of images that have ceased to materially 
exist. Still pictures from real-time imaging event are only meaningful to those who were 
involved in their production, usually excluding other professionals than the examination’s 
performer, yet including the patient.  
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 The kind of fluoroscopic examinations I observed were done for diagnostic rather than therapeutic purposes. 
Fluoroscopy is also used however to monitor/navigate surgical procedures (e.g. bone-setting, catheterization of 
blood vessels). Digital fluoroscopy offers even more possibilities. My remarks however only concern analogue, 
diagnostic fluoroscopic examinations of the digestive and urinary tract. The purpose of imaging is the production 
of images apt to be read afterwards, rather than of images instrumental to a surgical procedure or intervention.  
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Although I have attended examinations where few words were exchanged except for the 
customary courtesies between physician and patient, during most real-time imaging events 
physicians talk about what they see: to the assistant, to an attending colleague, to the patient 
and sometimes to his or her partner. Professional discussions about medical images, real-time 
or not, are often pursued largely along the lines of the request form and the anticipated report 
and feature language that is only comprehensible to insiders.  
Most patients are not really familiar with the medical vocabulary used in discussions 
among medical professionals. For professionals, the shared language makes it possible to 
effectively communicate about images and share interpretations, ask for a second opinion or 
direct interventions. Some patients told me that the medical language, usually spoken in a low 
voice, obscures rather than clarifies what the monitor shows. However, patient’s presence 
during the interpretation of real-time images affects how doctors talk about images. Besides 
biomedical language, doctors use every-day language to talk about images in real-time 
imaging events when they address the patient, like ‘taking a bite’ for a biopsy. The language 
used during an examination can thus be very different from the language used in a report. 
When an examination does not show any irregularities, radiologists as well as endoscopists 
often invite patients to watch the monitor to “see for yourself that everything is okay”. 
Watching the monitor, however, does not provide patients with an actual diagnosis. For that 
and for the development of a treatment plan, patients are referred to their attending physician.  
When images have been selected, edited, stored, discussed, combined and compared, 
physicians translate them into reports. Below is the report that resulted from the radiological 
examination of Mr. Coenen. It only refers to particular parts of Mr. Coenen’s body: his 
kidneys, liver, gallbladder, bile ducts, and bladder. It includes verbal and numerical, but no 
visual information. Pictures are translated into measurements and deviations from certain 
standards. What looks normal is only mentioned as background: standards and normal images 
act as an implicit frame of reference in the report.  
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All imaging reports roughly follow a similar order that reflects the reading routine: first look 
at the question, then describe what you see, do measurements, compare to standards, and 
come to a conclusion. A report’s conclusion presents findings as an answer to the question by 
the requesting physician, rather than a diagnosis. Different examinations have their own 
report formats, which leave room for various specialist and personal vocabularies. Endoscopy 
reports, for example, are more likely to include an account of the course of the examination 
than radiological reports, which reflect the different status of images in relation to other 
findings in endoscopic and radiological examinations. Furthermore, experienced imagers in 
radiology as well as in endoscopy often write more concise reports, including an overview of 
the situation according to the standards and the relevant abnormalities, and are more likely to 
mention a preliminary or possible diagnosis than less experienced colleagues. Residents, for 
whom it generally takes longer to perform an examination, often write longer reports as well, 
including their considerations to come to a certain conclusion. Thus imaging reports are 
selective accounts of imaging events rather than representations of bodies, body parts or 
medical conditions. 
Real-time imaging reports read as if they have been written while the radiologist or 
endoscopist is watching the images. Except for fluoroscopy reports dictated in the 
radiological reading room while the radiologist is looking at the light box, however, doctors 
Report ultrasound xx-xx-03 
To  Outpatient department internal medicine 
 <Name requesting doctor> 
Ultrasound upper abdomen    Ultrasound kidney bs 
Clinical information: 
Preparation for kidney transplant. Size of polycystic kidneys. Stones in gallbladder or urinary tract. 
Report: 
In both kidneys a marked amount of cysts is present of different size. The largest on the right 
measures 7 ½ x 5 cm., the largest on the left 4,7 x 4,7 cm. Minimal remains of normal kidney tissues 
are discernible. As for size the kidneys fall out of transducer range, bs at least 18 cm., although as 
said, they fall out of range and are actually bigger. Identification of concretions inside those multiple 
cysts cannot be executed. In the liver at least about three cysts are observed, furthermore 
homogenous. Furthermore the gallbladder is slender, no concretions, no thickened wall. The ductus 
choledochus measures 6 mm., still within the norm. The bladder is fairly filled. No clear defects. 
 
Conclusion: 
Marked polycystic kidneys on both sides, both sides at least 18 cm. At least about three cysts in the 
liver. No cholelithiasis. 
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make reports without having the images at hand. Stored ultrasound pictures are consulted only 
in rare cases. A report based on stored images, however, is considered as less reliable than a 
report dictated immediately after an examination. A radiologist may need to postpone the 
writing of a report because of interfering duties, and may only be able to come back to it 
several hours or even days afterwards. In one such case, concerning a belated ultrasound 
report, the report stated that it was based on the ‘assessment of pictures’ and was therefore of 
limited value. This example shows how normally, real-time imaging reports refer to 
examinations rather than pictures of particular body parts. For a valid interpretation real-time 
reading is indispensable: pictures alone are not enough. 
In the professional interpretation of real-time images, the pictures are largely stripped 
from the effects of realism that characterized their production: the real-timeness which makes 
it possible to watch pictures while they are made and the presence of the patient’s body during 
image acquisition. When moving pictures produced during an examination are translated into 
reports, their referent is no longer the patient’s body, but a data-set relative to standards. 
Medical images are not intended to resemble real bodies, but are topological constructs 
representing phenomena that cannot be fully understood from a singular perspective (cf. 
Saunders forthcoming).  
Imaging reports represent data rather than bodies. To enable the translation of pictures 
into manageable bodies, reports present a fragmented body, translated into numbers and 
compared to certain standards. Yet the body presented in a report is also a whole, assembled 
from a variety of visual and non-visual data. Tissue samples, evaporated images, pictures, 
numbers and reports are brought together under the same heading: a patient with a particular 
name, sex, date of birth and patient number. Administrative structures, such as the practice to 
print or write the patient number on jars, reports and pictures, serve to guarantee that parts can 
stand for the whole. As coordination tools, reports connect the various referents of medical 
images: patients, body parts and medical conditions.  
  
 
 
From reports to patients 
 
After a quick yet extensive journey through the professional clinical imaging apparatus, 
translations of real-time imaging results ultimately return to patients. Reports of imaging 
events are stored in the hospital digital system, where they can be retrieved by patients’ 
attending physicians who requested the examination. A printed copy is sent to applicants 
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outside the hospital. The attending physician then communicates the results to the patient in a 
face-to-face consultation or on the phone. In most cases, doctors base their diagnosis and 
treatment on written verbal translations of real-time images without having seen any visual 
material themselves. The referent of the findings attending physicians communicate to 
patients are not images, but imagers’ reports. Patients themselves usually do not receive a 
copy of the report. 
The only pictures I saw being used in visits following real-time imaging events, were 
doctors’ sketches made for patients to illustrate a finding or diagnosis, or anatomical 
illustrations available in the consultation room on which the physician points out the location 
of a particular finding. The actual visual products of the examination, the pictures, are entirely 
absent from consultations. What patients get there are not pictures, but their attending 
physician’s verbal translations of other doctors’ written reports.  
Their real-timeness distinguishes ultrasound, fluoroscopy and endoscopy from many 
other diagnostic technologies. Unlike in other examinations, in real-time imaging events 
patients actually see the raw material on which doctors base their diagnosis. In the case of 
real-time imaging, doctor-patient communication is not limited to consultations about an 
examination’s results between an attending physician and a patient several hours, days or 
weeks after the examination. Indeed, patients are present when pictures are produced, shown 
and interpreted on the job. After an ultrasound examination during which the radiologist 
explained hardly anything, the patient told me: 
 
P I did not really see anything. Most of the time I was lying on my side. And 
then, they did not really tell me anything. They were just talking to each other. 
And then when they are whispering like that, you think, oh, maybe they have 
found something. But then he said: everything looks fine. Then I thought: well, 
then it must be okay. 
 
What doctors say during and immediately after examinations may be similar to, but also 
rather different from the results that attending physicians communicate to their patients. A 
malignant-looking tumor may turn out to be benign or a blood test may indicate a normal 
looking bile duct to contain gallstones anyway. Coincidental findings that do not address the 
applicant’s request are often mentioned during an examination, but might not be included in 
the report, or in the eventual consultation. Misunderstandings may arise about a fluoroscopy 
assistant saying that “the pictures look fine”, referring to the quality of the prints rather than 
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to the condition of the depicted body. Moreover, during examinations many doctors tend to 
use professional language that is largely incomprehensible to patients, whereas an attending 
physician tries to translate findings into more common-sense terms. However, physicians’ 
comments on images during and after an examination, like “You see it is a bit red here, that 
means it is infected”, or “This is fluid you see, because it is black”, can contribute to patients’ 
perceptions of real-time images as well. 
As I argued earlier, diagnoses are rarely based on the report of a single imaging event. 
Consultations are usually not about the results of a particular examination; they are about the 
(possible) diagnosis suggested by the results, whether or not in combination with other data, 
and about possibilities for treatment or the necessity of follow-up. Sometimes a physician has 
requested various examinations and combines all results before proposing a diagnosis. In 
other cases, the result of a single examination is shared with a patient first to set a trajectory 
of further diagnostic or therapeutic action. 
A patient’s visit to the doctor is the final stage in professional translations of medical 
images. For patients it is one among several transformations that contribute to their 
incorporation of real-time imaging. The following case story illustrates this point. 
 
A week after she underwent a colonoscopy, I accompany Mrs. Remmers on a visit to 
her attending surgeon. Since she had surgery for colon cancer eleven years ago, Mrs. 
Remmers has a check-up every three years. Her attending physician, the surgeon, does 
not perform endoscopic examinations himself. He got the results, including the lab 
findings about samples of polyps taken during the examination, from his colleague 
who did the colonoscopy. He tells Mrs. Remmers about the results: 
 
D Mmm, they were adenomous with some dysplasia. It must be removed 
entirely, before it turns into something nasty again. 
MR That is okay. As long as I will not need a stoma. 
D Oh no, they just need to remove that polyp. 
MR They told me to come back for a small examination. 
D Yes, that is a good idea. They look at the last eighty centimeters, and they can 
remove all polyps. 
MR It was not malignant, was it? 
 D It will become malignant.  
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Two months later, I am in the same consultation room again, with the same surgeon 
and with Mrs. Remmers. I met Mrs. Remmers in the waiting room half an hour earlier, 
where she tells me that she had surgery for breast cancer less then a week ago. A 
tumor had been found during a regular check-up, some weeks after I had last met her. 
I have come to see Mrs. Remmers to accompany her on her visit to the doctor to hear 
the results of her follow-up sigmoidoscopy. The endoscopist has told her already that 
the polyp had been successfully removed, and that it was not malignant. The visit to 
her attending surgeon, however, is largely dedicated to planning future treatment for 
the breast cancer. Mrs. Remmers agrees on having radiotherapy, but strongly refuses 
chemotherapy, since she does not “want to spend the rest of my life lying sick in bed”. 
 
Endoscopic pictures eventually only play a minor role in Mrs. Remmers’ medical trajectory. 
The only thing she wants is to recover from cancer and to prevent it from coming back. It is 
the surgeon who is able to connect the results of the endoscopic examinations to her present 
condition; his translations render the images important for Mrs. Remmers.  
 There are two moments when professionals’ and patients’ translations of real-time 
images actually meet: when the images are produced (the imaging event) and when the results 
are communicated (the consultation). When the trajectories meet, differences between them 
are articulated yet their mutual shaping becomes apparent as well. Whereas during an 
examination a patient’s body presence is produced as a real-time referent for the imaging 
event, during a consultation we witness the attempt to coordinate the different referent-bodies 
that have emerged from physicians’ and patients’ translation trajectories into a suitable action 
plan.  
 
 
From screens to lived bodies 
 
In real-time medical images, medical translations cross the trajectory of patients. Patients 
engage in their own translations of imaging events. Professional translations of images into 
medical knowledge and actions can be part of patients’ trajectories, yet what is mediated in 
the latter is embodied experience and identity. I return to Mr. Coenen to illustrate this point. 
 
After having observed Mr. Coenen’s ultrasound examination, I talk to him about the 
examination and about his illness. He tells me that he has known for almost twenty 
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years that he has polycystic kidney disease. Back then, ultrasound was used for the 
diagnosis, but Mr. Coenen does not remember whether he actually saw ultrasound 
images of his kidneys. Lately Mr. Coenen has suffered from increased hypertension 
and fatigue, identified by relatives and himself as possible signs of a decline in his 
kidney functions. In an attempt to describe the likely condition of Mr. Coenen’s 
kidneys, his attending physician used a powerful metaphor. 
 
MC He (the attending physician, MR) said a kind of sponge, with small holes, with 
liquid-filled follicles. That is how he explained it. I did not remember that from 
the previous time (the ultrasound examination twenty years ago, MR), but then 
I did not really pay attention. That is different now. 
MR  And now, did it look like you expected? 
MC  It looked much worse than I imagined. The holes are much larger than I 
expected. I am a bit shocked actually. And then in the liver, she found some 
cysts there as well, I did not know about it. 
 
The ultrasound images made a deep impression on Mr. Coenen. He was looking for a 
sponge, yet the monitor showed him something different. Now that his kidneys did not 
look like a sponge, with small holes, but were actually more hole than tissue, Mr. 
Coenen felt that his condition was worse than he thought. The physician, however, was 
less concerned with the number and sizes of the cysts but rather with the size of the 
kidneys. The kidneys were too large to fit on the screen and could not be measured. 
Mr. Coenen for his part was not impressed by that finding. He knew already that his 
kidneys were large, because his doctor had felt that during a physical examination.  
When the radiologist also located several cysts in Mr. Coenen’s liver during 
the same examination, Mr. Coenen was worried at first. He was then reassured by the 
doctor who explained that a small number of little cysts is no cause for concern and 
that people who are prone to having cysts in one organ are more likely to have them in 
other organs as well. After the examination Mr. Coenen explained to me how he 
experienced the images of his liver differently than the images of his kidneys:  
 
You see a liver (…), but actually I cannot really imagine it. She just tells me: this is the 
liver (…). But the kidneys, yes, they are easy to recognize. Well, not really recognize. 
You know that it is the thing with the holes in it, but you do not really see the shape of 
a kidney as you imagine it. At least, I do not. 
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Whereas Mr. Coenen had a framework for watching images of his kidneys – the 
doctor’s image of a sponge – he did not have it for images of his liver. 
 
In this story, the images showed that something was the matter, both to the radiologist and to 
Mr. Coenen. The nature of that matter, however, or the referent of the images, was different. 
Whereas the radiologist looked for clinically relevant information in the light of dialysis and 
transplantation by focusing on the size of the kidneys, Mr. Coenen compared the size and 
amount of the cysts to the interiorized image of a sponge in order to understand how ill he 
actually was. And where the liver was just another organ to visualize for the radiologist, for 
Mr. Coenen it was an unknown body part, unlike his kidneys.  
 To describe Mr. Coenen’s real-time imaging experiences, I have presented part of his 
own narrative. In interpretative anthropology, narrative is generally considered to be the 
condition for experience. To become an experience, perceptions, thoughts, feelings or events 
need to be part of a narrative, or plot (cf. Desjarlais 1996). Many anthropological studies of 
illness study experience in terms of representations, interpretation and meaning (e.g. 
Kleinman 1988, Mattingly and Garro 2000). Patients’ narratives, however, do not disclose 
how imaging technologies actually mediate embodied experience. Experiences are obviously 
shaped by the ways in which they are expressed but cannot be reduced to their expressions.  
Inspired by phenomenology, anthropologists have described illness narratives also as 
constitutive of experience, claiming that narratives reconstitute objectified medical bodies as 
embodied selves. Yet a narrative approach has few tools to address what I have called 
productions of bodily presence in chapter 4. It addresses issues of representation and meaning 
production primarily in discursive terms, whereas embodied experience is both discursive and 
material. An anthropological, narrative approach to the spin-off of medical imaging into 
patients’ embodied existence implies a bias towards concepts and reflections and leaves 
translations of bodily presence unattended. A constructivist description of translations 
includes the material and perceptual dimensions of embodiment and illness. 
 
 
Translations of illness and disease 
 
The preceding description of medical knowledge production, doctor-patient communication 
and patients’ experiences in terms of translation points to Bruno Latour’s concept of 
‘circulating reference’ as an alternative for a representational epistemology, introduced in 
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chapter 2. I extend this concept to describe both the production of medical knowledge through 
the objectivation of patients’ bodies as well as the production of embodied experience through 
their subjectivation. The experience of being ill is a ‘circulating referent’ (Latour 1999a: 69) 
rather than a relation between a particular person and her or his body.  
Illness, however, is not simply a subjective circulating capacity. It cannot be detached 
from the circulating referent that anthropologists have called disease: the medical-
professional objectivation of a body’s condition. The work of doctors is constitutive for 
patients’ experience. When described separately, the production of medical knowledge can 
easily be contrasted to the enactment of illness: one trajectory involves the translation of 
images into written language, via a reading of images as data-sets; in the other trajectory, 
images are rather read as pictures and translated into narrative expressions of experience. 
Considering the trajectories as being in line rather than parallel, offers an alternative to dualist 
descriptions in terms of object/subject, knowledge/experience and disease/illness. The 
production of disease is part of the “ongoing, shifting dialogue between professional 
discourses, public narratives and personal lifeworlds” (Persson et al. 2003: 411) in which 
illness is enacted as a referent that makes “experiences and actions intelligible to self and to 
others” (Persson et al. 2003: 411). 
An understanding of patients’ experiences as well as doctors’ knowledges in terms of 
circulating reference shows how capacities of bodies that have often been described as 
fundamentally different, actually result from continuous intra-actions (cf. Barad 1996: 179). 
The opposition between objective disease and subjective illness reflects a distinction between 
different sources of data: the techno-visual disclosure of the physical interior on the one hand, 
and the discursive analysis of patients’ narratives on the other. My analysis of technological 
mediations of embodiment starts neither from the body that people have nor from the body 
they are, but shows how ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ are co-enacted in a particular practice. 
 
 
Image incorporations 
 
Since the narrative expressions usually studied by anthropologists only partially convey 
embodied experience, psychologists and phenomenologists have complemented narrative 
analysis with the study of body images, described in chapter 2. Body images include 
perceptions of, attitudes to and beliefs about one’s own body in relation to others. Narratives 
are “part of the images people have of themselves”(Ochberg in Hydén 1997: 50), yet body 
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images are more than narratives. Body images are translations of sensory perceptions into 
explicit or implicit mental representations. Jacques Lacan’s analysis of the so-called mirror 
stage has shown that the mirror is crucial to the constitution of the body image as an 
integrated part of one’s body (Lacan 1953).  
Mirror images present a body’s exterior appearance. Most people recognize 
themselves when they look into a mirror. The mirror shows the whole of the outside body, 
only partly visible without a mirror. The exterior body is also familiar through photos, videos 
and through other people’s reactions to it. Real-time images, however, show parts of the body 
that are usually hidden from the eye. They present parts of one’s body that usually recede 
from conscious experience as being one’s own. I have observed examinations which mainly 
aimed at visualizing parts of patients’ digestive and urinary systems, like kidneys, livers, 
spleens, intestines, bladders, and gallbladders. The interior body parts that medical images 
represent are “a matter of mystery and speculation” to most people (Helman 2001: 16). For 
the most part, visceral phenomena are unavailable to one’s conscious awareness and control. 
Real-time medical imaging technologies transform how people perceive their bodies. Through 
mirror-like images, the absent body can be included in people’s body images. Describing real-
time imaging as a ‘monitor stage’ more or less analogous to the mirror stage (cf. Lajer-
Burckhart 1997: 191) may contribute to an account of technological mediations of body 
image. 
Body images are representations which are supposedly more embodied than narratives 
are. Yet such a representational concept does not allow for an understanding of embodied 
experience ‘in practice’. Like narratives, body images only allow for an analysis of embodied 
experience through its expressions. My comparison of real-time medical images to mirror 
images does not prelude an analysis of transforming body images, but of the production of 
image-bodies. Real-time images and mirror images are alike in their simultaneous 
transformation of bodies as image, spectator and actor. Real-time imaging presents the 
interior body as an image, something that is an object of sensory perception yet differs from 
the body that perceives it. It is what Don Ihde has called an image-body. The image-body is a 
representation of one’s own body, informed and shaped by culture, that does not coincide 
with the here-body that is the seat of sensory perception (Ihde 2002: 5). 
Real-time medical images and mirror images produce similar image-bodies. An 
analysis of embodied experience in terms of narratives or body images cannot cover the 
similar material and perceptual impact of mirror images and real-time images that I have 
described as presence in chapter 4. The question is how such real-time presences are 
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incorporated, i.e. translated into embodied experiences of a here-body, the embodied subject 
that is moving, perceiving, feeling and being-in-the-world (Ihde 2002: xi). In chapter 4, I have 
described attachments of here-bodies to image-bodies, concluding that they are intricately 
intertwined in the production of real-time medical images. Their simultaneous presence is 
disrupted once the examination is over. Physical bodies and material images are separated 
from their context of production. They end up in various new contexts: the translation 
trajectories that I have described in the first section of this chapter. In those trajectories four 
related categories of image-bodies emerge as referents for real-time imaging events: the 
medical body which is constructed in professional translations, the transparent body resulting 
from interferences of medical and media technologies, the spectacular body the patient has 
watched on the monitor, and the lived body, which is actively engaged in the imaging event as 
an embodied spectator and actor.  
 
 
The medical body 
 
The first translation trajectory that I have described earlier in this chapter has been the 
professional chain of translations: from real-time images to stills and prints, to spoken words, 
written texts and numbers. The body that is constructed as the referent for real-time medical 
images in this trajectory is a medical body. The imaging report coordinates a variety of visual 
and non-visual data into a stable referent-body that can be an object of diagnosis and 
treatment. In chapter 3, I described the request form for an examination as a coordinating 
device as well: it coordinated distributed agencies of machines, physicians, patients and 
bodies into a potential image. The body that is eventually presented in the imaging report, 
however, is not the body that has been anticipated by the request form. It has been affected by 
the simultaneous production of body’s and image’s presence during the examination. 
Although real-time productions of presence are removed from the imaging report as much as 
possible, the report carries their traces. 
 Compared to written reports, doctors’ verbal observations during an examination 
usually contain more informalities, uncertainties and inconsistencies, like “this could be …” 
or “this might fit …”. Although in written reports one also finds phrases such as “this may 
represent” or “this fits closely to”, most uncertainties and associative tinkering has 
disappeared. The same holds for aesthetic and normative qualifications, which do not appear 
in final reports. Doctors may talk about beautiful pictures, when for example the contrast is 
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very high, or when it shows an uncommon lesion. Sometimes, however, physicians include 
information that ‘having been there’ has granted them in an examination report.
74
 The 
endoscopy report of a patient with a chronic bowel infection, for example, states that the 
examination went smoothly despite an anxious patient. 
I mentioned before that real-time images are considered to be relatively subjective 
sources of information according to medical standards. Patients sometimes witness how 
‘objective’ information is being produced.  
 
I observed a surgeon communicating the results of a colonoscopy and an MRI-scan to 
a patient during a consultation. A malignant tumor had been removed from her colon 
a year earlier and her liver had been checked because some irregularities had been 
seen during an ultrasound examination, which was requested to check for possible 
metastasis. The colonoscopy looked normal now and the liver lesions seemed 
relatively innocent. Yet the surgeon proposed regular check-ups of the colon as well as 
of the liver. Since the patient was a bit claustrophobic she asked whether the latter 
could be done by means of ultrasound, since the lesions had also been detected with 
that technology. The surgeon explained why he preferred an MRI: 
 
Ultrasound is good for diagnosis, but not to check whether the lesions have increased 
in size or not. Besides, an ultrasound is more individual, it depends very much on who 
performs it, because it yields moving images. Not everyone is equally good at that. 
MRI is independent, and can better be compared. 
 
The supposed subjectivity of ultrasound is related to its real-timeness. For images to be 
objective, they need to be intersubjectively comparable. Real-time images only make sense to 
the physician involved in making them: their referent is the examination event rather than a 
body-object. What is striking in the professional assessment of real-time imaging as 
subjective, is its contrast with lay perceptions of real-time images as ’live television’. For 
patients, it may seem that for physicians real-time images are means to see through: windows 
to bodily interiors. However, doctors emphasize their hermeneutic relation to images and 
bodies and consider images as tools to see the body by (cf. Verbeek 2005: 126). 
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 Barry Saunders describes how in the conference room, the (resident) readers of images are often not directly 
familiar with the clinical circumstances of the case on view. When a resident has been involved in the acquisition 
of an image, or in its primary reading, some things are easier to understand. ‘Having been there’ provides the 
reader with a special authority (Saunders forthcoming). 
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The medical body that patients meet during examinations and consultations is very different 
from their body in everyday experience. It is an object of textual and numerical interpretation 
rather than sensory or even visual perception. Differences between professional translations of 
images during the examination and afterwards during the consultation may result in alienating 
experiences. During an endoscopy, for instance, there may have been intensive discussion 
about the supposed abnormality of a polyp between physician and assistant, whereas the 
message of the attending physician a few weeks later may simply be that ‘the examination 
showed that nothing is wrong with your colon”. Either one of the two bodies fits the patient’s 
perception: either he feels that something is wrong or he feels okay. Alienation then, either 
during the examination or after the consultation, results from a mismatch between embodied 
self-perception and objectified knowledge. Not the images alienated the patient from her or 
his body, but their translations. Real-time imaging renders the doctor’s work transparent, 
rather than a patient’s own body. When real-time discussions and ultimate diagnosis match, 
however, a strong identification of the patient with the images may be the result of imaging, 
as I will argue in one of the following subsections. The objectified bodies that physicians refer 
to in their production and reading of images may become part of patients’ own bodies.  
 
 
The transparent body 
 
Links between medical technologies and media-technologies in the contemporary western 
world have resulted in a widespread ideal of a transparent and modifiable human body (Van 
Dijck 2005). Through newspapers, magazines and television shows, people have increasingly 
become used to medical language, doctors’ work and to the icons of modern biomedicine: 
radiological and other medical images of the interior body. With the transfer of medical 
images to the public domain, the interior body has become a “bioscape” for non-professionals 
(Sawchuk 2000: 11). As cultural icons, medical images have become metaphors for particular 
bodily and mental states, such as pregnancy (Mitchell 2001) and depression or schizophrenia 
(Dumit 2004). Metaphors are not merely rhetorical instruments, but powerful epistemological 
devices by which people understand the world (Sontag 1991). The blurring of media images 
and medical images has resulted in a conception of illness situated inside a body, something 
that can be visualized by technological means. Patients implicitly compare media images of 
interior bodies to their own experiences during an examination, as in the following example.  
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After a diverticulitis (infected pouches in the intestinal lining, part of Mr. Breuls’ 
colon has been surgically removed three years ago. He has come for a check-up 
sigmoidoscopy.  
MR The idea of looking inside your own body, how special is that? 
MB Well, they have those instruments these days. Whether you see it on 
television or here directly from yourself… 
MR That doesn’t make much of a difference? Whether it is your own body or that 
of someone else on television? 
MB No. 
MR It does not feel differently? I can imagine, I mean, it is your own body. 
MB No, I do not experience it that way. 
 
For Mr. Breuls the pictures on the monitor refer to a generic body that he recognizes from 
TV, rather than to his own interior. The possibility to identify and locate disease by means of 
medical images has become part of the standard lay perception of medicine and medical 
practice. Paradoxically, real-time images that are relatively hard to reduce to two-dimensional 
inscriptions for doctors and therefore are the weakest in terms of medical evidence, seem 
particularly powerful in disseminating the idea of a transparent body among patients.  
The transparent body is a mix of medical images and media images that constitutes a 
macro-perceptual frame for those involved in real-time medical imaging (cf. Van Dijck 2005: 
12). It is a cultural construct rather than a medical ideal. Earlier I have described how 
professional translations of real-time imaging events do not start from pre-existing bodies and 
visual representations. The production and interpretation of real-time images in practice is a 
contingent, dynamic adjustment process in which bodies and images are enacted as fitting 
entities. That complexity and messiness, however, tends to get lost in media translations of 
medical imaging that enter the examination room with patients and with doctors. The 
possibility to watch the monitor suggests to patients that there is something to be seen and 
recognized. 
When I observed ultrasound, fluoroscopy or endoscopy examinations I repeatedly 
heard “Hey, will I be on TV?” or words of similar import, when patients saw the monitor in 
the examination room. In chapter 4, I mentioned the perceptual similarity between real-time 
medical imaging and live television. Like live television broadcasts, real-time images have an 
aura of immediacy that other (still and stored) medical images lack. They appear immediately 
upon their acquisition, suggesting direct access to the body ‘as it really is’. Endoscopic color 
images have a particularly realistic appearance. The 3D moist structures, red and blue vessels, 
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yellow excrements, and flowing blood after a biopsy, are more reminiscent of the body’s 
fleshiness than the fussy black and white shapes of an ultrasound. Real-time imaging suggests 
an embodiment relation between doctor and imaging device. 
 From available analyses of real-time medical imaging in the field of visual culture, one 
might conclude that most lay experiences with medical images are through “biotourism” 
(Sawchuk 2000: 11) enabled by the mediatization and cultural dissemination of medical 
images. However, most of the patients I observed had seen medical images before during or 
after a medical examination of their own body or that of a relative or friend. The 
popularization of medical images is not merely the result of the mediatization of such images 
(Van Dijck 2005), but more and more of the growing number of people who have come 
acquainted to such images of their own body. What appears as transparent in magazines and 
on television is ‘the generic body’ rather than a particular patient’s own body. The media 
image of the transparent body, however, informs patients’ bodies lying on examination tables 
to undergo real-time medical imaging, in a way that is comparable to the mirror’s role in 
conditioning that experience, described in the previous chapter. 
 
 
The spectacular body  
 
Technologies that on the one hand have been described as contributing to a transparent body 
actually do the opposite for many patients. Real-time medical images transform body parts 
that hitherto were absent from experience into unknown shapes and structures that seem 
unrelated to the ways in which patients perceive their bodies sensorily and introceptively. In 
the following fragment, the patient presents himself as a mere spectator of the body appearing 
on the screen.  
Mr. Habets asked his general practitioner to be referred for an endoscopic check-up 
of his sigmoid. Although his complaints are likely to be due to hemorrhoids, he wants 
to make sure it is nothing more serious. After the examination I asked him how he 
experienced the examination. 
MH It is the second time I see this. I had never imagined an intestine would look 
like this. I just thought it was a small tube with a large balloon on top. But if 
you see, through such a camera… then one sees how ingenious it all is. You 
cannot really understand how it all works. 
MR  Did it look very different from what you expected? 
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MH Yes, it is all very special. When you think that you eat, you digest that, the 
waste products are processed and then flow through that tube, through the 
anus, it comes out. That is ingenious, a mystery really, isn’t it? 
MR  It is special indeed. 
MH  The body is a mystery. The ticking of the heart, the seeing of the eyes, that’s 
so unbelievable! 
The endoscopic pictures indeed showed Mr. Habets that apart from the hemorrhoids, his 
sigmoid looked perfectly normal. But more than that, the images provided him with a view 
into the ingenious machinery of his body. The pictures filled him with awe for the visual 
spectacle, so different from his body as he knew it.  
 Images can be more powerful than sensory perceptions. The Dutch anthropologist 
Anne-Mei The has described how radiologists use X-rays to convince patients who do not feel 
very ill they have lung cancer and need to start chemotherapy. During and after the therapy, 
when patients feel much more ill than at the time of diagnosis, X-rays are used to show 
patients that their condition is improving. Although their cancer is incurable, the images make 
patients optimistic about their chances for recovery. They rather trust the images to tell them 
how ill they are than the sensory perceptions of their own bodies (The et al. 2003). This 
example illustrates how the image that I call the spectacular body can be reinforced by the 
image of the medical body communicated by doctors. This mechanism can also be observed 
in the case of Mr. Habets whom I just quoted. He also said that 
 
MH First, looking inside your own body is very interesting. It is like science-fiction. But I 
think it is also psychologically important. Maybe not for everyone, but for me it is. That 
you can see any time what is wrong with you. That the diagnosis they come up with, 
that you have seen it… that they cannot make it up. That you can convince yourself. 
That is, if they give a full explanation of what they are doing, and they did that. 
 
For Mr. Habets it is through the doctor’s explanation that the images come to refer to his own 
body. Despite the double objectivation of his body – through his own spectatorship and 
through the doctor’s reading – Mr. Habets is attached to what he sees on the monitor. The 
real-timeness of the images, however, is not a main constituent of attachment here. It is rather 
through his emotional responses that the images affect Mr. Habets as a person.  
Technologies and practices of modern medicine have been described by philosophers 
and social scientists as a source of alienation and a move away from patients’ own 
experiences and embodied selves (e.g. Duden 1993b, Leder 1990, Toombs 1992). In their 
analyses of medical practices, sociologists and anthropologists have frequently opposed 
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objective medical conditions that “can be directly read from the body or discovered through 
laboratory tests” (Baszanger 1998: 145) to experiences of pain and illness that are private, 
personal and only indirectly accessible through patients’ narratives. Diagnostic technologies 
are then opposed to subjective expressions of experience, either explicitly in terms of 
alienation, or implicitly in terms of knowledge versus experience. Rather than about 
oppositions, however, my story has been about diverging and converging trajectories. The 
chains of translation described in the first section of this chapter involve different actors and 
produce different bodies as referents from real-time imaging, yet they all include the stage of 
simultaneous presence of body and image in real-time.  
 
 
Introspections: images of one’s own body  
 
For some patients watching real-time medical images is like watching a television show. For 
many, however, the set-up of a real-time imaging event constitutes a direct relation between 
the images on the monitor and their own bodies, as in the case of Mr. Theunissen introduced 
in chapter 2.  
 
Mr. Theunissen has suffered from a chronic bowel infection for almost twenty years. 
He regularly undergoes a colonoscopy to check his condition, especially when he 
experiences pain or other symptoms.  
MR Did you ever see those kind of images, except for those of yourself? On 
television maybe? 
MT Okay, but then it is just an examination you would be watching, not your own.  
MR If you see those images, you know that: this is my body, this is me? 
MT Yes. You feel that, you know? You feel that tube right here in your guts. You 
can feel approximately where they are with that tube. 
 
In chapter 4, I quoted Mr. Theunissen to illustrate the production of the body as 
simultaneously an object of a patient’s visual and of his sensory perception. I argued that the 
simultaneity of seeing and feeling is constitutive for a particular mode of embodied presence 
during a real-time imaging event. I come back to it here, because it shows that the transparent 
media body is not simply transferred to personal experience, but is made part of a complex 
configuration of knowledge-producing and experience-evoking actors.  
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In chapter 4 I quoted Mr. Theunissen saying that he knew the white spots that appeared on the 
monitor to be signs of infection; he said that from what he felt, he could infer what the 
endoscopic images would show. Mr. Theunissen presented himself as an informed spectator, 
an object of visual and sensory perception and an object of medical examination at the same 
time. In his story about the imaging event, the four modes of attachment identified in chapter 
4 are integrated: the professional real-time readings, the simultaneous visual and haptic 
perception of one’s interior, one’s active subjection to the requirements of imaging and also 
the emotions about him being ill that were evoked by each examination, as described in 
chapter 2. The translation of those modes of attachment that were simultaneously present in 
real-time, can only partly be expressed by narrative means. The composite image has become 
part of the body that Mr. Theunissen is. 
Michel Callon and Vololona Rabeharisoa have described how objectivations of the 
bodies of people with muscular dystrophy by means of a mirror, transform the ways in which 
that body is able to perceive and act as a result of the constant going back and forth between 
being a body and having a body:“(i)t is the miracle of the mirror which makes these two 
experiences possible at the same time and makes this essential tension visible” (Callon and 
Rabeharisoa n.d.). The simultaneous real-time presence of a body as an image and as one’s 
own lived body characteristic for real-time medical imaging, similarly translates bodily 
presence into embodied experience.  
 Patients with a chronic condition undergo medical examinations on a regular basis. 
They become acquainted to pictures of their interior body and integrate them in their body 
images. During an interview, Mr. van Norden, who suffers from a chronic bowel infection, 
explained that watching the images is interesting because they show what is behind the 
symptoms so familiar to him: pain, blood and diarrhea. Seeing the images helps him to 
understand what is going on, he said. Similar remarks were made by several other patients.. 
Mr. Coolen, who attends his wife’s endoscopy and has undergone similar examinations 
himself, summarized this experience concisely when he advised his wife to watch the monitor 
during the examination:  
 
The more you see, the more you know, the more you are informed, and the better you can 
cope with it. 
 
Images do not merely represent one’s body: they transform one’s embodied existence. 
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The possibility to watch real-time images on a monitor provides many patients with a sense of 
control in a situation that is characterized by uncertainty and uneasiness. Physicians often 
mention this as an advantage of showing patients real-time pictures. I asked Mr. and Mrs. 
Coolen what they actually got from watching the monitor. 
 
 Mr. C I was much more involved, for sure. 
 M How do you mean? 
 Mr. C It is only positive. It is not abstract, it is concrete, it is just reality. 
Mrs. C You see what is happening to you, what they are doing with you, and that is nice, 
sure. 
 
The possibility for patients to watch the real-time images affords a particular mode of 
synecdoche, meaning that an objectified body part can come to stand for oneself, since one is 
able to relate to it as an actor (cf. Cussins 1998). Whether or not watching the monitor during 
the examination provides patients with meaningful agency over the examination or their own 
bodies, depends on the extent to which patients are provided with the means to read the 
images. Doctors’ guidance through the images gives patients a sense of control over a 
situation generally considered to be beyond their personal command. That situation is not 
limited to the examination, but also includes the experience of being ill or at risk of illness. 
However, the benefits of watching medical images of your own body is doubted by 
some patients, among whom Mr. Hendriks who had an ultrasound because of abdominal pain. 
 
MH In itself it is progress, that hospitals and doctors try to be more open about what is 
going on. But the openness has limits as well: you (a doctor, MR) should tell 
something that someone else (the patient, MR) can understand. But when someone is 
not able to understand what you say, simply because he or she lacks knowledge, well, 
then you (the doctor, MR) are speaking a kind of magical language. That is not useful. 
 
Watching real-time images can reinforce a loss of control in patients when they lack a 
meaningful frame of reference. Patients are then unable to link the represented body to their 
embodied self. The objectivation of one’s body then results in alienation. Some patients do 
not consider that problematic whatsoever. In chapter 4, I described patients who were not at 
all keen on watching the monitor during an examination. Some explained their choice not to 
watch by referring to the doctor’s attitude (“They do not explain anything, so I do not 
understand it anyway”), others were happy to leave the doctor with the responsibility of 
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watching the images. They are only interested in the results. After a colonoscopy under 
sedation, I heard a patient say to the endoscopist that she had not seen anything, but that was 
“okay, because I do not need to know everything”.  
Not all real-time imaging events result in patients’ identification with images. The 
complex nature of image-mediated embodied experience becomes particularly apparent when 
patients’ feelings contradict doctors’ findings. Mr. Geels, who was introduced in chapter 2, 
told me about the fluoroscopic examination of his colon. 
 
MG The doctor pushed me on the belly and then I said: “Ouch, that hurts”. And he said: 
“That pain is there, but we do not see anything”. That is what he said. I said: “Well, I 
do not understand it”. He said: “Yes, it is different for you. There is pain, but we do not 
see anything.” So now I just wait for the final results. 
 
The doctor could not see the cause of the pain that Mr. Geels felt. The examination resulted in 
what has been called disembodiment, or alienation between the body-as-self and the body-as-
object (Young 1997: 4-5). The eventual report of Mr. Geels’ fluoroscopy indeed stated that no 
abnormalities had been found. An earlier colonoscopy resulted in the same conclusion. Mr. 
Geels was convinced something was wrong and considered going to another hospital for a 
second opinion. His case shows that real-time imaging sometimes does not produce the 
expected images of a patient’s own body. However, there is nothing in the nature of the 
technologies or the images that constitutes alienation, and neither is there something essential 
about real-time imaging technologies that produces transparency or identification. Real-time 
imaging can produce synecdoche: images representing a patient’s condition. Alienation, 
caused by contradictory visual and sensory perceptions, is a possible outcome as well.  
 
 
From image to body 
 
During real-time imaging, the referent for live images on the monitor is the imaging event: the 
temporal and spatial configuration of doctor, patient and machine collectively producing 
bodies as objects and subjects of imaging and sensory perception. As soon as the imaging 
event is over, images enter two translation trajectories: a trajectory of professional translation 
into medical findings by doctors and a trajectory of translation into patients’ embodied 
experience articulated in narratives and body images. Those epistemological and 
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phenomenological translations diverge, yet they are connected in the same material imaging 
practices of examination and consultation. A patient’s experienced body is contaminated by 
“the body set up by medical knowledge” (Akrich and Pasveer 2004: 81). In most cases, 
images require an expert’s interpretation to be meaningful to patients. Professional 
translations may add to patients’ knowledge and command of their own bodies.  
Don Ihde’s concept of image-bodies helps to describe categories of referents for real-
time imaging events emerging in physicians’ and patients’ translations (Ihde 2002). It is only 
in patients’ and professionals’ translations that real-time images obtain a stable, yet composite 
referent: an image-body. The image-body is the object of embodied experience. 
Transformations of image-bodies by real-time medical imaging include the connection of 
image-body to here-body. What happens to image-bodies in professional and patients’ 
translations affects one’s own acting, perceiving body as well.  
 ‘Image-body’ describes the connection as well as the separation between one’s body 
as an object of perception and oneself as a perceiving subject. It is your own body as you can 
see it yourself. That visual perception is mediated by mental images from the media or 
previous experiences, by the technology used to produce real-time images, by professional 
translations and by the physical sensation triggered by imaging. Both professionals’ and 
patients’ translations of those visual perceptions into knowledge and embodied experience are 
informed by patients’ simultaneous embodied presence as object, actor, and spectator during a 
real-time imaging event. Those translations include the ‘subjective’ professional reading of 
ephemeral real-time images, the implicit or explicit comparisons of clinical images to media 
images and the connections between what patients see and what they feel. 
 Patients’ experiences of their body during and after real-time imaging are situated 
along a continuum stretching from complete disembodiment to full identification of the 
images with one’s embodied self. In chapter 2, I claimed that existing anthropological and 
sociological frames separate disease from illness, object from subject, body from person and 
knowledge from experience. A focus on productions of embodied presence, as advocated in 
chapter 4, shows the irrelevance of common dualisms in practice. Disease and illness, object 
and subject, body and person, knowledge and experience are co-produced during a real-time 
imaging event. After the event, physicians and patients objectify the images and the bodies 
that are produced as their referents. What is objectified however, is not a pre-existing physical 
entity represented by moving pictures, but an image-body that is present as an image and a 
perceiving body at the same time. The translation of presence into embodied experience 
implies transformations of subjectivity. 
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Despite their simultaneous presence during an imaging event, image and body do not 
coincide. The difference, or ‘écart’,
75
 between perceiving and perceived body in a real-time 
imaging event does not necessarily result in an experience of alienation, however. Some 
patients include real-time images – i.e. the translations of real-time imaging events – in their 
body images. Even for me as a mere observer, having watched the images of patients’ 
intestines affected how I perceived my own body. Eating ice-cream shortly after I had 
observed several duodenoscopies,
76
 I imagined in endoscopic pictures the position of the cold 
substance I felt moving down my intestines. Whether permanently or not, real-time imaging 
may affect how patients perceive their own bodies afterwards. Physical sensations can bridge 
the space between image and own body. Thus technological representations of interior bodies 
can provide patients with an unusual “visual experience of the self” that brings along “the 
advent of a new mode of relatedness to self” (Merleau-Ponty 1962 in Weiss 1999: 37).  
Real-time imaging technologies mediate embodied experience, which includes the 
production of medical reference and patients’ agency. That is, images are actively involved in 
the construction of bodies as subjects and objects of perception and experience. I use the term 
‘mediation’ in the way of Latour, to describe how real-time imaging transforms how bodies 
are present to people as well as how people live and act as bodies (Verbeek 2005: 147-8; 
Latour 1999a). In other theoretical frames and in every-day language, however, the concept of 
mediation tends to describe the hermeneutic dimension of experience rather than the 
perceptual, material dimension of existence and agency (cf. Latour 2002: 250). Therefore, I 
prefer another expression coined by Latour to describe the work of real-time imaging in the 
formation of embodied experience: that of a body learning to be affected. 
 
When you enter into contact with hospitals, your ‘rich subjective personality’ is not reduced to a mere 
package of objective meat: on the contrary, you are now learning to be affected by masses of agencies 
hitherto unknown not only to you, but also to doctors, nurses, administration, biologists, researchers 
who add to your poor inarticulate body complete sets of new instruments (….) No subjectivity, no 
introspection, no native feeling can be any match for the fabulous proliferation of affects and effects 
that a body learns when being processed by a hospital (…). 
(Latour 2004: 227, italics MR). 
 
                                                 
75 Cf. chapter 4, p. 96. 
76 Endoscopic examinations of the oesophagus. I watched several of those examinations in the initial stage of my 
fieldwork. Since patients are not able to watch the monitor during a duodenoscopy, however, I excluded the 
examination from my eventual sample. 
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In the translations of real-time imaging events by patients and physicians described in the 
present chapter, patients learn to be affected by the particular presence produced during an 
examination. Real-time imaging technologies trigger a series of translations of bodies and 
images into image-bodies, which function as objects of patients’ embodied experience. Rather 
than being the material basis for the formation of an embodied identity, one’s body is “an 
interface that becomes more and more describable as it learns to be affected by more and 
more elements” (Latour 2004: 206). The imaging devices, monitors, pictures, numbers, 
gestures, spoken words, reports, cultural images and sensory perceptions involved in a real-
time imaging event are examples of such elements. Embodied experience is enacted in real-
time imaging practice. It is a not a meaning, belief or interpretation, but a proposition. Latour 
uses this concept, coined by the philosopher Isabelle Stengers, as an alternative to the notion 
of statement, which stands for the representationalist idea of “statements referring to matters 
of fact through the fragile bridge of correspondence” (Latour 2004: 212). As I argued before, 
statements about embodiment are not able to provide access to embodied experience. 
Regarding the body as a proposition articulated in a real-time imaging event, however, 
presents embodiment as a material becoming rather than an interpreted state of being.  
 The notion of embodiment as a proposition, as ‘learning to be affected’, denies any 
distinction between an ‘inside’ self and an ‘outside’ body. It allows for an account of techno-
visually mediated embodiment as ‘subjective body-fashioning’.
77
 Patients are capable of 
being a self and acting as oneself through the multiplication of their connections with 
‘outside’ elements. In Latour’s words: “you need to subscribe to a lot of subjectifiers to 
become a subject” (Latour 2005: 216). Real-time images are neither outside representations 
that suppress embodied experience nor are they immediate self-evident views inside oneself. 
The enactment of image-bodies in patients’ and professionals’ translations of real-time 
imaging events is a process in which patients actively learn to be bodies.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 This expression refers to the idea of ‘objective self-fashioning’ used by Joe Dumit to describe “how we take 
facts about ourselves – (about our bodies, minds, capacities, traits, states, limitations, propensities, and so on) – 
that we have read, heard, or otherwise encountered in the world and incorporate them into our lives” (Dumit 
2004: 164). Whereas Dumit’s concept attends to “the categories of the person built into facts” (Dumit 2004: 
164), subjective body-fashioning refers to the ways in which objectivations of one’s body transform embodied 
self-experience. 
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Illness in practice 
 
Nearing the end of my analysis, I narrow the focus: from the ways in which bodies learn to be 
affected in real-time imaging practices to the more specific experiences of illness and health 
that my research question addresses. In the present and preceding chapters I have 
substantiated the claim that “technologies fundamentally shape people’s experience of 
disease” (Verbeek 2006: 366). Real-time imaging mediates how for patients, their own bodies 
are present as sick or healthy. What makes their interference with illness experience 
fundamental, however, is that such hermeneutical mediations are intertwined with 
transformations of patients’ active and material existence as healthy or ill. 
The set-up of a real-time imaging event suggests that illness can be made visible. 
Examinations are often standard starting points in a diagnostic trajectory – when illness is 
suspected, one of the first things to do is have a look at the body’s interior. Implicitly or 
explicitly inviting patients to watch the examination, doctors and monitors articulate the 
assumption that illness is visible. Spectators of real-time medical images, however, even 
when they are experienced or trained, do not see ‘health’ or ‘illness’. They see shapes, colors, 
movements, codes and numbers. Physicians as well as patients engage in the active 
production of diagnostic information, body images and sensory perceptions as referents for 
the apparent visual clues. The translation of such referents into narratives is a material-
discursive process, like the preparations described in chapter 3. Moreover, the mediating 
power of real-time images, described in chapter 4, transcends the borders of the examination 
room. 
Illness is not something a body has or something a person is, nor is it what a body is or 
what a person has. Illness is a proposition rather than either a physical condition or a complex 
of meanings (Latour 2004: 212 ff.). It circulates as a potential referent of real-time images 
along the chains of reference performed before, during and after imaging events by patients, 
physicians, imaging devices, pictures, body parts and many other actors. Without 
technological interference, the interior body that possibly harbors illness is largely absent 
from a patient’s conscious experience (Leder 1990).
78
 The imaged body parts are hidden in 
one’s interior and generally recede from sensory perception.  
In chapter 2, I introduced Drew Leder’s concept of dys-appearance, describing illness 
as a mode of bodily absence. I have argued, however, that illness is a particular articulation of 
                                                 
78 The idea that health is ‘the silence of organs’ has also been articulated by George Canguilhem (cf. Mol 2006: 
44). 
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a body’s presence. How that presence has been produced is therefore constitutive for how 
illness is experienced. Real-time imaging technologies enable the production of a 
characteristic co-presence of image and body. Experiences of illness or health are enacted in 
translations of that co-presence into more or less stable referent-bodies. Real-time imaging 
technologies interfere in the space between a lived body and its representations. Whether real-
time imaging contributes to an alienating experience of embodiment and illness or evokes 
patients’ identification with particular image-bodies hinges on the (in)compatibility of 
physicians’ and patients’ translations in practice. Rather than reflecting a body’s condition or 
estranging bodies from selves, real-time images are means of articulation through which 
bodies learn to be affected. The diffuse and contradictory experiences of patients taking part 
in real-time imaging events require a concept of illness that acknowledges and addresses the 
hermeneutic as well as the material and existential layers of embodiment.
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6 Inside out: endographic conclusions 
 
 
 
 
Real-time medical images exist only for a moment, yet it has taken me an entire book to 
describe their role in how people experience their bodies and their illnesses. Real-time 
medical imaging deserves that ample attention because of its special status in the visual 
opening of human bodies. It allows patients an unprecedented direct visual access to the 
inside of their bodies through pictures claiming to represent their interior. The possibility to 
watch images of their interior complicates patients’ experience of their bodies. In a clinical 
setting, that experience often includes illness. Real-time imaging transforms the matter of 
patients’ bodies (the bodies that patients perceive), their meaning (how patients perceive their 
bodies) and their agency (how patients act as bodies). Therefore, real-time medical imaging 
requires a reconceptualization of social-scientific notions of embodiment and illness. 
 As an ethnographer entering the worlds of radiology and endoscopy, I entered the 
bodies of patients. I looked with patients at pictures of their interiors. As an endographer, I 
traced how real-time images affect bodies as they are watched and watching, known and 
knowing, experienced and experiencing. Characteristic for real-time imaging is the constant 
going back and forth between image and body and between inside and outside. Visualizations 
neither replace other perceptions nor do they reduce a body to images: bodies and images are 
both actors as well as results of imaging. 
 
 
The circulation of illness 
 
Real-time medical imaging presents the human interior simultaneously as both object and 
subject of perception, knowledge and experience. Understood as a process, embodiment 
presents an alternative to the dualist idea of being and having a body. In the clinical practices 
I have described, real-time medical imaging devices and the pictures they produce are part of 
embodiment processes. I have focused on illness as a specific mode of embodiment. In social-
scientific discourse, illness is an object of subjective experience (“I am ill’) that is usually 
contrasted to disease, which is the object of professional medical knowledge production (“I 
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have a disease’). The social-scientific notion of illness is an interpretative, hermeneutic 
concept to describe expressions of experience that are mostly narrative. Alternatively, I have 
analyzed illness as a mode of embodied experience circulating in clinical practices of real-
time imaging. 
 Bruno Latour has introduced the concept of circulating reference as an alternative for 
a representationalist epistemology. Correspondences between the world and representations of 
phenomena in the world, result from scientific work rather than from a confrontation between 
a knowing subject and a given research object (Latour 1999a). I have analyzed clinical 
practices of real-time medical imaging along those lines. Since the objects of medical 
examinations are patients’ bodies, I have included both patients’ and physicians’ referential 
work in my descriptions of real-time imaging practices. Whereas for medical professionals 
real-time imaging is an instrument of knowledge production, for patients it constitutes 
particular perceptions and experiences of their own bodies. The referent of that knowledge, 
perception and experience is (the presence or absence of) illness. I have presented circulating 
reference both as an alternative epistemology and as an alternative phenomenology. In 
various stages of translation in real-time imaging, the phenomenon ‘illness’ obtains multiple 
hermeneutic, material and existential layers. 
  
 
Myths on trial 
 
I studied chains of translations that link the bodies of patients to biomedical diagnoses leading 
to and following from real-time imaging events. Rather than describing medical images as 
representations, I have analyzed productions of bodies’ presence. The co-presence of a 
patient’s physical body and ephemeral pictures of parts of its interior affords modes of 
embodiment that put common analytical concepts and distinctions to the test. Among them is 
the idea of a transparent body. Although its immediacy suggests direct access to physical 
realities, I showed that real-time imaging involves translation rather than representation. Real-
time imaging transforms as well as transfers the bodies of patients. Rather than being reduced 
to images, bodies are multiplied to include images. They become more rather than less (cf. 
Latour 2004: 227), opaque rather than transparent.  
My analysis has also challenged the idea – which is somehow the opposite of the 
notion of a transparent body – of the essential strangeness of representations of one’s body 
that result from a ‘clinical gaze’ (Foucault 1973). Real-time medical images do not represent 
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bodies’ interiors, but actively contribute to patients’ bodies’ presence. My story about real-
time imaging has been neither a salvational nor an apocalyptic narrative about the blessings or 
dangers of medical technology. Whoever takes a close look at medical practices may notice 
that such grand oppositions are not very helpful in understanding what medicine and 
technology do with people and what people do with medicine and technology. Through a 
detailed analysis of how bodies and images are attached, I have differentiated the popular 
myth of the transparent body as well as that of alienating medicalization, and therewith also 
the contrast between those myths. 
 
 
The chain of real-time imaging 
 
The figure on the next page summarizes the structure of my argument. It presents 
technological, professional and patients’ acts and transformations in real-time imaging as a 
chain of translations. As in Latour’s graphical representation of circulating reference (1999a: 
70), the different stages of translation are not directly linked, avoiding the suggestion of 
univocal relations. Every stage is at once ‘matter’ for the next translation as well as ‘form’ for 
the previous one. Each oval represents the dominant mode of embodiment in the various 
stages of a body’s imaging trajectory, as discussed in the previous chapters. Although chapter 
2 has primarily been written as an introduction to my main theoretical frames and concepts, 
the case studies included gave an impression of patients’ entrance into a medical trajectory. It 
presented a first stage of transformation: from embodied illness experience to becoming an 
object of medical examination. Chapter 3 described the second stage: the collective 
embodiment of patients as object and instruments of real-time medical imaging – and by the 
same token their collective embodiment as spectators and sensing subjects. The translation of 
those prepared bodies into imaging event-networks was the focus of chapter 4. Finally, in 
chapter 5 I described how professionals’ and patients’ translations of those events become 
part of patients’ embodied experience. In the stages of preparation, imaging and translation 
elaborated upon in chapters 3, 4 and 5, the configuration of a collective-body object, the 
production of a body’s visual presence, and the phrasing of reports and diagnoses transform 
patients’ embodied experience. The co-enactment of embodied objectivity and embodied 
subjectivity is represented by dotted lines in the following figure. 
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The referent circulating along this chain is illness: the potential object of medical 
examination and of embodied experience. An ‘objective’ finding or a subjective perception 
are possible effects of tuning activity and passivity, seeing and feeling. At each step in the 
chain, the referent of medical imaging is materially and discursively adjusted to the 
requirements of a particular configuration of actors.  
 
 
Interdisciplinary reflections 
 
The enactment of illness experience in real-time medical imaging is too complex to be 
described in terms of a single disciplinary framework. Using concepts and ideas from 
medical anthropology, the sociology of health and illness, actor-network theory and (post- ) 
phenomenology, I have developed what could best be described as either an elaboration of 
post-phenomenology or of actor-network theory. Whereas in chapter 3, I presented an ANT-
style analysis of patients’ bodies as actor-networks, in chapter 5 I attempted to describe 
experience as more than discursive subject position or narrative expression. Chapter 4 
connected the two approaches in an analysis of real-time productions of bodily presence, 
building on the prepared actor-networks and providing the basis for subsequent translations 
into embodied experience.  
The leading idea that a body, being subject as well as object of experience, does not 
precede technological imaging but results from it, comes closest to the work of post-
phenomenologists. Postphenomenology, however, has not explicitly addressed medical 
technologies so far. Moreover, I argue that an analysis of technologically mediated 
embodiment requires an elaborate description of the formation of the networks in which 
Ill body Prepared 
body 
Real-time 
imaging 
Report 
Diagnosis
/ therapy 
Embodied 
experience Schematic representation of the stages of bodily translations 
in the chain of real-time medical imaging 
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bodies emerge. Although people in their expressions of experience often distinguish between 
their body as a subject and as an object, in real-time imaging events the networks in which 
bodies emerge into presence cannot be empirically separated from people’s relations with 
their own bodies. I take the complementarity of phenomenology and ANT a step further than 
post-phenomenologists have done. Whereas they acknowledge and demonstrate the value of 
ANT in the analysis of constructions of objectivity in a chain of translations, post-
phenomenologists zoom in on relations between a maximum of three actors (person - 
technology - world, cf. Verbeek 2005a: 170). A post-phenomenological analysis of real-time 
imaging would leave the black boxes of “the humans who experience and act, the mediating 
artifacts, and the humans and things that are experienced or dealt with” (Verbeek 2005a: 166) 
closed, since it “is interested not so much in the networks of relations on the basis of which 
the mediating artifacts and the experiencing humans are present, but in the nature of the 
relations that human beings – thanks to these artifacts – can have to other humans and things” 
(ibid.). I have argued, however, that a meaningful understanding of technologically mediated 
human experience requires insight in the ways images and people are presented. Actor-
network theory allows for descriptions of the conditions of experience and the forms it can 
take, moving beyond experience as a subject-object relation. It thus enables an analysis of 
how relations of mutual engagement become articulated in terms of subjects, object, 
representation, experience, perception or knowledge in the first place.  
Whereas phenomenologists choose to put any presuppositions about what the world – 
or a body – is between brackets,
79
 I have argued that phenomena can only be described in a 
context that is wider than the relation between directly involved entities. An analysis of 
technological mediations of embodied experiences of illness cannot be limited to patients, 
images and bodies, but includes the processes in which those actors have emerged. Bodies 
learn to see, feel, act and experience – in short: to be affected – in hybrid networks.  
 
 
Distributed embodiment 
 
My theoretical work contributes most significantly to medical anthropology, where the 
disease/illness dualism since its introduction has rarely been an issue, and where medical 
technology has been under-researched. Building on the strengths and responding to the 
                                                 
79 This is called ‘phenomenological reduction’. 
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weaknesses of the frames and vocabularies presented in chapter 2, I have developed a notion 
of illness as a mode of distributed embodiment.
80
 Throughout this book I have described 
various distributions of embodiment in real-time imaging practices: among lived bodies, 
patients, intestines, kidneys, physicians, technological devices, pictures, reports, words and 
numbers. The idea of distributed embodiment summarizes my critique of hermeneutic 
distortions in medical anthropology, of the subject/object dualism in (post-) phenomenology 
and of ANT’s bias towards agency. ‘Distributed embodiment’ is the result of ‘bodies learning 
to be affected’ (Latour 2004), a notion that I have introduced in chapter 5 to replace that of a 
‘mediated body’. The latter notion risks to be understood in terms of representation rather 
than agency, existence, and presence. Examples can be found in analyses of embodiment in 
the field of cultural studies and critical theory, where both embodiment and technology are 
put into discourse and treated as tropes or representations (cf. Hayles in Hansen 2000: vi).
81
 
The following table indicates the differences between the interpretative notion common in 
medical anthropology and cultural studies and the constructivist notion of embodiment 
developed throughout this book. Characteristic for the latter are three elements first 
introduced in the conceptual matrix in chapter 2: the collective nature of embodiment, the 
material and agential notion of experience and the constitutive role of technology. The notion 
of illness that follows from this frame is one of illness as an embodied experience not situated 
inside a body or a person, but enacted in collective processes of distributed embodiment.  
 
Interpretative frame Constructivist frame 
Embodied identity Embodied experience 
Illness as meaning Illness as experience 
Representations Productions and translations of presence 
Discourse Practice 
Perception Agency 
Images Imaging 
Body-image Image-body 
Narrative Matter 
Body as condition  Body as proposition 
                                                 
80 Cf. the concept of ‘distributed cognition’ (Hutchins 1995).  
81 The focus on issues of representation seems to be at odds with the usually explicit political agenda of scholarly 
work in this field, often referred to as ‘identity politics’. Most analyses of embodiment seem to be detached from 
the material realities of the issues of study (e.g. transsexuality or disability) in the research field. Embodied 
identity is studied through the analysis of representations, meanings and concepts. A paradox arises: how to 
transform people’s ways of doing by means of alternative vocabularies and ways of thinking that are merely 
discursive? A more radical realistic rethinking of embodiment seems more fruitful for political action. A 
constructivist notion of embodiment addresses the reality of living with an illness or a body, which a 
representationalist notion does not. Descriptions of the assemblage of the body in material-discursive practices 
(e.g. Barad 1998, Latour 2004) poses more of a challenge to existing frames and practices than conceiving the 
material body as a discursive construction (cf. Butler 1993). 
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Real-time imaging, articulate patients and the logic of care 
 
Real-time imaging may not transform life and personhood as radically as for example  
genetics or neuroscience do, yet it does induce new modes of subjectivation. Moreover, real-
time medical imaging embodies, articulates and problematizes certain central developments 
and values in contemporary biomedicine and western culture, like the mediatization of 
medicine (cf. van Dijck 2005) and the rise of an ‘articulate patient’. Besides instrumental 
objectives like enhancing patients’ compliance to examination requirements and subsequent 
therapy or further examinations, real-time imaging may fit normative objectives. Stimulating 
the rise of ‘articulate patients’ who are well-informed and make autonomous choices, can be 
such an objective. The possibility to share the professional clinical gaze by watching a 
monitor during an examination seemingly allows patients to be conscious, autonomous, 
critical consumers of medical services, like those described in the following quote about 
genetic medicine: 
 
(…) to make human individuality the object of positive knowledge is not ‘subjection’ in the sense of 
domination and the suppression of freedom – it is the creation of subjects that is at stake here. Today, as 
at the birth of clinical medicine, the sick person bears their illness with their corporeality and vitality – it 
is the body itself that has become ill. But this somaticization of illness did not, in fact, mandate the 
eternal passivity of the patient. In fact, clinical medicine, increasingly of the last half of the twentieth 
century, constituted the patient as an ‘active’ subject – one who must play their part in the game of cure. 
(Novas and Rose 2000: 489, italics in original) 
 
The possibility to watch real-time images of one’s own interior, however, does not 
automatically result in patients’ active spectatorship and involvement. Let’s for example take 
patients who choose not to watch the images. Although both patients and physicians usually 
present and understand it as an individual decision, the ‘choice’ whether or not to watch the 
monitor during an examination seems a logical outcome of the confrontation between many 
patients’ image of omniscient techno-medicine and the lack of information of the possibilities 
and impossibility of real-time imaging before and during examinations. On the one hand, 
media images of medical technology have convinced many patients that their bodies are 
transparent for doctors. On the other hand, to understand anything themselves, many patients 
feel dependent on individual physicians’ willingness and ability to explain what they see and 
do. Physicians who do not inform patients about the objectives, procedure and context of an 
examination may enforce the idea of a body that is transparent and manageable only for 
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professionals. In short, real-time imaging is not merely involved in the performance of 
patients’ bodies, but also in the performance of the clinic in which those bodies come to 
existence (cf. Berg and Bowker 1997: 514). Real-time imaging practices articulate an 
apparatus of appearance that includes hierarchies between medical specialties and imaging 
technologies and patients’ alleged and actual roles in medical knowledge production. 
For patients who do choose to watch the monitor, any claim about the contribution of 
real-time imaging to their empowerment would be empty, since patients are not explicitly 
being prepared for their role as spectators in real-time medical imaging events. The notion of 
distributed embodiment, which enables a more precise analysis of how patients are affected 
by real-time medical imaging than existing concepts, displays patients’ possibly contradictory 
perceptions and experiences. For patients, what they see, hear and feel during a real-time 
imaging trajectory can be confusing and sometimes inconsistent. This book has presented a 
way to deal with that inconsistency primarily on a conceptual, theoretical level. All theoretical 
explorations, however, have been informed by empirical observations of real-time imaging 
practices. Its results could be relevant for those practices as well. The complexity of illness 
experience in real-time medical imaging may also require practical adjustments.  
Physicians are usually unaware of the contradictory perceptions and experiences that 
real-time imaging may evoke in patients. When doctors present medical images to patients as 
representations of a state of affairs, they themselves produce a view of images as pictures 
depicting an objective reality, rather than communicating the interpreted nature of images. 
The whole set-up of clinical practice invites an appraisal of imaging and images as pictures 
rather than events, as reflections rather than interpretations, as reality rather than data to be 
interpreted. In their professional translations of real-time imaging events, physicians produce 
a more or less univocal referent. Patients, on the other hand, are confused by the multiple 
referents of real-time imaging they encounter, and in particular by contradictions between 
their own perceptions and physicians’ translations. Indeed, many patients do feel reassured 
and secured by the possibility to ‘see for themselves’, underscoring its psychological 
importance. However, they are not adequately prepared for real-time imaging.  
Patients are actively involved in material and cognitive preparations for their part as 
research object and instrument in a real-time imaging event, but they are not prepared for their 
role as spectator. By referring to their role as spectators, I do not mean to allude to possible 
emotional reactions, but to the lack of information about what real-time imaging technologies 
actually do with or in a body, about how they produce pictures and about the role of those 
pictures in diagnoses and therapies. Written and verbal information for patients before and 
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during real-time imaging could contain more explicit reference to such aspects. Such 
information could raise patients’ consciousness about the reductive implications of 
preparations and procedures and the limited diagnostic possibilities of imaging. It would 
require physicians to be more aware of patients’ possibly contradictory experiences of real-
time imaging.  
However, arguing for more and better information to teach patients on how to watch 
and understand real-time medical images is too simple, as it remains doubtful how such 
information would actually boost patients’ say in medical decision-making and contribute to 
their role as critical consumers and citizens. Notwithstanding the potentially profound impact 
of real-time imaging on patients’ experiences of their bodies and their illnesses and on their 
interaction with medical professionals, the possibility to watch medical images of one’s body 
on a monitor in itself does not change anything about the ways in which medical knowledge is 
produced. Whereas it has been claimed that medical images can contribute to dialogue and 
joint knowledge production between patients and medical professionals (cf. Shohat 1998), my 
analysis of clinical practices of real-time medical imaging mitigates such claims. Although 
real-time images may even seem a more likely basis for dialogue than other medical images, 
because of the real-time co-presence of doctor, patient and images, agential distributions of 
seeing and reading does not guarantee a meaningful dialogue whatsoever, as I have illustrated 
in chapter 4.
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 A mere call for better information in order for patients to become 
knowledgeable spectators and participants in medical knowledge production, holds an 
implicit recognition of biomedical knowledge production and action over that of patients. 
It is highly questionable whether the empowerment of patients should be an objective 
of real-time medical imaging anyway, even if patients’ own knowledge and experiences 
would be taken seriously. The underlying premise of pleas in favor of the transformation of 
patients into critical consumers and citizens, is that patients are in need of (more) power, 
autonomy or articulation. It is a questionable premise fitting a discourse of choice that is 
dominant in contemporary health care as well as in many other areas of society these days. 
The logic of choice fits best to an interpretative frame as presented in the first column of the 
above table, with its emphasis on information, representation and the body as condition. 
Annemarie Mol has pleaded for the rehabilitation of a logic that fits the constructivist frame 
indicated in the second column, focusing on agency, practice and the body as a proposition. It 
is a logic of care that has implicitly informed the organization of western health care until 
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patients’ agency lies in feeling and experiencing. 
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recently (Mol 2006). These days, however, ‘good care’ as the primary goal of health care is 
more and more surpassed by ‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom of choice’. Mol argues that for 
patients in need of good care, it might not be very beneficial to be addressed to as a consumer 
or a citizen. Patients seem to be better off when they are taken seriously as patients, i.e. as 
people sharing agency rather than having autonomy. From that point of view, many real-time 
imaging practices I observed were rather successful.  
I have described how patients were actively involved in collective productions, 
readings and translations of medical imaging events that affected their bodies and their lives. 
Physicians were the ones who took responsibilities and made decisions, yet patients were 
actors in regaining or maintaining health or in coping with illness. Flyers and physicians 
should make explicit that the practice of real-time imaging is a collective effort with limited 
possibilities. Real-time images neither present reality nor yield objective knowledge, but 
produce clues that can be meaningful when combined with clues from other sources. 
 
 
Reflexivity in practice 
 
I hope that my analysis of embodied illness experience in real-time imaging practices has 
contributed to insights into 
 
locating the objective referent, understanding the epistemic and psychic seductiveness of visual 
representations, understanding the epistemological and ontological consequences of making particular 
virtual cuts, and getting practitioners (and patients, MR) to reflect on the ways in which (...) technology 
has the potential to both erase and initiate the patient’s subjectivity. (Barad 1998: 119) 
 
Rather than in straightforward applications or recommendations, the practical value of 
empirical-philosophical analysis lies in the promotion of reflexive medical practices.
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Promoting reflexivity is a way to improve the quality of care (cf. Mesman 2002: 149-60; Pols 
2004: 155). My book provides input for contemplations and discussions between and among 
health care professionals, managers, patients and policy makers by evoking questions like: 
What do we do when we make and watch images? What do images do in the production of 
knowledge and experience? Which unintended consequences may real-time imaging have? 
                                                 
83 Although the previous contemplations may seem a mere footnote to my analysis, I judge it necessary to 
prevent any easy translation of it into such straightforward recommendations and applications. As tempting as it 
may be, it risks violating the sophistication of this kind of work. 
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How can watching contribute to coping with uncertainty, with a sick body, with a disturbed 
life? How do we live with technological images of our bodies?  
An academic thesis, however, is not an appropriate medium to reach physicians and 
patients and promote reflexive practices. Doing fieldwork is. My presence during 
examinations and in the departments made some patients and physicians ‘see things 
differently’. Translations of my analysis for biomedical and patient’s audiences in 
professional and popular publications and presentations will be necessary to extend that 
effect. In this book I have only been able to explore empirical and theoretical grounds for a 
notion of illness experience as a result of distributed embodiment. It enables a description of 
how medicine and medical technologies add to lived embodiment rather than reduce it or 
subtract from it. That opens up possibilities for critical yet constructive interventions in 
medical practices as well as in cultural practices where images of medicine and technology 
are produced. In the scope of this project I have not engaged in such theoretically informed 
and informative contributions to the quality of care and decision making in the actual 
practices of study, yet I hope that my findings and conclusions will find their way into 
interventionist projects by myself and others.  
As I said before, at present there seems to be little reason to instigate reflection and 
discussion about real-time medical imaging. Neither patients nor physicians report substantial 
problems in clinical imaging practices. Of course, things go wrong sometimes, but they 
usually do not cost lives or cause tremendous suffering. Most real-time imaging events seem 
to exemplify ‘good care’ where agency is shared between patients’ bodies, technical devices 
and medical professionals. Moreover, real-time medical imaging technologies – being 
relatively cheap – are not an obvious target for critiques on capital-intensive health care. The 
uncontested status of real-time imaging is what made it a good case for my (theoretical) 
objective to analyze techno-visual mediations of embodied illness experience. However, real-
time imaging is not the best case for testing any claims on the ramifications of my conceptual 
work for the improvement of care practices.  
My analysis may contribute to the assessment of other imaging practices that pose 
more ground for debate among physicians, patients or other social groups. The raising 
popularity of ‘complete body scans’, offering people the possibility to check their condition 
through various imaging and other medical technologies, is an example. Commercial 
providers of such tests build on people’s trust in the objectivity of medical technologies. 
Policy makers and insurance companies have doubts about prohibiting or reimbursing the 
examinations, and patients consider the costs and benefits. My analysis of medical imaging 
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might provide a broader perspective for their considerations. Another fascinating case is 
presented by recent neuropsychological research about the possibilities for real-time 
functional MRI representations of brain activity in neurofeedback therapy (Weiskopf et al. 
2004). Those and other projects and initiatives attract a lot of media attention and contribute 
to the distribution of the myth of a transparent body and accompanying high expectations. 
Therefore they are prone to criticisms presenting such developments as yet another instance 
of undesirable medical alienation. Those are just as one-sided as the transparency trope. The 
analysis in this book has provided ingredients for a more nuanced and sensible debate about 
how (real-time) visual presentations affect human bodies on the outside and on the inside. 
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Visions of illness. An endography of real-time medical imaging 
English summary 
 
 
 
 
Medical imaging is among the core activities of contemporary biomedicine. Ultrasound, 
fluoroscopy and endoscopy are real-time medical imaging technologies that produce ‘live’ 
moving pictures of the interior body, which patients can often watch during the examination. 
In this book I show how real-time medical imaging affects patients’ embodied experience of 
illness.  
Medical images are not mere representations of given bodies: they mediate human 
embodiment. Real-time images refer to a body that is the object of medical examination by a 
physician as well as the object and the subject of a patient’s sensory perception and agency. 
In this book I describe the transformations of bodies and images in various stages of imaging 
grounded on fieldwork in the radiology and endoscopy departments of a Dutch hospital. For 
that purpose I develop a method and vocabulary to describe the production of embodied 
experiences of health and illness related to such transformations.  
 
In chapter 2 I explore conceptual frames from the interpretative anthropology and sociology 
of health and medicine, from phenomenology, from actor-network theory (ANT), and from 
post-phenomenology in order to collect building blocks for that vocabulary. I introduce three 
core concepts successively: illness from medical anthropology, embodied experience from 
phenomenology, and technological mediation from actor-network theory and post-
phenomenology. 
Medical anthropologists use the word illness to denote an individual’s psychosocial 
and cultural experience of being ill. They use the notion of disease to refer to physical or 
mental abnormalities in the structure and functions of a body, which are the object of 
professional medicine. Technology is commonly associated with the medical professional 
outlook on (ill-) health and therefore said to widen the gap between disease and illness. The 
distinction between disease as the object of medical knowledge and illness as the object of lay 
experience is at odds with a study of illness as an embodied experience, for it implies a 
distinction between the patient as person (being ill) and as body (having a disease). A 
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narrative bias, a poor vocabulary to describe material aspects of experience, an instrumental 
definition of technology, and the illness/disease dualism are the main shortcomings of an 
interpretative social-scientific framework for my purpose. 
 For phenomenologists embodiment is the basis of all human experience. Medical 
imaging technologies transform body images, which are part of embodied experience. 
Phenomenologists have been concerned with the mediating role of technologies, yet rarely 
been with illness experience. Furthermore phenomenologists consider to be alienating. Since I 
want to know how technology shapes one’s own body, I look for a more appropriate way to 
describe the work of technology. 
Actor-network theory (ANT) describes the identities of humans and things not as 
given, but as resulting from the relations between entities. Technologies mediate such 
relations. With ANT’s material semiotics I can describe technological mediations of agency, 
yet I cannot address how experience is technologically mediated. Post-phenomenology 
attempts to join the best of two worlds: a phenomenological concept of experience, and 
ANT’s notion of technological mediation. The strength of post-phenomenology is its analysis 
of the role of instruments in making the world present for people and in making people act in 
the world. My question about technological mediation of bodies as subject and as object of 
(illness) experience, addresses the relations between what Don Ihde has called ‘here-bodies’ 
and ‘image-bodies’. The ‘here-body’ is the embodied subject that moves, perceives, senses 
and is-in-the- world. The ‘image-body’ is one’s own body as an object of perception. An 
analysis of either here-bodies or image-bodies misses a crucial quality of embodied 
experience: that experience is enacted in relations between bodies and images.  
 
The subsequent chapters present empirical material showing that the specific impact of real-
time medical imaging on illness experience cannot properly be described in terms of either 
medical anthropology, (post-)phenomenology or actor-network theory. That specificity 
especially relates to the visual nature of the technology’s impact, the fact that it concerns 
interior bodies, and the possibility for patients to watch images in real-time, simultaneously 
with the physician who produces them. The third, fourth and fifth chapters present the 
subsequent stages of preparation of bodies for imaging, image production, and translation of 
images in knowledge and experience. 
 
In chapter 3 I describe what happens to patients’ bodies before they end up on an examination 
table and on a monitor. Imaging devices, physicians, protocols and patients themselves 
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prepare bodies for real-time imaging. Before there has been any physical contact between a 
patient and an imaging device, particular features and abilities are already inscribed in the 
design, set-up and intended use of the technology, ranging from interior dynamics and 
exterior transparency to the possibility of active cooperation and spectatorship. Besides the 
imaging device, the training of physicians, technicians and nurses also affects the body that 
will be the object of real-time imaging. The coordination of visual and haptic skills is 
characteristic for the performance of ultrasound, fluoroscopy and endoscopy. Prospective 
imaging professionals also learn that real-time imaging produces data that are relatively 
subjective. Whereas X-ray, CT and MRI produces objective images, which are readable to 
everyone who has acquired a professional radiological gaze, real-time images are only 
meaningful to those who actually made them. 
Many examinations require patients to adjust their diet and purge their intestines. By 
meeting such requirements, patients actively prepare their body for its role as object of 
medical examination. The information on the procedure, which they receive from physicians 
and by other means, also contributes to the formation of a frame for patients’ experiences of 
real-time imaging. Most information flyers, for example, present one’s body as an object of 
examination that one can actively prepare, yet do not mention that patients will be able to 
watch the monitor during a real-time imaging event. Forms and protocols present a fourth 
category of actors involved in the preparation of patients’ bodies. I discuss the role of request 
forms especially, which categorize, reduce and multiply bodies into various objects, 
coordinating the actions by machines, physicians and patients. The request for a particular 
kind of examination and the specific phrasing of the question aims at translating what is felt in 
something that can be seen.  
The preparations for real-time imaging by imaging devices, professionals, patients and 
forms constitute a process of collective embodiment, setting the conditions for the eventual 
visual transformation of patients’ bodies into potential seats of disease/illness. From the very 
moment that a patient’s experiencing and experienced body meets the objectified medical 
image of a body, the development of both modes of embodiment is interconnected and the 
medical anthropological distinction between illness and disease looses its descriptive and 
analytical power.  
 
In chapter 4 I describe the translation of bodies into real-time images as a particular 
production of bodily presence. In two respects real-time imaging is distinct from other ways 
of medical representation: the evanescence of the images and the presence of the patient 
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during image-production. The patients watches how real-time images appear instantly upon 
acquisition. Real-time imaging leaves few material traces, like stored stills or prints.  
 To describe the impact of those particular characteristics on embodied experience, I 
distinguish four modes of attachment, viz. ways in which patients’ bodies and real-time 
images are connected during real-time imaging events. The first mode of attachment 
originates from the real-time interpretation of images by medical professionals. Bodies and 
images are connected in physician’s real-time readings and in the communication between 
doctor and patient during an examination. To physicians, images are semi-finished data sets 
that need to be molded into information, which can be represented visually, numerically or 
otherwise. Doctors’ real-time readings inform patients’ perceptions of their own body. The 
second mode of attachment comes into being in the confrontation of patients’ visual 
perceptions of images of their own interior body and their simultaneous sensory perceptions 
of the imaging procedure. It enables patients to identify with the images on the monitor. The 
third mode of attachment results from the simultaneous passivity and activity of patients’ 
bodies in a network of distributed agency. The fourth mode of attachment consists in patients’ 
emotional responses to the images and the imaging procedure, like fear or embarrassment. 
During a real-time imaging event, the patient’s body is simultaneously present in 
various qualities: as the body that a patient sees, feels and acts with; as the body on the 
examination table that is the object of medical examination; and as the body on the monitor 
represented by black and white shapes or colorful structures. The real-time connection 
between the different bodily qualities constitutes a production of presence that resembles the 
experience of watching oneself in a mirror. Seeing oneself acting at the very moment of the 
act, establishes a direct link between the body in the mirror (or on the monitor) and the person 
in front of it (or on the examination table). 
The analysis of modes of attachment and productions of presence shows once more 
how real-time imaging technologies mediate bodies as ‘objects’ as well as ‘subjects’ of 
perception, knowledge and experience – of disease and of illness. Analyzing material-
discursive attachments of patients’ bodies and real-time images actually offers a way out of 
such dualisms, which hamper an understanding of embodied experience as technologically 
mediated. 
 
In chapter 5 I describe how images, perceptions, interpretations and experiences during a 
real-time imaging event, are translated into diagnoses by professionals and into narratives and 
body images by patients. Both translation trajectories contribute to the enactment of embodied 
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experiences of health and illness. Once the real-time imaging event is over, the co-presence of 
the patient’s body on the examination table and on the monitor is disconnected. An 
examination does not simply produce a diagnosis, nor a coherent narrative or body image. 
Real-time images only require durable referents in two connected trajectories of translation: 
the professional translation of imaging results into examination reports that contribute to a 
medical diagnosis; and the primarily narrative translation into a patient’s experience. Imaging 
reports seem very different from patients’ narratives. However, they both bear the marks of 
their joint origin in the preparations of a body for real-time imaging – described in chapter 3 – 
and in the production of real-time images, described in chapter 4. In the examination report 
imaging physicians compose findings from a variety of visual and other data. Those findings 
are further translated into diagnoses by attending physicians. Patients witness two moments in 
the professional translation trajectory: the translation during the examination by the image 
producer, and afterwards the translation by their attending physician who communicates the 
results of the examination. Patients include and transform professional practices of reading 
and writing in their translations of imaging events in their primarily narrative expressions of 
experience.  
The comparison of real-time images to mirrors in chapter 4 suggested a constitutive 
role for real-time imaging in the formation of body images. However, technological mediation 
concerns not so much body images but image-bodies, which are the objects of experience 
constitutive for patients’ illness experiences. Four related categories of image-bodies emerge 
as referents for real-time imaging events: the medical body that is constructed in professional 
translations; the transparent body that results from converging medical and media 
technologies; the spectacular body that the patient has watched on the monitor; and the lived 
body that is actively engaged in the imaging event as an embodied spectator and actor.  
The confrontations of image-bodies may result in disembodiment and alienated 
experiences of illness, but may also evoke patients’ identification with images. The 
construction of a particular experience hinges on the (in)compatibility of physicians’ and 
patients’ translations. I suggest substituting the notion of ‘mediation’ by that of Bruno 
Latour’s idea of ‘a body learning to be affected’, since it better covers the overtone of 
interconnected interferences of real-time imaging with embodied experience. Real-time 
images are not reflections of a body’s condition nor do they automatically alienating bodies 
from selves: through real-time imaging bodies learn to be affected. 
 The diffuse and contradictory experiences of patients taking part in real-time imaging 
events require a concept of illness that acknowledges and addresses the hermeneutic as well 
 156 
as the material and existential layers of embodiment. In the final phase of image translation as 
it is described in chapter 5, illness cannot be detached from the medical-professional 
objectivation of a body’s condition any more than in the phases of preparation and image-
production described in the previous chapters. When described separately, the production of 
medical knowledge can easily be contrasted to the enactment of illness: one trajectory 
involves the translation of images into written language, via a reading of images as data-sets; 
in the other trajectory, images are rather read as pictures and translated into narrative 
expressions of experience. Presenting the trajectories as being in line rather than parallel, 
however, affords a description of the co-production of medical knowledge and embodied 
experience that results in illness as a technologically mediated, layered experience. An 
analysis of techno-visual mediation of embodied experience needs an extended (ANT) 
description of the networks from which bodies emerge and in which illness circulates as the 
referent of medical images, as well as a detailed (phenomenological) account of how people 
experience those bodies.  
 
My analysis of real-time medical imaging challenges two tropes commonly presented as 
opposites in the public domain and in social-scientific discourse: the trope of the transparent 
body, accessed and controlled by medical technology; and the trope of alienation, with 
medical technologies objectifying and disembodying patients. Many physicians consider 
patients’ high expectations of medical imaging to be unrealistic. I argue that medical practices 
themselves produce such high expectations. Physicians contribute to the cultural discourse of 
a ‘transparent body’ when they present real-time imaging in terms of ‘seeing what is wrong’. 
The apparently self-evident possibility for patients to watch the monitor is part of that 
practice. Not meeting patients’ expectations may indeed result in alienation. To prevent that, 
physicians need to understand that watching images of their own interior is a complicated 
experience for many patients. 
My analysis can prevent misunderstandings by making that complicated experience 
understandable. A different notion of real-time medical imaging by patients as well as by 
physicians can prevent misunderstandings and affords an understanding of that complicated 
experience. In various stages of translation, the body and the phenomenon ‘illness’ obtain 
multiple hermeneutic, material and existential layers. Rather than the outcome of processes of 
signification, or an inherent quality of bodies, illness is a matter of practice. Using medical 
anthropology to describe expressions of experience, actor-network theory to trace conditions 
for experience, and post-phenomenology to understand technological mediation of 
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experience, I have developed a vocabulary for the analysis of that multilayered experience as 
a mode of distributed embodiment. 
For patients, what they see, hear and feel during a real-time imaging trajectory is often 
confusing and inconsistent. A notion like ‘distributed embodiment’ presents a conceptual 
strategy to deal with that inconsistence. It could be translated into practice by including in 
hospital flyers information to prepare patients for what the monitor will show during an 
examination. However, that implies that patients’ knowledge should be better aligned with 
biomedical knowledge, in order to obtain a kind of ‘informed agency’. That is not what I 
intend to suggest. Enhancing patients’ power and autonomy by providing information fits a 
discourse of choice that is dominant these days in contemporary health care as well as in 
many other areas of society. A constructivist approach as I have presented, however, rather 
fits a logic of care. Patients benefit from being taken serious as patients, i.e. as people sharing 
agency rather than having autonomy. What flyers and physicians should do is make explicit 
that real-time imaging is a collective effort with limited possibilities, not presenting reality or 
yielding objective knowledge, but producing clues that can result in a diagnosis when 
combined with clues from other sources. That requires reflexive medical practices, to which I 
hope to contribute with this book. 
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Ziektebeelden. Een endografie van real-time medische visualisering 
Nederlandse samenvatting 
 
 
 
 
Medische beeldvorming behoort tot de kernactiviteiten van de moderne geneeskunde. 
Echoscopie, doorlichting en endoscopie zijn real-time beeldvormingstechnieken die ‘live’ 
bewegende beelden van de binnenkant van het eigen lichaam produceren, die patiënten vaak 
tijdens het onderzoek zelf kunnen zien. In dit boek laat ik zien hoe real-time medische 
beeldvorming de belichaamde ziekte-ervaring van patiënten maakt en raakt.  
Medische beelden zijn niet zomaar afbeeldingen van gegeven lichamen: ze bemiddelen 
de menselijke lichamelijkheid. Bij real-time beeldvorming is een lichaam zowel het object 
van medisch onderzoek door een arts, als ook het object en het subject van de zintuiglijke 
waarneming en het handelingsvermogen van een patiënt zelf. In dit boek beschrijf ik de 
transformaties van lichamen en van beelden in verschillende stadia van beeldvorming op basis 
van veldwerk op de radiologie- en endoscopieafdelingen van een Nederlands ziekenhuis. 
Daartoe ontwikkel ik een methode en een vocabulaire om de productie van belichaamde 
ervaringen van gezondheid en ziekte te beschrijven, die met zulke transformaties samenhangt.  
 
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik conceptuele kaders uit de interpretatieve medische antropologie 
en sociologie, uit de fenomenologie, uit actor-netwerk theorie (ANT) en uit de 
postfenomenologie om bouwstenen te verzamelen voor dat vocabulaire. Achtereenvolgens 
introduceer ik drie kernconcepten: ziekte (illness) uit de medische antropologie, belichaamde 
ervaring uit de fenomenologie en technologische mediatie uit actor-netwerk theorie en 
postfenomenologie. 
 Medisch antropologen gebruiken het begrip ‘illness’ om de individuele psychosociale 
en culturele ervaring van ziek-zijn aan te duiden. Hun begrip ‘disease’ verwijst naar 
lichamelijke of geestelijke afwijkingen in de structuur en functies van een lichaam, die het 
object zijn van professioneel medische handelen. Technologie wordt gewoonlijk geassocieerd 
met de medisch-professionele kijk op het lichaam. Medische technologie zou daarom de kloof 
tussen ‘disease’ en ‘illness’ vergroten. Het onderscheid tussen ‘disease’ als object van 
medische kennis en ‘illness’ als object van lekenervaring staat op gespannen voet met een 
onderzoek naar ziekte als lichamelijke ervaring, omdat het de patiënt als persoon (die ziek is) 
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onderscheidt van het lichaam (dat een ziekte heeft). Een voorkeur voor narratieve analyse, een 
gebrekkig vocabulaire om materiële aspecten van ervaring te beschrijven, een instrumentele 
definitie van technologie en het ‘illness/disease’ dualisme zijn de grootste tekortkomingen 
van een interpretatief sociaal-wetenschappelijk kader voor mijn onderzoek. 
 Voor fenomenologen is lichamelijkheid de basis van alle menselijke ervaring. 
Medische beeldvormingstechnieken transformeren lichaamsbeelden, die deel uitmaken van 
belichaamde ervaring. Fenomenologen hebben zich wel beziggehouden met de bemiddelende 
rol van technologieën, maar zelden met ziekte-ervaring. Verder beschouwt de fenomenologie 
technologie vooral als vervreemdend. Omdat ik juist geïnteresseerd ben in de vraag hoe 
technologie het eigen lichaam vormgeeft, ga ik op zoek naar een geschiktere manier om het 
werk van technologie te beschrijven. 
 Actor-netwerk theorie (ANT) beschrijft de identiteiten van mensen en dingen niet als 
gegeven, maar als het resultaat van relaties tussen entiteiten. Technologieën bemiddelen zulke 
relaties. Met de materiële semiotiek van ANT kan ik wel de technologische bemiddeling van 
handelen beschrijven, maar niet begrijpen hoe ervaring technologisch bemiddeld wordt. 
Postfenomenologie probeert het beste van twee werelden te verenigen: een fenomenologisch 
begrip van ervaring en ANT’s idee van technologische bemiddeling. De kracht van de 
postfenomenologie ligt in haar analyse van de rol van instrumenten in het aanwezig maken 
van de wereld voor mensen en in het handelen van mensen in de wereld. Mijn vraag over de 
technologische bemiddeling van lichamen als subject en object van (ziekte-)ervaring, gaat 
over de relatie tussen wat Don Ihde ‘hier-lichamen’ (here-bodies) en ‘beeld-lichamen’ 
(image-bodies) heeft genoemd. Het ‘hier-lichaam’ is het belichaamde subject dat beweegt, 
waarneemt, voelt en in-de-wereld-is. Het ‘beeld-lichaam’ is het eigen lichaam als object van 
waarneming. Een analyse van enkel hier-lichamen of alleen beeld-lichamen mist een cruciaal 
aspect van belichaamde ervaring: dat ervaring tot stand komt in relaties tussen lichamen en 
beelden.  
 
De volgende hoofdstukken gebruiken empirisch materiaal om te laten zien dat de bijzondere 
invloed van real-time medische beeldvorming op ziekte-ervaring niet goed beschreven kan 
worden vanuit louter medisch-antropologisch, (post-)fenomenologisch of actor-netwerk 
perspectief. Het bijzondere betreft het visuele karakter van de impact van de technologie, het 
feit dat het om afbeeldingen van de binnenkant van lichamen gaat, en de mogelijkheid voor 
patiënten om de beelden in real-time te zien, tegelijk met de arts die ze maakt. Het derde, 
vierde en vijfde hoofdstuk beschrijven de opeenvolgende stadia van de voorbereiding van 
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lichamen op beeldvorming, het maken van de beelden en het vertalen van beelden in kennis 
en ervaring.  
 
In hoofdstuk 3 beschrijf ik wat er gebeurt met patiëntlichamen voordat ze terechtkomen op 
een onderzoekstafel en op een monitor. Beeldvormingsinstrumenten, artsen, protocollen en 
patiënten zelf bereiden een lichaam voor op real-time beeldvorming. Voordat er enig 
lichamelijk contact heeft plaatsgevonden tussen patiënt en beeldvormingsinstrument, worden 
bepaalde kenmerken en mogelijkheden al in het lichaam ingeprent door het ontwerp, de 
opstelling en het beoogde gebruik van het apparaat. Het betreft onder meer de dynamiek van 
de binnenkant van het lichaam, de transparantie van de buitenkant en de rol van de patiënt als 
actieve toeschouwer. Naast het beeldvormingsinstrument is ook de opleiding van artsen, 
laboranten en verpleegkundigen van invloed op het lichaam dat het object wordt van real-time 
beeldvorming. De coördinatie van visuele en haptische vaardigheden is kenmerkend voor 
echoscopie, doorlichting en endoscopie. Aspirant-beeldmakers leren ook dat real-time 
beeldvorming relatief subjectieve data oplevert. Terwijl röntgen, CT en MRI objectieve 
beelden produceren die leesbaar zijn voor iedereen met een professionele radiologische blik, 
hebben real-time beelden alleen betekenis voor degene die ze zelf maakt of gemaakt heeft.  
 Voor veel onderzoeken is het nodig dat patiënten hun dieet aanpassen en ervoor 
zorgen dat hun darmen leeg zijn of hun blaas juist vol. Door aan zulke vereisten te voldoen, 
bereiden patiënten hun lichaam actief voor op zijn rol als object van medisch onderzoek. Ook 
informatie over de procedure, die patiënten krijgen van hun arts of op andere manieren, draagt 
bij aan de vorming van een kader voor hun ervaringen van real-time beeldvorming. De meeste 
informatiebrochures presenteren bijvoorbeeld het lichaam als een object van onderzoek dat 
men actief kan voorbereiden, maar besteden geen aandacht aan het feit dat patiënten tijdens 
het onderzoek de beelden op een monitor kunnen zien. Formulieren en protocollen vormen 
een vierde categorie actoren die betrokken is bij de voorbereiding van patiëntlichamen. Ik 
bespreek vooral de rol van aanvraagformulieren, die lichamen categoriseren, reduceren en 
vermenigvuldigen in verschillende objecten en het werk van apparaten, artsen en patiënten 
coördineren. De aanvraag voor een bepaald soort onderzoek en de specifieke vraagstelling 
zijn erop gericht iets dat gevoeld wordt te vertalen in iets dat gezien kan worden. 
De voorbereidingen door beeldvormingsinstrumenten, beeldmakers, patiënten en 
formulieren vormen een proces van collectieve belichaming, waarin de voorwaarden worden 
gesteld voor de uiteindelijke visuele transformatie van patiëntlichamen in mogelijke zetels 
van ziekte. Vanaf het moment dat het ervarende en ervaren lichaam van een patiënt wordt 
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geconfronteerd met het geobjectiveerde medische lichaamsbeeld, is de ontwikkeling van 
beide soorten lichamen met elkaar verbonden. Het medisch-antropologische onderscheid 
tussen ‘illness’ en ‘disease’ verliest dan zijn beschrijvende en analytische kracht. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de verplaatsing/vertaling (translation)
84
 van lichamen in real-time 
beelden als een bijzonder soort productie van lichamelijke aanwezigheid/tegenwoordigheid 
(presence).
85
 Op twee belangrijke punten onderscheidt real-time beeldvorming zich van 
andere manieren van medische representatie: de vluchtigheid van de beelden en de 
aanwezigheid van de patiënt bij het maken van de beelden. De patiënt kan real-time beelden 
zien verschijnen op het moment dat ze gemaakt worden. Real-time beeldvorming laat weinig 
tastbare sporen na, zoals opgeslagen of afgedrukte beelden.  
 Om de invloed van deze twee kenmerken op belichaamde ervaring te beschrijven, 
onderscheid ik vier vormen van hechting, oftewel manieren waarop patiëntlichamen en real-
time beelden met elkaar verbonden zijn tijdens een onderzoek. De eerste vorm van hechting 
komt voort uit de real-time interpretatie van beelden door de professionele makers ervan. In 
de real-time lezing van de arts en in communicatie tussen artsen en patiënten tijdens een 
onderzoek worden lichamen en beelden met elkaar verbonden. Voor artsen zijn beelden 
halffabrikaten: datasets die nog tot visuele, numerieke of andersoortige informatie gevormd 
moeten worden. De real-time lezing van artsen informeert hoe patiënten hun eigen lichaam 
waarnemen. De tweede vorm van hechting ontstaat in de confrontatie van de visuele 
waarnemingen die patiënten hebben van het binnenste van hun eigen lichaam met hun 
gelijktijdige zintuiglijke waarnemingen van de beeldvormingsprocedure. Die maakt het 
mogelijk dat patiënten zich identificeren met de beelden op de monitor. De derde vorm van 
hechting komt voort uit de gelijktijdige passiviteit en activiteit van patiëntlichamen in een 
netwerk van gedistribueerd handelingsvermogen. De vierde vorm van hechting wordt 
gevormd door de emotionele reacties van patiënten op de beelden en de 
beeldvormingsprocedure, zoals angst of gêne.  
 Tijdens een beeldvormend onderzoek is het lichaam van een patiënt aanwezig in 
verschillende hoedanigheden: als het lichaam dat een patiënt ziet en voelt en waarmee hij of 
zij handelt; als het lichaam op de onderzoekstafel, dat het object is van medisch onderzoek; en 
als het lichaam op de monitor, dat wordt verbeeld door zwart-witte vormen of kleurrijke 
                                                 
84 Ik gebruik het Engelse begrip ‘translation’ in de betekenis die Bruno Latour eraan geeft: een materiële 
verplaatsing die tegelijk een vertaling inhoudt (cf. Latour 1999: 311).  
85 Ik vertaal het Engelse ‘presence’ als ‘aanwezigheid’ en/of als ‘tegenwoordigheid’, om zowel recht te doen aan 
de temporele als aan de ruimtelijke connotatie van het begrip. 
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structuren. De real-time verbinding tussen de verschillende lichamelijke hoedanigheden vormt 
een productie van aanwezigheid/tegenwoordigheid die overeenkomsten vertoont met de 
ervaring van jezelf in een spiegel zien. Jezelf zien handelen op het moment van de handeling 
brengt een directe relatie tot stand tussen het lichaam in de spiegel (of op de monitor) en de 
persoon ervoor (of op de onderzoekstafel). 
 De analyse van de totstandkoming van hechting en aanwezigheid/tegenwoordigheid 
laat nogmaals zien hoe real-time beeldvormende technologieën lichamen bemiddelen als 
zowel ‘object’ als ook als ‘subject’ van waarneming, kennis en ervaring – van ‘disease’ en 
van ‘illness’. De analyse van materieel-discursieve verbindingen tussen patiëntlichamen en 
real-time beelden biedt juist een alternatief voor zulke dualismen, die een begrip van 
technologisch bemiddelde belichaamde ervaring in de weg staan. 
 
In hoofdstuk 5 beschrijf ik hoe beelden, waarnemingen, interpretaties en ervaringen tijdens 
een onderzoek door artsen worden vertaald in diagnoses en door patiënten in verhalen en 
lichaamsbeelden. Beide vertalingstrajecten dragen bij aan de totstandkoming van belichaamde 
ervaringen van ziekte en gezondheid. Zodra het beeldvormend onderzoek voorbij is, wordt de 
gezamenlijke aanwezigheid van het lichaam van de patiënt op de onderzoekstafel en op de 
monitor, verbroken. Een onderzoek levert niet zonder meer een diagnose op, noch een 
coherent verhaal of lichaamsbeeld. Real-time beelden verkrijgen duurzame referenten in twee 
met elkaar verbonden vertalingstrajecten: de professionele vertaling van 
beeldvormingsresultaten in onderzoeksrapporten die bijdragen aan een medische diagnose; en 
de hoofdzakelijk narratieve vertaling in de ervaring van een patiënt. Onderzoeksrapporten en 
patiëntenverhalen lijken hemelsbreed van elkaar te verschillen. Toch dragen ze allebei de 
sporen van hun gezamenlijke oorsprong, die ligt in het voorbereiden van een lichaam op real-
time beeldvorming – beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 – en in de productie van real-time beelden, 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 4. In het onderzoeksrapport componeren artsen hun bevindingen uit 
een veelheid aan visuele en andere data. Die bevindingen worden vervolgens door 
behandelend artsen in diagnoses vertaald. Patiënten zijn op twee momenten in het 
professionele vertalingstraject getuige: tijdens het onderzoek van de vertaling door de maker 
van het beeld en later tijdens een consult van de vertaling van de onderzoeksresultatan door 
hun behandelend arts. Patiënten nemen professionele lees- en schrijfpraktijken op in hun 
eigen vertalingen en transformeren ze in hun hoofdzakelijke narratieve uitingen van hun 
ervaring.  
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De vergelijking van real-time beelden met spiegels in hoofdstuk 4 suggereerde een 
vormende rol voor real-time beelden bij het ontstaan van lichaamsbeelden. Technologische 
bemiddeling betreft echter niet zozeer lichaamsbeelden, maar beeld-lichamen: het object van 
ervaring dat vormend is voor de ziekte-ervaringen van patiënten. Vier met elkaar verbonden 
soorten beeld-lichamen fungeren als referent voor beeldvormende onderzoeken: het medische 
lichaam dat wordt geconstrueerd in professionele vertalingen; het transparante lichaam dat 
het resultaat is van convergerende medische en mediatechnologieën; het lichaam als 
schouwspel dat de patiënt heeft gezien op de monitor; en het geleefde lichaam dat actief 
betrokken is bij het onderzoek als een belichaamde toeschouwer en actor. 
 De confrontatie van beeld-lichamen kan leiden tot vervreemding van het lichaam, 
maar kan ook stimuleren dat patiënten zich met beelden identificeren. De constructie van een 
bepaalde ervaring hangt af van de (in)compatibiliteit van de vertalingen van artsen en van 
patiënten. Ik stel voor om het idee van ‘mediatie’ te vervangen door Bruno Latour’s concept 
van ‘een lichaam dat leert geraakt te worden’, omdat dat de lading van onderling verbonden 
interventies van real-time beeldvorming in belichaamde ervaring, beter dekt. Real-time 
beelden zijn geen afspiegeling van een lichamelijke toestand, noch vervreemden zij zonder 
meer lichaam van ‘zelf’: door real-time beeldvorming leren lichamen geraakt te worden. 
 De diffuse en tegenstrijdige ervaringen van patiënten die real-time medische 
beeldvorming ondergaan, vereisen een begrip van ziekte dat zowel de hermeneutische als ook 
de materiële en existentiële lagen van lichamelijkheid erkent en recht doet. In de laatste fase 
van de vertaling van beelden, zoals die in hoofdstuk 5 beschreven wordt, kan ziekte-ervaring 
net zomin onderscheiden worden van de medisch-professionele objectivering van een 
lichamelijke toestand als in de eerdere fases van voorbereiding en beeldproductie die in de 
voorgaande hoofdstukken werden beschreven. Als ze los van elkaar worden beschreven, kan 
de productie van medische kennis eenvoudig onderscheiden worden van de totstandkoming 
van ziekte-ervaring: het ene traject betreft de vertaling van beelden in geschreven taal, door 
middels van het lezen van beelden als datasets; in het andere traject worden beelden gelezen 
als plaatjes en vertaald in narratieve uitingen van ervaring. Door de trajecten niet parallel te 
beschrijven, maar in elkaars verlengde, is het echter mogelijk de coproductie van medische 
kennis en belichaamde ervaring te beschrijven, die resulteert in ziekte als een technologisch 
bemiddelde, gelaagde ervaring. Een analyse van technovisuele bemiddeling van belichaamde 
ervaring vraagt om een uitgebreide (ANT) beschrijving van de netwerken waarin lichamen 
ontstaan en ziekte circuleert als de referent van medische beelden, maar ook om een 
gedetailleerde (fenomenologische) weergave van hoe mensen die lichamen ervaren.  
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Mijn analyse van real-time medische beeldvorming ontkracht twee dominante stijlfiguren uit 
het publieke domein en het sociaal-wetenschappelijke vertoog: het beeld van het transparante 
lichaam, toegankelijk gemaakt en gecontroleerd door medische technologie; en het idee van 
medische technologieën die patiënten objectiveren en van hun lichaam vervreemden. Veel 
artsen zeggen dat patiënten onrealistische verwachtingen hebben van medische beeldvorming. 
Ik betoog dat medische praktijken zelf zulke hoge verwachtingen wekken. Artsen dragen bij 
aan het culturele vertoog van een ‘transparant lichaam’ door real-time beeldvorming voor te 
stellen in termen van ‘kijken wat er mis is’. De ogenschijnlijk vanzelfsprekende mogelijkheid 
dat patiënten mee kunnen kijken op de monitor, is onderdeel van die praktijk. Als niet aan de 
verwachtingen van patiënten wordt voldaan, kan vervreemding inderdaad het gevolg zijn. Om 
dat te voorkomen, moeten artsen begrijpen dat het zien van beelden van hun eigen binnenkant 
voor veel patiënten een ingewikkelde ervaring is. 
 Mijn analyse kan misverstanden voorkomen door ervoor te zorgen dat die 
ingewikkelde ervaring begrijpelijk wordt. In een traject van verplaatsing en vertaling 
verkrijgen het lichaam en het fenomeen ‘ziekte’ verschillende hermeneutische, materiële en 
existentiële lagen. Ziekte is niet het resultaat van betekenisgeving, noch een inherente 
eigenschap van een lichaam: ziekte is een praktische zaak. Door medische antropologie te 
gebruiken om uitingen van ervaringen te beschrijven, actor-netwerk theorie om voorwaarden 
voor ervaring te traceren en postfenomenologie om de technologische bemiddeling van 
ervaring te begrijpen, heb ik een vocabulaire ontwikkeld om die gelaagde ervaring te kunnen 
analyseren als een vorm van gedistribueerde lichamelijkheid. 
 Voor patiënten is wat ze zien, horen en voelen tijdens een beeldvormend onderzoek 
vaak verwarrend en inconsistent. Een begrip als ‘gedistribueerde lichamelijkheid’ biedt een 
conceptuele strategie om met die inconsistentie om te gaan. Die strategie zou in de praktijk 
vertaald kunnen worden door in ziekenhuisbrochures informatie op te nemen om patiënten 
voor te bereiden op wat er op de monitor te zien is tijdens een onderzoek. Dat impliceert 
echter dat de kennis van patiënten beter aangepast moet worden aan biomedische kennis, om 
te komen tot een vorm van ‘informed agency’. Dat is niet wat ik wil suggereren. Het 
vergroten van de macht en autonomie van patiënten door informatieverstrekking past in een 
discours van kiezen, dat tegenwoordig niet alleen in de gezondheidszorg dominant is. Een 
constructivistische benadering zoals ik die voorsta, past echter beter bij een discours van 
zorgen. Patiënten hebben er baat bij serieus genomen te worden als patiënten: als mensen die 
het vermogen tot handelen delen, eerder dan als mensen die autonomie hebben. Wat 
brochures en artsen zouden moeten doen, is expliciteren dat real-time medische beeldvorming 
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een gezamenlijke inspanning is met beperkte mogelijkheden, die niet de werkelijkheid 
verbeeldt of objectieve kennis oplevert, maar wel aanwijzingen die in combinatie met andere 
aanwijzingen een diagnose kunnen opleveren. Dat vereist reflexieve medische praktijken, 
waaraan ik met dit boek hoop bij te dragen. 
                                                                                                                       167                                                                                                                                           
Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
 
 
Maud Radstake (1973) studied cultural anthropology at the Catholic University (now 
Radboud University) Nijmegen and at the University of Amsterdam, where she specialized in 
medical anthropology. She wrote her Master’s thesis on home-based for people living with 
HIV/AIDS in Ghana. In 1999 she obtained her MA degree (with honours). After having 
worked as a documentalist at the Metamedica department of the Free University in 
Amsterdam and as a project coordinator for the Nederlands Gesprek Centrum, she started a 
PhD at the Faculty of Arts and Culture of Maastricht University in 2001. She was a member 
of the department of Technology and Society Studies and of the research program Science, 
Society and Technology. Her PhD project was part of the NWO-funded research program The 
Mediated Body. She represented the PhD students in the board of the research school of 
Science, Technology and Modern Culture (WTMC) and in the faculty’s research consultation 
council. She is member of the editorial board of the Graduate Journal of Social Science 
(GJSS). In April 2006 she accepted her current position as staff member Research & Dialogue 
at the Centre for Society and Genomics in Nijmegen.  
 
